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The title "James Joyce and the Revolution of the Word" 
suggests a thesis committed to vagueness and imprecision. It 
may seem to be yet another symptom of that inflation of language 
which penetrates the universities as rapidly as the advertising 
agencies; if one can read slogans advertising "Watneys and the 
Red Revolution", why not a thesis on "James Joyce and the 
Revolution of the Word"? The title aims, however, at precision 
rather than vagueness; it focuses a set of problems that 
confront the reader of Joyce. Each term of the title reflects 
on the other in a dialectical movement which provides the 
impetus for the trajectory of the thesis. For the argument 
of the dissertation is that we can make no attempt to arrive 
at a correct assessment of Joyce's work until we have some 
workable concept of a revolution of the word but such a concept 
can only be elaborated on the basis of a thorough investigation 
of the innovations of Joyce's texts. 
The general reaction of English teachers and researchers 
to mention of academic work on Joyce is, in my experience, a 
sneer at the productions of the "Joyce factory 11 , but the sneer 
is almost always ignorant. There can be no great writer whose 
work is so little read except by those who make his work their 
major preoccupation and this charge is doubly damning if one 
considers, as I do, that he is the major writer in English 
since Shakespeare. If everybody has read A Portrait of the 
Artist as a Young Man, few have read Ulysses with the necessary 
attention and fewer still have done more than open Finnegans 
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Wake. This general ignorance may explain why the magnificent 
achievement of Joyce scholars over the past two decades has not 
generally received the praise it is due outside a professional 
enclave. The work on the manuscripts accomplished by such as 
Thomas Connolly, David Hayman and Fred H. Higginson has not 
merely provided invaluable material for scholars but has also 
produced some of the most startling and valuable texts in the 
English language (Scribbledehobble is perhaps the finest unread 
text of modern English literature). In addition to the work 
on the manuscripts, there has been the production, through 
unremitting labour, of several indispensable aids to the serious 
study of Joyce's texts: Richard Ellmann's biography, James 
Atherton's The Books at the Wake, Clive Hart's Concordance to 
Finnegans Wake and Weldon Thornton's monumental Allusions in 
Ulysses are four of the most striking productions of this 
dedicated Joyce scholarship. 
The sceptic may, however, fall back on a second line of 
attack. If it be admitted that the scholarship accomplished 
has been both serious and necessary, surely the mass of Joyce 
criticism which pours forth from the universities is almost 
uniformly worthless? In reply to this, my contention is that 
it is not some congenital inability that provokes this generally 
admitted failure (and my limited personal experience suggests 
that this failure~ generally admitted amongst Joyce critics) 
but rather that literary criticism itself cannot cope with 
Joyce's texts because Joyce•s texts refuse to reproduce the 
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relation between reader and text on which literary criticism 
is predicated. The literary critic labours under the same 
delusion as Professor Jones. He is unable to decipher the 
letter because he mistakes its very constitution; his error 
is not that he cannot find the right interpretation but that 
he tries to interpret at all. 
Here then is the first problem which the title "James 
Joyce and the Revolution of the Word" attempts to focus. 
Eugene Jolas' original manifesto "The Revolution of the Word" 
published in transition and the notable review "James Joyce and 
the Revolution of the Word" published by F.R. Leavis in Scrutiny 
constitute the opposite poles of literary criticism's relation 
to Joyce. What I attempt to demonstrate is that these 
opposites share certain theoretical premisses and this 
demonstration is accomplished through an investigation of two 
of literary criticism's founding fathers: I.A. Richards and 
Percy Lubbock. 
Central to my account of these disparate figures as well 
as some more recent critics of Joyce is the philosophical 
category of the subject. This category makes a strange 
appearance within a work of literary criticism but I would 
argue that the unexamined use of this category under different 
names is crucial to the very activity of literary criticism. 
Traditionally the function of the category was to provide a 
unity for the field of experience such that it was possible to 
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judge between possibilities within that experience. The 
subject provided both the limit and the unity of experience. 
In constituting its own limits it gave itself a position of 
dominance from which to judge items within the field of 
experience. But in providing this unity and homogeneity to 
experience it also provided something else: it allowed for the 
possibility of a representational theory of language. 
It is only given the essential homogeneity of experience 
and a position from which the elements within it can be judged 
that it is possible to talk of a representational theory of 
language. If experience is heterogenous then there can be no 
simple one to one relation between it and language and even if 
it is homogenous there can be no possibility of a theory of 
representation unless there is postulated a position from 
which word can be aligned against thing. Literary criticism 
depends on a theory of the subject in such a dominant position 
and some theory of representation in order to carry out its 
tasks of interpretation. Interpretation is the search for 
meaning and meaning can be given some full sense within this 
perspective in terms of representations. The aim of interpre-
tation will be to explain particular mechanisms of representation 
and then to judge their success. What remains stable for 
literary criticism is the relation of subject to language 
because this must always remain the same in order for language 
to function at all. 
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Joyce's texts, however, refuse the subject any dominant 
position from which language could be tallied with experience. 
Ulysses and Finnegans Wake are concerned not with representing 
experience through language but with experiencing language 
through a destruction of representation. Instead of constructing 
a meaning, Joyce's texts concern themselves with the position 
of the subject in language. If the literary critic is 
interested in meaning, Joyce 1 s texts are concerned with the 
various positions from which meaning becomes possible. In order 
to grasp the activities of Joyce's texts it becomes necessary 
to understand the construction of the position of the subject 
and what is always buried in that construction. This, then, is 
the second and major part of the thesis, an investigation of 
the changed position offered to the reader in Joyce 1 s texts 
from Dubliners to Ulysses. However, the considerations so far 
advanced prompt one to interrogate the accuracy of the phrase 
"the Revolution of the Word". The voluntaristic tones of 
Jolas' manifesto and the pronoun 'of' combine to suggest that 
this revolution is achieved through the conscious decision to 
expand the possibilities of expression. Insofar as it suggests 
a realm exterior to language from which language can be 
manipulated it falls back into traditional conceptions. If 
revolution there be, it is not a question of one imposed from 
outside as is suggested by the preposition 1 of 1 but rather a 
revolution in the internal relations of language. Thus the 
second part of the investigation is entitled "James Joyce and 
the Revolution in the Word11 • 
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The investigation of the revolution in the word is a 
consideration of the relation of the subject to the discourses 
that he speaks, to the place that is assigned to him by his 
discourses. Joyce's texts disrupt the normal position assigned 
to a reader in a text and thus alter the reader's relation 
to his own discourses. This disruption is not merely a formal 
matter but also determines Joyce 1 s concerns at the level of 
content. This thesis attempts to investigate the way in which 
formal and substantial elements intertwine to produce a text. 
Crucial to this investigation is the use of various 
psycho-analytic concepts and it is necessary to consider briefly 
why these concepts figure in this dissertation and certain 
objections that could be raised against their use. If we are 
concerned with the place of the subject in language then it is 
inevitable that we fall back on psycho-analysis as the only body 
of concepts which have been produced in response to this 
problem. This statement may seem ridiculous in England where 
the post-war vulgarisation of Freud is common cultural currency, 
but,thanks to the work of the French psycho-analyst Jacques 
Lacan,it is now a commonplace in France that Freudian theory is 
centrally interested in language. Lacan's work constitutes an 
unceasing effort to prevent psycho-analysis falling back into 
biologism (a theory of the empirically given body) or 
psychologism (a theory of the mind as authentically experienced) 
and to redirect attention to the primary material of the psycho-
analytic situation - language. 
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Anna O. characterised the treatment that Breuer created 
with her and which Freud was to develop as the "talking cure" 
and, if we think of the techniques of analysis (the attention 
to slips, free associations, jokes, dreams) we can best 
understand them as an elaborate work on language. The silence 
of the analyst and his refusal to enter into normal inter-
subjective relations is what allows the patient in the analytic 
situation to re-orient himself in language - constantly he 
hears his own discourses come back to him across the silence 
of the analyst with a message different from that which he 
first entrusted to them. And it is this re-orientation that 
allows repressed desires to find expression. Further, within 
this perspective, it is possible to understand the unconscious 
not as some bestial nature that has suffered a necessary but 
inadequate censorship but as the inevitable result of the entry 
of the body into language. The primary processes of the 
unconscious can be understood as the processes of signifying. 
Repression can be understood as the fact that for language to 
operate that which gives sense to a word (the paradigmatic and 
syntagmatic chains into which it can enter) cannot be present 
with the word itself in consciousness, but these chains must 
both be in existence and are necessarily absent from 
consciousness. Through the operations of language itself this 
unconscious area can produce another meaning in what we say,and 
the techniques of analysis are designed to bring this meaning 
to our attention. The unconscious is the result of the fact 
that as we speak what we say must always escape us - that as I 
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say one thing, it says something else. 
Generally the use of psycho-analysis within literary 
criticism has remained caught within literary criticism's 
model of the relation of the subject to language (indeed 
Freud's own excursions into literary criticism do not escape 
these strictures). The text is taken as the representation of 
certain psychic conflicts and various elements within the text 
are read off as representing features of the author's psyche. 
With the insights offered to us by Lacan it is possible to 
see that literature cannot function in this way. Psycho-
analytic practice demonstrates that it is not a question of 
the patient's language representing the patient's experience 
but rather that what "I" can experience is dependent on what 
positions ".I" can take up in language. Paranoia is the 
impossibility of saying that 11 I love x" and instead permutating 
that linguistic form until it reads 11 x hates me 11 • Within the 
psycho-analytic perspective it becomes impossible to drive the 
wedge between language and experience on which literary 
criticism depends. Rather it becomes a question of investigating 
the position allowed to the subject in his discourses and a 
set of techniques to re-orientate these positions. It might 
thus seem that we can simply apply psycho-analysis to 
literature as the science of the positions of the speaking 
subject in his discourses with the proviso that with literature 
we are not interested in attempting to change those positions 
in a clinical 11 cure11 • We could attempt to categorise literary 
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texts in terms of the positions they offer. 
Such an application of psycho-analysis, however, while 
avoiding the mistakes of traditional literary criticism lays 
itself open to two other traditional reproaches. Given that 
psycho-analysis has been developed within an analytic situation 
which depends on a certain linguistic order (that of analyst 
and analysand), how can one simply apply its concepts to the 
situation of reading. And, further, how is one going to avoid 
reducing the work of art to a symptom? How can one account for 
the specificity of Hamlet over and above an analysis which 
emphasises it as the production of an unresolved Oedipus 
complex? 
In answer to the first objection, it must be said that 
Freud's insights into language go far beyond the analytic 
situation. Lacan has attempted to emphasise the radical nature 
of Freud's investigation of language through a re-formulation 
of the Cartesian cogito. The cogito provides the justification 
for the subject as the founding source of meanings. "I think 
therefore I am" postulates that the "I" in simple evidence to 
itself provides a moment of pure presence which can found the 
enterprise of judging the world. Lacan states that the Freudian 
cogito runs as follows: 11 I think where I am not and I am 
where I do not think 11 • We can understand this formulation as 
indicating the fundamental misunderstanding that is involved in 
any successful use of language in which the processes of 
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articulation which create a position for the subject are 
ignored from that very position that they have created. The 
unconscious is that effect of language which escapes the 
conscious subject in the distance between the act of signifi-
cation in which the subject passes from signifier to signifier 
and what is signified (in which the subject finds himself in 
place as, for example, the pronoun "I 11 ). Freud's theory thus 
enables us to understand the subject as fundamentally divided 
and this division is a feature of any use of language; the 
analytic situation is merely able to bring this division to the 
analysand's attention in a concentrated and focused way. 
The second objection to the effect that any use of 
psycho-analytic categories on literature will be necessarily 
reductive, loses much of its force when we understand that 
these categories cannot be used on a single work of literature. 
A symptom occurs in relation to a set of social norms and 
expectations that make up a life but a work of literature 
is produced within a specific form. If a work of literature 
is regarded independently of its form then it will inevitably 
be treated as a symptom. But such a treatment will always 
involve, as Freud's own efforts prove, a fall back into 
literary criticism. For the work of art is not a symptom, and 
if it is treated as one then it can only be treated as a 
representation of a symptom. We thus very quickly reach that 
division between representation and thing represented which is 
characteristic of literary criticism. If, therefore, we wish 
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to use psycho-analytic categories it must be in relation to 
formal changes in literature and then we may use its insights 
to see how formal and substantial changes interact. It is for 
this reason that the second part of the thesis is so centrally 
concerned with the relation of Joyce's texts to the traditional 
novel form. In chapter 3 I attempt to demonstrate a different 
organisation at work in George Eliot's texts and in Dubliners 
and to point to certain consequences that these formal 
organisations produce at the level of content. In chapter 4 
I investigate the problem of narrative within the classical 
novel of Balzac and how A Portrait alters the relation of 
narrative to the rest of the text - an alteration which 
involves the nature of the sexuality portrayed within the text. 
This chapter also demonstrates that Flaubert can be understood 
as the precursor of Joyce as long as that relation is understood 
in relation to problems of narration. Chapter 5 is devoted to 
examining in detail some of Joyce's practices in Ulysses and 
Chapter 6 attempts to demonstrate how such formal experiments 
interact with the subject-matter of the text. That Ulysses 
is concerned with the problems of paternity is a commonplace 
and that it is written in experimental fashion is hardly news 
but that the one and the other are part of the same structure 
has never been satisfactorily explained. Traditionally form 
in Ulysses has been understood to be expressive whereas I try 
to show that it is constitutive. 
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But if literature does have its own specificity then it 
is not surprising that in order to account for all the features 
of Joyce's texts it is necessary to develop and alter certain 
psycho-analytic concepts. For it is not a question of using 
Joyce to prove psycho-analysis as though a work of literature 
could prove anything about the concepts developed in the study 
of the unconscious. Nor is there any question of attempting to 
show that because both Freud and Joyce were interested in puns, 
dreams, paternity and the problem of women's desire that there 
is some mysterious affinity between them. Rather psycho-analytic 
theory is drawn on insofar as it can offer an account of Joyce's 
practices which does not reduce them to traditional notions of 
the eccentric artist using strange means to express himself. 
But insofar as psycho-analysis is firstly directed to the problems 
involved in the cure of neurotics, it is not surprising that 
literature may cause it to develop certain concepts particularly 
those related to changes within the symbolic order. Joyce's 
central preoccupation with the feminine takes his texts beyond 
the traditional concepts of psycho-analysis and it is in an 
attempt to give an account of this that I have elaborated the 
concept of perversion and suggested certain further specifications 
within the structure of the Oedipus. 
If the second section of the thesis attempts to show in 
detail the revolution in the word that Joyce's texts operate, 
the very word revolution has connotations which provide the 
third area of inquiry. Part 3, entitled, "The Revolution in 
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the Word and the Revolution", attempts to confront the question 
of the political nature of Joyce's texts. I attempt in this 
section to suggest that Joyce's texts produce a change in the 
relation between reader and text which has profound revolutionary 
implications. However, the political situation in which Joyce 
found himself has the effect of rendering these implications 
largely ineffective. 
So much for the title of the dissertation but the subtitle 
too has its significance. The emphasis on Joyce's writing as a 
practice is to drive home the extent to which Joyce's writing is 
concerned both with the material effects of language and also 
with the possibilities of transformation. The traditional 
Marxist definition of a practice is the transformation of 
material through work. In Joyce's texts we are constantly 
forced to work on our discourses, constantly transf6rming them 
and thus ourselves. The difficulty of reading Joyce's texts 
is a difficulty in our notion of reading. Reading for us is a 
passive consumption, with Joyce it becomes an active transforma-
tion, a constant displacement of ourselves in language. The 
consequences of this practice for literary criticism are 
momentous. As I have indicated above and as I attempt to 
demonstrate at length below,Joyce's texts present literary 
criticism with its own impossibility. Interpretation is no 
longer possible but in its place we can begin the study of the 
various positions offered to the subject within literature, 
the history and mutations of these positions and the relation 
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of these mutations to the political and economic history in 
which they take place. It should be emphasised that this has 
nothing to do with a sociology of literature in which literature 
is taken as a representation of society but rather involves 
the study of the changing relation of the body to language 
through time. Finnegans Wake will be the primer for this new 
discipline. In 1894, in a lecture in Cambridge, Mallarme 
suggested that aesthetics and political economy were the only 
two subjects left to study. Joyce provides one of the central 
texts for that investigation of aesthetics which Mallarme 
foresaw but which has been so long delayed. 
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JAMES JOYCE AND THE REVOLUTION OF THE WORD 
"L'erreur esthetique fondamentale - l'erreur 
economico-politique - consiste 'a croire que 
le langage est un simple instrument representatif. 11 
Philippe Sollers. Logiques. p.105. 
CHAPTER I 
IN THE REALM OF COMMUNICATION: 
I.A. RICHARDS 1 THEORY OF POETRY. 
Although very many of the critical works on Joyce which 
have appeared over the last thirty years have been of great 
value to a reading of Joyce, it is, nonetheless, my contention 
that none of them is finally able to give an appropriate 
explanation of Joyceis texts. And this because they have 
remained caught within a theory of language and the subject 
which has prevented them giving an account of the Joycean text 
in its reality as a practice of writing and as consequent 
subversion of the reading subject. 1 I wish to concentrate at 
first on the negative reaction to Joyce not simply because it 
has been, in general, the Cambridge one but also because it 
facilitates an understanding of the theoretical problems involved 
1. There are of course certain texts like Samuel Beckett's and William Carlos Williams' contributions to Our Examination Round his Factification for Incamination of Work in Progress or Hugh McDiarmidts In memoriam James Joyce: from a vision of world language which are an exception to this rule. But the major 
orthodox studies provide almost no examples of an attention to 
theories of language. Even a book as brilliant as Hugh Kenner's The Stoic Comedians contains its insights within a most 
conventional view of the relation between subject and language: 
see infra ppJ1-72Several articles which have appeared on Joyce in France in recent years have begun to redress the balance but there is as yet no full length book. Hfl~ne Cixousr article 11 La ruse de ltecriture. 11 Poe°tique No.4, 1970, pp 419-432 
contains a very interesting account of "The Sisters" but her 
earlier book L'exil de James Joyce ou ltart de remplacement 
remains caught within a traditional psychologism. For a 
consideration of texts that deal specifically with Joyceis language see Chapter 7, footnote 6. 
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in investigating the more general positive reaction. It is 
this positive reaction which has produced the plethora of 
critical works which confronts anyone who wishes to engage in 
a theoretical understanding of Joycets practice. What I hope 
to show is that this positive reaction is simply a mirror image 
of the negative reaction, reduplicating exactly the misunder-
standing of Joycets texts. 
In his little book on Joyce in the Modern Masters series, 
John Gross ignores any difficulty that Joyce might pose for the 
reader by lumping all those areas of Joyce which will not fit 
into a simple ideology of representation (the majority) 2 into 
the traditional refuge of the critic faced with a text that 
ruins his expectations - the authorts personal quirks. Thus all 
the investigation of language in Joycets texts is labelled "the 
calculated fireworks displays of a virtuoso 113 and Gross instead 
concentrates on the psychological realism; on JoyceYs "fully 
rounded and realistic conception of Bloom. 114 The critical 
strategy that Gross uses in his book is simply a debased version 
of that which can be found in a review written in 1933 by 
F.R. Leavis. This short review covers both all of Work in 
Progress then available and the theoretical justification of it 
2. It is not simply Finnegans Wake but the major part of 
Ulysses which has to be abandoned if traditional notions of 
realism are used to read the books. See infra passim. 
3. John Gross. Joyce p.63. 
4. Ibid., p.60. 
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produced by Jolas and others in the transition circle. Having 
announced his rejection of Work in Progress, Leavis goes on to 
explain that it is not the invention of words that he objects to. 
He contrasts Joyce with Shakespeare in a passage of the utmost 
interest: 
"Mr Joyce's liberties with English are essentially 
unlike Shakespearets. Shakespeare's were not the 
product of a desire to "develop his medium to the 
fullest", but of a pressure of something to be 
conveyed. One insists, it can hardly be insisted 
too much, that a study of a Shakespeare play must 
start with the words; but it was not there that 
Shakespeare - the great Shakespeare - started: the 
words matter because they lead down to what they 
came from. He was in the early wanton period, it is 
true, an amateur of verbal fancies and ingenuities, 
but in the mature plays, and especially in the late 
plays stressed above, it is the burden to be 
delivered, the precise and urgent command from 
within, that determines expression - tyrannically. 
That is Shakespeare's greatness: the complete 
subjection - subjugation - of the medium to the 
uncompromising, complex and delicate need that uses 
it. 11 5 (my emphases) 
What we find here is a fear of words escaping their 
condition of "subjection", a fear which is linked in this passage 
with the threat of "wantonness" - that is a sexuality which is 
no longer tyrannically determined in its "expression11 • 6 What 
must be preserved at all costs is a space between the writer and 
language, between the command and the expression, between the 
need and the mediumo Joyce is rejected insofar as he tends to 
5. F.R. Leavis. "James Joyce and the Revolution of the word. 11 
Scrutiny, Vol.2, No.2, September 1933, p.194. 
6. That 'amateuri and Ywantoni are linked together in this way 
provides an emblematic configuration of the traditional Puritan 
virtues within LeavisV work. 
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collapse these two areas into each other. His use of language 
tends to obscure the undefined "what they came from" - the 
individual consciousness autonomously producing works which 
finish within the social medium of language, but which "start" 
somewhere else. It is the independent judging subject which 
must be preserved at all costs against the pressures of language. 
Language itself threatens to dissolve and deconstitute the 
subject into a set of positions which are always already there 
for individual bodies to take up. That this is the case is made 
clear when Leavis goes on in his article to talk of Ulysses: 
"For in the earlier work, in Ulysses and before, 
the substance is clearly the authorts personal 
history and the pressure immediate personal urgency; 
the historical particularity is explicit enough 
and it is hardly impertinent to say that Ulysses 
is clearly a catharsis. 11
7 
In this passage Ulysses is absolved from the wanton play 
with language as it finds its substance in an area outside 
language, namely the author's personal history. Leavis does, 
however, warn us that: 
"A certain vicious bent manifested itself very 
disturbingly in Ulysses, in the inorganic 
elaborations and pedantries •.• 11 8 (my emphasis) 
In other words Ulysses can be read insofar as it does not 
enter into verbal fancies and ingenuities; but those parts of the 
7. F.R. Leavis. op.cit. p.196. 
8. Ibid. p. 197. 
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text that partake of 'inorganic elaborations' are condemned as 
vicious and must be left unread. John Gross' book lacks all the 
subtlety and seriousness of Leavis 1 analysis. It also lacks the 
strength of conviction to carry through what is entailed by its 
theoretical presuppositions and reject Joycets work. However, 
in its emphasis on the split between judging subject and language, 
between author and text, and in its disregard of the investigations 
of language, which are simply seen as a gratuitous supplement to 
the novel, Gross' book rejoins Leavist article in its refusal to 
read the text of Ulysses as other than the •subjectiont of the 
medium to a personal vision. Everything else is ignored: 
11 And no one is going to get the best out of the 
novel unless he is to some extent ready to accept 
such displays (the experimental techniques) for 
their own sake, for their wit and inventiveness, 
without worrying unduly about how far they can be 
accommodated to traditional fictional procedures. 11 9 
Any interest in the effects of language is ignored or else 
condemned by Leavis as "vicious" or by Gross as without "organic 
unity 11 • 10 
What is in question here is the whole relationship between 
subject and language. The very category of tauthort has, built 
into it, certain notions of the relation of a writing subject to 
his discourses which may well have to be abandoned under the 
9. John Gross op.cit. p.63. 
10. Ibid. p.64. 
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pressure of Joycets texts. What is at work in Leavis' text, 
or in Gross', is the assumption of a radical split between 
language and experience in which language becomes a mere 
instrument with which the burden of experience is delivered. 
In order to see clearly what is theoretically involved in such 
a position it is necessary to turn that other great founding 
father of Cambridge English - I.A. Richards. The necessity of 
examining Richards is that the issues are considerably clearer 
in his work. For Leavis, although admiring certain advances of 
Richards, is not concerned to produce a theory of language nor 
a theory of literature. A theory of language can be left to 
those who are professionally equipped for it - Leavis is 
obsessed with setting up an area of professional inquiry into 
literature and is therefore very keen to demarcate his own from 
other professions. The job of a literary critic is not to produce 
a theory of literature but to bring a certain kind of 11 attention 11 
and "discrimination", a certain 11 eye for significance" to 
particular texts. 11 It is obvious that there are definite 
assumptions about literature and language at work in his 
criticism even in the short passage from the Joyce review already 
quoted. It is, however, easier to place these views in 
perspective and understand their congruence with apparently 
opposed views, if we examine the more explicit work of Richards. 
Richards' crucial texts were produced in the aftermath of the 
11. These last phrases are taken from the review "Criticism and 
Literary History", Scrutiny, Vol.4, no.1, June 1935, p.97. 
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1914-18 war and his concerns and prejudices are very much those 
of the period. The belief that if one could construct a medium 
of perfect communication (The League of Nations) then there would 
be no more disagreements between nations is reproduced in Richards' 
attitude that in language all that prevents perfect communication 
is inadequacies in our symbolisation: 
"Words, whenever they cannot directly ally 
themselves with and support themselves upon 
gestures, are at present a very imperfect means 
of communication. Even for private thinking 
thought is often ready to advance, and only held 
back by the treachery of its natural symbolism; 
and for conversational purposes the latitude 
acquired constantly shows itself to all those who 
make any serious attempt to compare opinions. 11 12 
12. I.A. Richards and C.K. Ogden. The Meaning of Meaning. p.21. 
It could be objected that the weight attributed to The Meaning of 
Meaning in the following pages is unwarranted in an analysis of 
Richards. Immediately one could reply that Richards himself 
refers back to The Meaning of Meaning throughout his work as the 
one place where he fully articulated the theory of meaning which 
he uses in other works, e.g. Interpretation in Teaching. 2nd 
edition, p.viii, or So Much Nearer, p.143. But this answer would 
not be the appropriate one. For my interest in Richards' 
theories is less in working out the exact positions that Richards 
held throughout his life but rather to use certain sections of 
his work to demonstrate the kind of pre-suppositions at work in 
many critics. In fact I think that the theory I outline here is 
the one that runs through the work Richards published in the 
1920s but I would also hold (against the thesis of Jerome P. 
Schiller's I.A. Richardts Theory of Literature) that there is a 
change in Richard's position and that in, for example, The 
Philosophy of Rhetoric {written in 1934) the emphasis on the 
dominance of the subject has given way to an interest in language 
which is less orientated towards communication and more concerned 
with language as articulation. What militates against the later 
Richards ever finally breaking through to a view of language 
nearer to the one presented within this thesis is the security of 
the meta-discourse in which he writes. To examine the reasons 
for this security would involve a history of intellectuals in 
Britain in this century. Suffice for the moment to point out that 
while Richards can question a fixed human nature at the level of 
content e.g. Mencius on the Mind pp.80-81, the nature of his 
discourse is such that he soon gets drowned again in certainty. 
His discourse always leaves Mencius in a subordinate position no 
matter how much he struggles against it. It may well be that it 
was this that drove Richards to place more emphasis on the writing , 
of poetry. 
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This quotation comes from the book that Richards wrote 
with C.K. Ogden The Meaning of Meaning and the book is explicitly 
devoted to practical ends - to reforming our use of language 
through scientific enquiry to ensure perfect communication: 
"The practical importance of a Science of Symbolism 
even in its present undeveloped form needs little 
emphasis. All the more elaborate forms of social 
and intellectual life are affected by changes in our 
attitudes towards and use of words. How words work 
is commonly regarded as a purely theoretical matter, 
of little interest to practical persons. It is true 
that the investigation must at times touch upon 
somewhat abstruse questions, but its disregard by 
practical persons is nevertheless shortsighted. 
The view that language works well enough as it is, 
can only be held by those who use it merely in such 
affairs as could be conducted without it - the 
business of the paper boy or the butcher, for instance, 
where all that needs to be referred to can equally 
well be pointed at. Only those who shut their eyes 
to the hasty re-adaptation to totally new circumstances 
which the human race has during the last century been 
blindly endeavouring to achieve, can pretend there is 
no need to examine critically the most important of 
all the instruments of civilisation. 11 13 
The aim of providing a theory of communication, based on 
scientific advances and of practical use, is achieved by giving 
a causal account of meaning (and, by demonstrating a certain 
kind of continuity, to guarantee language against error for each 
individual language user) and by isolating a symbolic 
(representational) function of language from an emotive function. 
This account of language shows that while mistakes in communi-
13. Ibid. pp.xxviii-xxix. 
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cation are possible, these mistakes are due to emotion - wilful 
misuse of symbols for aims other than communication - or to 
mistaken (because inadequate) symbolisation. These categories 
can be seen to reproduce the categories used to explain the 
causes of the first World War. In the firm belief that the 
horrors of war were avoidable, men sought desperately to explain 
the war in a fashion which would allow simple preventative 
measures to be taken against its reeacurrence. Despite the 
pessimisms of left and right that further destruction was 
inevitable (either because of the contradictions of capitalism 
or because of the destructive elements within human nature), the 
optimistic consensus of liberal democratic opinion was that war 
could be prevented through the setting up of efficient channels 
of communication. The calls for an end to secret diplomacy and 
the setting up of the League of Nations were supported by the 
· assumption that wars were caused either by wicked leaders who 
told lies about their peoples' real demands, or through 
misunderstanding. In both cases it was the means of communi-
cation that were to blame. If the leader's lies were believed 
it was because secret diplomacy kept the lies from his own 
people and, if there was no actual malice, it was simply secret 
diplomacy which led to false conclusions. The League of Nations 
was the political counterpart of a language of perfect communi-
. 14 
cation. 
14. This connection between politics and literary theory becomes 
explicit in Richards I Science and Po.etry, p. 35. 
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Further reflection on the ideology of the League of 
Nations shows that there is another essential counterpart to 
this theory of communicability. For if communication can 
prevent war, it is because, in fact, nations do not have any 
real conflicting interests and it is only misrepresentations 
of those interests through faulty communication that leads one 
to think that there is such a conflict. Thus it is no surprise 
that, together with Richards' theory of perfect communicability, 
there is a psychological theory that conflicting claims and 
appetites can be efficiently organised. This is, of course, 
Richards' thesis - indeed, his whole justification for the 
value of art is that it is a communication of the most efficient 
organisation of appetites that is possible and the artist is 
defined precisely as that figure who is able to organize his 
life the most effectively and communicate that organization. 
Richards• theory of psychology finds its clearest 
expression in chapter 7 of his book The Principles of Literary 
Criticism and in its curious and optimistic formulation we can 
find the other face of the coin of total communication. 
Starting from the position that advances in our knowledge of 
other people and other times have rendered obsolete a judgement 
based on contemporary social norms, Richards advances the 
proposition that anything that satisfies an impulse is valuable. 
Although it is impossible to satisfy all impulses at all times, 
it is, however, possible to organize conflicting impulses in 
such a way that a maximum of satisfaction is gained. To achieve 
11 
this maximum of satisfaction great complexity of organisation is 
required and it is this greater complexity (which permits greater 
satisfaction) that becomes the criterion of value. What is, 
however, the basis of this organisation of impulses? Richards, 
starting from the twin premisses that there are conflicting 
impulses and that we do succeed in satisfying these conflicts, 
concludes that the impulses are organized. But in order to 
organize one has need of an organizer and it is this organizer 
that Richards assumes throughout his discussion of a theory of 
psychology. Admittedly he repudiates any idea that this 
organizer is a conscious agent, when, at the end of the chapter, 
he remarks: 
"To guard against a possible misunderstanding 
it may be added that the organisation and 
systematisation of which I have been speaking 
in this chapter are not primarily an affair of 
conscious planning or arrangement •.• We pass as 
a rule from a chaotic to a better organized 
state by ways which we know nothing about. 11 15 (my emphasis) 
The fact that this comment is an addition (a supplement) 
is of great significance because in general that which is added, 
is added not because it has been forgotten in the course of the 
15. Principles of Literary Criticism. Reprint of the so-called 
"third edition" of 1928. Routledge paper backs. London 1960, 
p.57. My argument that the paragraph quoted constituted a 
"supplement" received independent justification when I failed to 
discover it in the first edition of the Principles. All other 
quotations are from the first edition. 
11 
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argument, but because it has been repressed. Freud in his 
writings on the techniques of analysis is continually at great 
pains to point out the importance of what the patient adds as 
an after-thought to his account of the dream. For this addition 
(this supplement) contains that element which the secondary 
revision could not include in a coherent account of the dream. 
The analyst can, therefore, use this supplement to subvert the 
coherence of the dream and reveal the gaps which the secondary 
revision has attempted to conceal. In the same way we can re-read 
Richards' argument with the aid of this addition so that the gaps 
covered over in the flow of the argument may re-appear. 
For if we now turn back to examine the ways in which the 
impulses are organized we find that without an organiser, there 
can be no organisation. Richards introduces the impulses as 
simple notions without further need of explanation, but in talking 
of the ways in which a primitive new born animal may be gradually 
transformed into a bishop he writes: 
11 At every stage in the astonishing metamorphosis, 
the impulses, desires, and propensities of the 
individual take on a new form, or, it may be, a 
further degree of systematisation. 11 16 
and he continues with: 
II the conduct of life is throughout an attempt 
to organise impulses so that success is obtained 
16. I.A. Richards. Principles of Literary Criticism, p.46. 
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for the greater number or mass of them, for 
the most important and weightiest set. 11 17 
What is interesting about these formulations is that 
these impulses are seen as a certain content for 'forms' or 
tsystematisations 1 or 1 organisation 1 - the impulse is defined 
in terms of the range of actions which will satisfy it and these 
actions are co-ordinated by the subject. But the subject is 
formed by these very impulses. The difficulty is the difficulty 
of finding a moment where the process commences - where there 
is already a form for the content of the impulses. The Richards 
analysis rests on the assumption that there is always, already, 
a form for the impulses. The metaphor used throughout the 
discussion is the metaphor of the subject choosing between 
impulses. This might lead us to imagine that it is the subject 
which provides this prior form. But this solution cannot 
possibly work because, temporally, the judging subject comes 
after the impulses. The difficulty here is the difficulty of 
treating the individual subject outside the social form of 
language - for it is in language that the subject is constituted; 
in those positions that are allowable to the subject within a 
particular set of discourses. And it is within the perspective 
of the positions allowed to the subject in language that we 
can talk of a conflict between impulses. For the conflict is 
generated by those impulses that cannot find their way into 
language; and it is these impulses which cannot speak - that 
17. Ibid. 
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have been deprived a voice - which Freud defined as the unconscious. 
Indeed this perspective (of positions assigned to the subject in 
language as constitutive of the subject) is essential if we are 
to understand the notion of conflict. Within the terms of 
Richards' analysis there is no reason why conflict should occur 
unless there is a form (a subject) within which the impulses make 
their appearance. For there seems no reason why the impulses 
should not simply arrive at temporally separate intervals and 
thereby avoid conflict and the need for organisation. Within the 
Freudian schema, however, the subject is already in conflict 
through the institution of difference implied in the speaking of 
a language. In a language, words find their meaning through a 
series of differential oppositions. The fact that these opposi-
tions cannot be held in the conscious mind at the moment of 
speaking ensures the existence of the unconscious. And it is 
this fact, also, that ensures conflict between a judging subject 
constantly placed in position as the 'I' of the statement and the 
subject of the speech act constantly displacing itself along the 
signifying chain. It is this signifying chain which constantly 
th t th "bl t f . "f" t· 18 Id d th rea ens ano er possi e se o s1gn1 ica ions. nee e 
18. The distinction being made here is an elaboration of a dis-
tinction proposed by Emile Benveniste in two articles in Probl~mes 
de linguistique generale.,Iesrelations de temps dans le verbe 
fran~ais 11 pp.237-250 and 11 De la subjectivite' dans le langage" 
pp.258-266. Benveniste suggests that, in order to arrive at a 
logical understanding of tenses and to understand fully the impor-
tance of language for subjectivity, it is necessary to distinguish 
between the speaker as the producer of the discursive chain "le 
sujet de ltenonciation 11 and the speaker as the grammatical subject 
of the statement he is producing, 11 le sujet de l'enonc~ 11 • It is in 
the distance between these two subjects that we can find a formal 
linguistic account of the distance between the philosophical 
subject, le sujet de l'enonce, the 'I', judging the correspondence 
of the world and language and the psycho-analytic subject, le 
sujet de l'enonciation, the 1 it 1 , unable to distinguish between 
word and world and constantly threatening and unmasking the 
stability of the 'I'. 
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entry into language can be conceived of as the knot of the 
Oedipus complex, the recognition of difference between the 
subject and what is not the subject and this difference being 
the basis of law; the positions which the subject can and 
cannot take up. 
If we return to Richards' account we can see that he is 
caught in the paradox of postulating an organising principle 
before the organisation that will create the organising principle. 
The process by which the undifferentiated impulses become 
specific actions is inexplicable without the use of some concept 
of the organisation of experience in language which exists before 
any particular individuality. However, Richards has need of the 
judging subject outside language in order for his theory of 
language to work and, therefore, he is caught in the paradox 
that I have indicated. To avoid this paradox, and to achieve a 
systematic account of his theory, he is thus driven to assume 
throughout his exposition a set of metaphors implying the 
primacy of the judging subject; and it is only at the end that 
he attempts to withdraw this foundation stone and yet leave the 
edifice standing. 
Before we finally return to the concepts at work in his 
psychology we must now examine Richards' theory of language. 
As the vocabulary employed is complex and unintuitive it is, 
perhaps, as well to introduce the terms fairly fully. When a 
statement is made there are two factors at work. Firstly, if we 
16 
regard language as strictly representational, there is the 
symbolic function of language. This is composed of three terms: 
there is the word or words themselves (the symbol), there is the 
mental process (the reference) and there is the thing in the 
world (the referent). In addition to this strictly representa-
tional function there is the emotive occurrence of language as 
sign. As sign the tone, sound, pitch etc., of words express 
the feelings of the speaker and these signs are interpreted by 
the hearer in the light of his past experience. 
We will notice that there is a similar structure of 
explanation at work in the accounts of both these functions of 
language but first let us look at the account of signs. 
are defined in terms of the subject's past: 
11 The effects upon the organism due to any sign, 
which may be any stimulus from without, or any 
process taking place within, depend upon the 
past history of the organism ..• 11 19 
Signs 
Signs are thus anything at all in the whole of experience 
but are dependent for their definition - on whether they are 
signs - on the past history of the subject. If the situation 
has been encountered before then some part of the situation 
will be a sign of the whole situation and will cause memory to 
be activated in the subject through what Richards calls an engram: 
19. I.A. Richards and C.K. Ogden. op.cit. p.138. 
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"An engram is the residual trace of an adaptation 
made by the organization to a stimulus. The mental process due to the calling up of an engram is a 
similar adaptation: so far as it is cognitive what 
it is adapted to is its referent and is what the 
sign which excites it stands for or signifies. 11 20 
The sign is thus a mode of passage from the actual situation 
in which the stimulus was encountered, and the interpretation is 
the psychological reaction which is the product both of the 
original and the present experience. This, then, is the causal 
basis of meaning. A stimulus is experienced and causes an 
adaptation in the organism which determines any subsequent 
reaction to the same stimulus. The meaning of the signs are the 
physical changes in the metabolism which were occasioned by the 
original encounter through the physical contiguity ensured in 
the brain. Furthermore each reaction to a sign can serve as a 
further sign: 
"What we 'see' when we look at a table is first, 
modifications of our retinae. These are our 
initial signs. We interpret them and arrive at 
fields of vision, bounded by surfaces of tables 
and the like. By taking belief in these as second 
order signs and so on, we can proceed with our 
interpretation, reaching as results tables, wood, 
fibres, cells, molecules, atoms, electrons etc. 
The later stages of this interpretative effort are 
physics. Thus there is no study called 'philosophy' 
which can add to or correct physics, though symbolism 
may contribute to a systematisation of the levels of discourse at which 'table' and 'system of molecules' 
are the appropriate symbols. 11 21 
20. Ibid. p.140. 
21. Ibid. p.385. 
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Signs thus provoke reactions in us which are based on 
our original experience. These reactions are symbolis.ed by 
words which stand for things in the world which caused the 
mental reactions. Words thus appear as determined by their 
references (the mental processes) which in turn are determined 
by their referents. However, words appear not only as symbols 
determined by their referent, but also as verbal signs - that 
is to say as parts of already encountered contexts of human 
behaviour and emotion. Richards and Ogden describe this dual 
appearance which leads to a double interpretation as follows: 
"One is interpreted from symbols to reference 
and so to referent; the other is interpreted 
from verbal signs to the attitude, mood, interest, 
purpose, desire, and so forth of the speaker, 
and thence to the situation, circumstances and 
conditions in which the utterance is made. 11 22 
However, the authors are at pains to point out that the 
attitude, moods, desires, etc which may be communicated through 
the verbal signs can also be communicated through symbolisation: 
11 Each of these non-symbolic functions may employ 
words either in a symbolic capacity, to attain the 
required end through the references produced in the listener, or in a non-symbolic capacity when the 
end is gained through the direct effects of the 
d II wor s. 23 
22. Ibid. p.356. 
23. Ibid. p.359. 
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Thus there is a direct passage to the referent with the sign 
and an indirect passage with the symbol. How, then, can we 
guarantee the passage through the symbol? It is perhaps worth-
while to quote a long, but extremely revealing, passage by the 
authors when they attempt to deal with the problem: 
"The first necessity is to remember that since 
the past histories of individuals differ except 
in certain very simple respects, it is probable 
that their reactions to and employment of any 
general word will vary. There will be some to 
whom a word is merely a stimulus to the utterance 
of other words without the occurrence of any 
reference - the psittacists, that is to say, who 
respond to words much as they might respond to 
the first notes of a tune which they proceed almost 
automatically to complete. At the other extreme 
there will be some for whom every word used 
symbolises a definite and completely articulated 
reference. With the first we are not here concerned, 
but as regards the others, unless we have good 
evidence to the contrary we should assume that, 
clear though their ideas may be, they will probably 
not be ideas of the same things. It is plain that 
we can only identify referents through the references 
made to them. Different references, then, may be 
to the same referent, sufficiently similar ones must 
be; and it is only by ensuring similarity of reference 
that we can secure identity in our referents. For 
this it is desirable to symbolise references by means 
of the simple routes of definition discussed above. 
We must choose as starting points either things to 
which we can point or which occur freely in ordinary 
. " experience. 24 
We can find in this statement, of how we achieve correct 
symbolisation and similar references, the same structure of 
explanation that was at work in the analysis of the interpretation 
of signs. The symbol is determined in its reference by its 
24. ibid. pp.230-231. 
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referent which is identified through a chain of definitions 
which have their basis in a temporal and spatial present. The 
symbol is thus totally fixed in its reference (its meaning) 
through a moment of presence in which the subject identifies 
the objects in the world. Similarly the sign is determined 
in its context by the engram which provides the link back to 
the original experience in which the whole context was present. 
Language is thus determined by moments of a full presence; 
as both symbol and sign it is grounded in a presence and this 
presence is tied to a specific moment of origin. In the case 
of the sign the origin is the first time that we experience the 
context in which the sign will appear. In the case of the 
symbol the origin is the 'starting point' in the things that we 
can point to. Literature thus becomes a particular use of 
language which is peculiar in that all the functions of language 
are at work to communicate the artist's experience. As sign, 
the author's language is determined by its origin in the author's 
past; in his experience of language as sound and tone. As 
symbols they are located in the references (thoughts) present in 
the author's mind as he writes. What it is here important to 
grasp is that it follows that each work of literature therefore 
possesses a definite meaning - in terms of the references and 
engrams which the words will call up. But why is there no easy 
passage to that meaning why, if the meaning is there in some 
full sense, do we need to learn to read poetry? The answer is 
to be located in an excess of intellectual reflection. 
I 
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Consciousness withdraws itself further and further from any 
full presence and finally loses the ability to reunite itself 
with its experience: 
"But as general reflection develops the place of 
the free direct play of experience is taken by the 
deliberate organization of attitudes, a clumsy and 
crude substitute .•• Now reflection, unless very 
prolonged and very arduous, tends to fix the 
attitude by making us dwell in it, by removing us 
from experience. 11 25 
With this notion of experience we have the essential 
corollary to words being fixed in their references and effects 
(in, that is, their meanings); namely that we all have the same 
human nature - the same response to stimuli which ensures that 
the poet's meaning will reach us. Richards' awareness of this 
necessity can be found in his analysis of the 'normality of the 
artist•: 
11 If the availability of his past experience is the 
first characteristic of the poet, the second is 
what we may provisionally call his normality. So 
far as his experience does not tally with that of 
those with whom he communicates, there will be 
failure. 11 26 
There is thus an interpretation of language which fixes 
the meaning of language once and for all - in the physical 
reality of the human body. The final level of interpretation is 
physical reactions inside us which are the same for everybody 
25. I.A. Richards, op.cit. p.202. 
26. ibid. p.190. 
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(except of course those unfortunates, described above, who have 
been deprived the free play of experience and are stuck in the 
fixed organization of attitudes). The inadequacy of this view 
of language can perhaps best be approached through a consideration 
of the other side of the subject-object dichotomy namely the 
object. On this view of language and experience, objects are 
given in their identity before language which simply serves as 
a method to represent them to the subject. If we take, for 
example, the quotation about •seeing' a table we can understand 
in this presentation that the table must be all these objects 
for sight. It must be successively a table, an atom and then 
visual stimulae again. But rather than us finding symbols to 
fit these levels, it is the symbols that produce the various 
levels. An object is not given to the subject but finds its 
place within a series of oppositions - of what it is and is not. 
And it is through the idea of difference and opposition that we 
can begin to grasp language and structure. Opposed to a notion 
of language as instituted by a moment of presence (as the 
meanings injected into words by the judging subject) we can 
find a notion of language as$ructure (in which meaning is 
produced through the sets of oppositions and differences which 
any body already finds in position together with the places 
which he, as subject, can occupy). These places are determined 
by the particular historical and familial conjuncture in which 
the body finds itself and which determine the sexed and civil 
subject it will become. 
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It is within the context of the object and of science 
(the study of objects) that we can locate the most obvious 
weakness in the explanation of language that Richards offers. 
This weakness is not, however, confined to the field of the 
object for it runs as a fissure, a gap, through both his account 
of the subject and of language. At the opening of his book with 
Ogden there are a few pages on the work of one of the great 
founders of linguistics and semiology Ferdinand de Saussure. 
These pages crystallize in their contradictions many of the 
strengths and weaknesses of English, and more particularly 
Cambridge, intellectual cul.ture of this period. The strengths, 
which produced the discovery of Frege and Peano, the work of 
Russell, Wittgenstein.and Richards himself, find expression both 
in the interest of language and the very fact of having read the 
Cours de linguistique gern:':irale which had appeared in 1916 only 
six years before the publication of their book {and this interest 
in Saussure goes hand in hand with the reading of other European 
thinkers such as Husserl and Brentano). The weaknesses, however, 
are also in evidence in their comments on Saussure whi•:;h reveal 
a theoretical and ideological gap, which Wc(S to widen considerably 
and which has yet to be examined, between Anglo-Saxon and 
continental thought. 27 
While welcoming Saussure's project of a science of signs, 
27. The first starting point for such an examination would have to be Perry Anderson 1 s "Components of the National Culture" in New Left Rev~ No.SO, July-August, 1968. pp.3-57. 
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semiologyJ the authors attack the great Swiss linguist for not 
understanding the bas~c notion of science. They attack Saussurets 
elaboration of la langue (the object of linguistics - the 
transindividual code which assures the possibility of any message 
(~ parol£) ) in the following terms: 
II Such an elaborate construction as la langue 
might, no doubt, be arrived at by some Method 
of Intensive Distraction analogous to that 
with which Dr Whitehead 1 s name is associated 
in Physics, but as a guiding principle for a 
young science it is fantastic. Moreover, the 
same device of inventing verbal entities outside 
the range of possible investigation proved 
fatal to the theory of signs which follows. 11 28 
The idea at work in this passage is that the world is just 
available for scientific investigation, which consists of the 
gathering of evident facts and the proper use of symbols. What 
remains outside the realm of the thinkable for Richards is that 
it is only after we have set up significant oppositions in theory 
that we can begin to test their application in practice. Thus 
'electron' is not something we 1 see 1 but rather is an element 
within a whole discourse of sub-atomic physics and finds its 
definition within this discourse. It is not the individual 
scientist (the judging subject) who sees or creates the electron 
but rather the theoretical discourse of physics which assigns a 
place both to the electron and to the scientist. The difficulty 
in grasping language as constitutive of both subject and object 
28. I.A. Richards and C.K. Ogden. op.cit. pp 6-7. 
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is most stunningly evident in a footnote in which Richards and 
Ogden explain Saussure 1 s distinction between signifiant (the 
acoustic image) and signifi~ (the concept) as the two components 
of the sign and then add: 
"The disadvantage of this account is, as we shall 
see, that the process of interpretation is included by definition in the sign! 11 29 (the exclamation mark is theirs). 
It is precisely the way that language comes together with its 
interpretative schema which takes it beyond an individual 
subjectivity to provide the scene on which any subjectivity must 
appear. It is this unquestioned belief in the primacy of the 
judging subject that constitutes one of the major 'blocks' within 
Richards' work. 
We are now in a position to give a general account of the 
theory advanced by Richards. We are given a fixed human nature 
and a fixed set of identities in the world; these two elements 
are united in the experience of the judging subject who uses 
language to represent and communicate this experience. To this 
can be opposed the idea of language as structure - that is to say 
as a set of oppositions and differences which constitute the space 
in which object and subject confront one another. Literature fits 
into Richards' general theory with remarkable ease. For literature 
29. ibid. 
26 
is the representation of the author's experience both of himself 1 1 
and of the outside world. Having the same nature and the same 
world we can understand what the author is representing - his 
work communicates his experience. Any misunderstanding of the 
work can be analysed in terms of our misunderstanding our own 
experien~~~ugh bad education. :H:: is s±gnH?ieant to notiee 
~ fhis~presupposes a language which is in direct contact with 
experience - the critic's own - which is never questioned as a 
form of experience. This ignoring of the form of one's own 
language entails a very definite attitude to a difficult work. 
This attitude is of special importance with regard to Joyce 
whose writings are legendary in their difficulty. Not only 
Finnegans Wake and Ulysses but also Dubliners and A Portrait 
have troubled readers. One of DublinerJ first reviewers talked 
of "the readerts difficulty1130 and early critics of A Portrait 
complained of the strain it put on readers. 31 If literature is 
communication and if language is simply representation then 
difficulty will simply be the difficulty of divining the message 
communicated and of discerning what is represented. The 
insistence that literature is communication is constant in 
Richards' works and is stated in its clearest form in the 
following passage from Practical Criticism: 
30. Review in T.L.S. 18 June 1914 in James Joyce. 
Heritage. ed. Robert H. Deming, vol.1. p.60. 
31. ibid. pp.81-110 in particular pp.93 and 95. 
The Critical 
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"But poetry itself is a mode of communication. What it communicates and how it does so and the worth of what is communicated form the subject-matter of criticism. 11 32 
Thus difficulty will be analysed in terms of communication. 
Difficulty is to be expected in literature because of the 
complexity of the experiences being communicated which entail 
the use of every aspect of language as sign and symbol. The 
resolution of difficulty will thus be in terms of defining the 
meaning - of identifying it. Whether an identification of meaning 
is possible will determine the judgement of the work. And it is 
with this knowledge that we can understand how the article by 
Leavis which condemns Joyce has common terms with those books 
that praise him - books we shall investigate in the next chapter. 
Both attempt to identify meanings - the difference is that Leavis 
fails to find them where another generation of critics have 
found them in abundance. Joyce 1 s work, however, is exactly an 
interrogation of meaning; a constant subversion of language as 
representation or communication and is thus unreadable within the 
perspective of a discourse for which a moment of full presence 
serves as origin. Indeed the whole of Joyce 1 s work can be read 
as a casting into play of these notions of presence and origin 
and an attempt to experience the limits of language which 
determine the scene of any possible presence or origin. What is 
essential for this reading of Joyce is an abandonment of the idea 
that a work of literature represents an experience. Instead we 
32. I.A. Richards. Practical Criticism. p.11. 
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must see the writing as a constant traversing of the positions 
made available to the subject in language - a constant attempt 
to break down those positions offered by Ireland, the father and 
the Church. This writing is not representation but practice -
the constant transformation of material rather than the transparent 
rendering of a reality already given. 
Richards' analysis rests on an ignorance of his own 
discourses as a constitutive element of the world. As the 
objects of science can be found lying about the world independently 
of man's theoretical activity - so the experiences within poems 
are just waiting to be observed. But the ignoring of language 
as form (both for the subject and the object) entails the 
transformation of the world into an unproblematic content. Nor 
is this surprising if we consider that each discourse becomes a 
content for the meta-discourse which talks about it. 33 It is the 
33. I use the term discourse (meta-discourse) because the term language (metalanguage) in English is, I think, too firmly linked to the notion of a national tongue and therefore it is confusing to speak of language in the plural within one national tongue 
unless one is dealing with formal languages. Further while a language can be seen as any significant set of oppositions, discourse is here used to emphasize the positions offered to a 
speaking subject within any specific language. cf. E. Benveniste 
op.cit. pp.258-263. The closest term within the British philoso-phical tradition is 'language games' but this too has unfortunate 
resonances with the notion of 1 game 1 • A meta-discourse 'talks 
about' (the term is taken from Tarski 1 s article "The Semantic Conception of TrutH' in Readin sin Philoso hical Anal sis ed. H. Feigl and W. Sellars pp.52-84 a discourse and transforms it into content by naming the discourse (accomplished through the 
use of inverted commas) and thus being able to identify both the discourse and its area of application and establish their 
correspondence. 
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existence of an unquestioned meta-discourse (in Richards' case 
this meta-discourse is anchored in the non-existent future of a 
science of psychology which will reveal our common human natures) 
that ensures that all form is turned into content. 
If we now turn back to Leavis 1 criticisms of Joyce we can 
see very much the same constellation of concepts at work in his 
comments on "Work in Progress". It is because Joyce 1 s experiments 
lack an origin in the presence of certain problems to the 
personality that they are condemned as vicious. The presence 
and origin that Leavis demands is a slightly more complicated 
affair than Richards' bare 'contexts' but it still involves the 
subjugation of the medium. It is this that ensures for Leavis 
Shakespeare's greatness and Joyce is condemned insofar as the 
medium escapes any personal domination. Leavis 1 position is, 
however, different from Richardsl in that the justification for the 
meta-discourse does not find its basis within a yet unrealised 
psychology but rather within the social basis of discussion amongst 
that minority section of a society which can appreciate cultural 
values. 
In his evaluation of Richards (significantly the first 
such study published in Scrutiny) D.W. Harding marks the shift 
very neatly: 
"The conclusion that his account of value gives 
a basis for agreement only when "normality" (or 
identical abnormality) is assumed, might seem to 
30 
leave us no defence against an endless variety of critical opinions, each justified by an appeal to a fundamental constitutional peculiarity in the critic. Since innate differences do of course 
exist, we must perhaps admit that in the end we 
shall have to recognize distinguishable 1types 1 of critical opinion founded on psycho-physiological differences in the critics, and irreconcilable •.. (But) it is still possible to show that differences of opinion in literary matters frequently arise from errors of approach which even those who make them 
can be brought to recognize. With people who assert that they know what they like the one hope is to demonstrate to them that in point of fact they don't, that according to standards they themselves 
recognize elsewhere their judgement here is mistaken. As these inconsistencies are faced and abandoned the possibility of agreement with other people grows greater. 11 34 
What is, of course, crucial here is "the standards they 
themselves recognize elsewhere" which provide the basis for 
agreement. Harding indeed attacks Richards for wishing to include 
every Philistine in his evangelical work for poetry. Because 
if shared standards are necessary then the field of the possible 
converted may be narrow. Harding concludes: 
"But whether Richards' methods would be effective in convincing the intelligent and friendly Philistine is another matter. It may be that his work fulfills its purpose by giving those who already value poetry a new assurance that their concern for it is a development and not a distortion, of "ordinary practical living". If this is one of its functions it bears witness to the growing need of those with minority views to justify themselves at the bar of the main community. The main community may not be convinced; perhaps the fundamental need is that the minority should be. 11 35 
34. D.W. Harding. "Evaluation of I.A. Richards' Scrutiny, vol.1, no.4. March 1933, p.334. 
35. ibid. p.338. 
, I 
i I 
31 
But if the movement from the psychological to the social 
marks in the political sphere a movement from the democratic to 
the elitist, there is, however, a certain gain on the theoretical 
side. For with the notion of a community it becomes impossible 
to take a simple and crude view of the relation of the individual 
to language. Rather Leavis oscillates between a view in which 
the writer simply operates within the genres and discourses of 
his time and another view in which the writer becomes the 
dominating creator of language. In general this oscillation is 
what enables Leavis 1 criticism to reach such a consistently high 
standard. 36 With regard to Joyce we have already taken note of 
the way in which his condemnation of Joyce remains tied to a 
view of the judging subject creating the correct expressive 
discourse. But in the same review he attacks this same view 
as it is presented by some of the early defenders of Joyce and 
it is worth pausing on this attack briefly before leaving the 
pages of Scrutiny. 
The title of Leavis 1 essay comes from the manifesto 
published in transition in June 1929 which was written by 
Eugene Jolas and signed by many of his friends. The confusions 
within this document can be neatly summarised through a 
consideration of the change of preposition from the title of the 
manifesto to its first thesis which reads: 
36. See for example the treatment of minor 17th century poets in "English Poetry in the seventeenth century 11 • Scrutiny, Vol.4, No.3 December 1935. pp.236-256. 
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"The revolution in the English language is an 
accomplished fact":- 11 37 (my emphasis) 
With this thesis we find a conception of the writer as working 
in language - a refusal of the assumption that a judging subject 
constituted outside language simply uses language to communicate 
his experience. 
On the other hand the attack on pre-established linguistic 
forms was often justified as the writer attempting to express 
himself more clearly. On this view the old words and forms were 
not adequate to the writer's experience and therefore he simply 
created new ones. This is the revolution of the word where the 
revolution is imposed from outside - by the writer on the word -
rather than a question of the writer working a revolution in the 
word - the writer engaging in a certain practice of writing 
which alters the very way in which signs are produced and 
defined. The sixth thesis of the manifesto neatly contains all 
these various paradoxes: 
"The literary creator has the right to disintegrate the primal matter of words imposed on him by text-books and dictionaries. 11 38 
In this sentence we find both an idea of the writer as 
engaged in a process of disintegration - an idea which points 
37. Manifesto "Revolution of the Word". transition nos. 16 & 17, June 1929, p.13. 
38. ibid. 
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forward to Joyce 1 s 'scorched earth' policy in which there is a 
constant ruination of the positions offered to the subject in 
language. 39 But there is also the idea that the tliterary 
creator' exists outside language - outside the textbooks and 
dictionaries which are imposed on an already existent 1 him 1 • 
In his book The Language of Night, which was amongst the books 
Leavis was reviewing, Eugene Jolas' major emphasis was on Joyce 
as a creator of a new language. He quotes approvingly the 
following passage from C.K. Ogden: 
"If we separate the functions of language into four main divisions - Sense, Feeling, Tone and Intention - it is clear that Mr Joyce's neologisms chiefly provide blends of the three last. He is not concerned, as is the scientist, with the creation of new names, so much as with the 
40 development of fresh emotive and invective gestures .•• " 
Here the idea is simply that Joyce is "inventing a language of 
his own1141 and it is this emphasis on the writer as dreaming up 
new words and forms to enable greater expression of experience 
39. "The word scorching has a peculiar significance for my superstitious mind not so much because of any quality or merit in the writing itself as for the fact that the progress of the book is in fact like the progress of some sandblast. As soon as I mention or include any person in it I hear of his or her death or departure or misfortune: and each successive episode dealing with some province of artistic culture (rhetoric or music or dialectic), leaves behind it a burnt up field." James Joyce. Letter to Harriet Shaw Weaver.6 August 1919. Letters vol.1, p.129. 
40. From the Preface to Tales of Shem and Shaun quoted in E.Jolas. The Language of Night pp.30-31. 
41. E. Jolas op. cit. p.30. 
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that Leavis is attacking when he criticizes the conception of 
•developing the medium to the fullest•. But whereas on the one 
hand Leavis realizes that the individual cannot exist outside 
language and simply create a better one, on the other he is 
forced back on this conception when he comes to talk of 
Shakespeare. Shakespeare's use of language is presented as 
finding its determination in an area of experience which is 
totally separated from language. 
What I have hoped to show in this chapter is the outlines 
of a theory of the relation between the judging subject and 
language which informs that criticism which rejects Joyce 
(whether they do it honestly like Leavis or less honestly like 
Gross, who while pretending to admire Joyce categorizes 
Finnegans Wake as the "aberration of a great man1142 ). I have 
suggested that in order to understand Joyce we would have to 
attempt to understand him as practi5ing a revolution in the 
word. But before we move on to consider that attempt it is 
necessary to examine in some detail the form of that criticism 
that accepts Joyce and to show why it rests on the same inadequate 
and inappropriate theories of language and representation. 
42. John Gross. op.cit. p.89. 
CHAPTER 2 
IN THE SHADE OF THE IMAGINARY: 
PERCY LUBBOCK2S THEORY OF FICTION 
It might be thought that an easy method of dealing with 
the positive reaction to Joyce would be to identify it 
geographically as the American one. On this view, the problem 
would revolve around locating the central figures of American 
criticism and demonstrating how they accepted Joyce, and the 
theoretical pre-suppositions at work in their acceptance. It is 
certainly true that the early critics favourable to Joyce and 
particularly to the problems posed by Finnegans Wake - Edmund 
Wilson, the transition circle, the Partisan Review critics, 
Harry Levin - were nearly all American. 1 Furthermore not only 
has Joyce suffered, and continued until very recently to suffer, 
neglect from English critics but also, and perhaps more crucially, 
Joyce has been widely ignored by novelists in England. 
However, to adopt this approach of dividing attitudes 
geographically and then locating the key figures within national 
sub-divisions, would be to mistake the complexity of the 
different forces and schools at work within American (and British) 
1. Thus, for example, Eugene Jolas writes, "Among the few whose 
analysis (of Finnegans Wake) struck him as being comprehensive 
and conscientious were, in rough order of his appreciation, William TroyYs essay in Partisan Review, Harry Levinis article in New Directions, Edmund Wilson's essays in the New Republic, Alfred Kazin's review in the New York Herald-Tribune, and Padraic Columts piece in the New York Times as well as one or two from England and Scotland". Eugene Jolas "My Friend James Joyce" in james joyce: two decades of criticism. ed. Seon Givens. p.17. 
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literary theory. It would thus run the risk of ascribing the 
interest in Joyce in America to an acceptance of him by a 
series of influential writers (e.g. Faulkner, Fitzgerald, Carlos 
Williams) and critics (such as Edmund Wilson and Harry Levin). 
The rejection of Joyce's texts in England would then become the 
product of the dislike evinced for him by Leavis and Lawrence. 
If the centrality of Leavis in English literary theory might 
make such an analysis plausible, the lack of a comparable 
dominant school in America would leave the analysis less than 
convincing. But in both cases the analysis would be incorrect; 
resting as it would, on the unexamined and idealist notion of 
Ysources'. The 'source' is that ideological concept which 
along with 'author' functions in literary criticism to protect 
a specifically asocial origin. Not only is the 'source' pure 
and self-contained, uncontaminated by any heterogeneity but, in 
addition, the metaphor of the river grants to the critic an area 
whose banks, whose limits, are carefully circumscribed. It is 
through such a coherent set of metaphors that the literary 
critic can map out the movement of ideas as the ethereal passage 
of great mind to great mind outside the heterogeneity of social 
and scriptural practices. For this heterogeneity entails that 
any idea can only be defined within the practice that articulates 
it and not in some nether world of geniuses and minds. Indeed 
any theory of influence - the etymology takes us back again to 
rivers and banks - depends on a theory of the literary work as 
a given unchanging object. Such a theory ignores the fact that 
the work is constantly changing as it enters into new relations 
37 
through the production of new works and through more general 
social changes. It is not that it is unimportant that Blake 
read Milton, or Byron Pope, but it is only through careful 
analysis of both the authors and the prevailing orders of 
discourse that we can determine the Milton and the Pope that 
they read. 
The concept which is perhaps most useful in deconstructing 
a positivist fixation on the work as an entity outside time and 
space is the psycho-analytic concept of deferred action. Freud 
employed this concept to escape the positivist position which 
conferred an absolute identity on events within the childYs life. 
Rather Freud argued that a new event can produce totally new 
configurations in the past life of the child i.e. endow a past 
event with totally new significance. The most obvious example 
of this mechanism at work is in the child's perception of a 
threat of castration (a threat understood in a past or future 
tense according to sex). The statements or the events which are 
taken retroactively by the child as threats will contain no 
direct reference to castration - but they will be taken as 
referring to castration after the recognition of sexual difference 
has instituted castration as a possibility. 2 
2. From his very earliest writings Freud demonstrated his 
recognition of this function: "··· I am working on the assumption that our psychical mechanism has come into being by a process of 
stratification: the material present in the form of memory-traces being subjected from time to time to a re-arrangement in 
accordance with fresh circumstances - to a re-transcription." Sigmund Freud. Letter to Wilhelm Fliess. The Standard Edition 
of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. vol 1, p.233. 
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Rather then than becoming involved in the task of 
differentiating the different positions from which Joyce was 
read in the United States (a task that would be necessary in 
order to give that detailed analysis necessary to an historical 
account of Joyce's reception in America), I shall take another 
major theoretical text of literary criticism and attempt to 
disengage a general theoretical structure. The homology between 
its key concepts and those of Richards will enable us to under-
stand the similarities that unite the opposing views on Joyce. 
Faced with the amorphous mass of Joyce criticism, this 
theoretical abstraction is necessary in order to demonstrate the 
general incorrectness of an approach which I would characterize 
as that of the literary critic. Obviously the volume of the 
secondary material on Joyce precludes its exhaustive coverage 
but hopefully the works here discussed can be taken as typical 
in their most general theoretical assumptions. What gets lost 
here is the specificity of particular texts which always, in 
some sense, escape the full weight of these very presuppositions. 
This escape is generated by the engagement with the specific text 
on the one hand and on the other with the socio-historical 
situation in which the critical work is being written. 
Despite its inspiration in certain remarks of Henry James 
(and although his insights had to a certain extent been antici-
pated by the German Otto Ludwig 3), Percy Lubbock's book The Craft 
of Fiction marks the beginning of an important approach to novel 
3. O. Ducrot and T. Todorov. Dictionnaire Encyclopedique des 
sciences du langage. pp.411-412. 
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criticism. Lubbock starts from the position that the novel is 
something that the reader can never get hold of; can never 
fully grasp. When we have finished reading a novel we are left 
with a certain residue, but this residue is not the whole novel 
indeed the whole novel constantly eludes us, even as we are 
reading. It is impossible to hold the whole of a novel in our 
minds at once. The task Lubbock thus sets himself, and in 
many respects it is an admirable one, is to disengage certain 
techniques within the novel, but the aim of this disengagement, 
which is more questionable, is to pin the novel down and fix 
it as an object. What is a premiss right from the start is that 
the novel is a coherent whole - that all its parts are 
simultaneously present in some ideal world. The critic must 
attempt to reach the stage where the novel can become present 
to him, as it was, it is always assumed, to the writer. Lubbock 
is crucially aware of the need for the critic not to become 
immersed in the work but to hold himself back so that he can 
follow the contours of the work's creation: 
"The reader of a novel - by which I mean the 
critical reader - is himself a novelist; he is the maker of a book which may or may not please his taste when it is finished, but of a book for which he must take his own share of the 
responsibility. The author does his part, but he cannot transfer his book like a bubble into the brain of the critic; he cannot make sure that the critic will possess his work. The 
reader must therefore become, for his part, a 
novelist, never permitting himself to suppose that the creation of the book is solely the 
affair of the author. The difference between them is immense .•• 
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Is it necessary to define the difference? 
That is soon done if we picture Tolstoy and 
his critic side by side, surveying the free 
and formless expanse of the world of life. 
The critic has nothing to say; he waits, 
looking to Tolstoy for guidance. And Tolstoy, 
with the help of some secret of his own, which 
is his genius, does not hesitate for an instant. 
His hand is plunged into the scene, he lifts 
out of it great fragments, right and left, 
ragged masses of life torn from their setting; 
he selects. And upon these trophies he sets 
to work with the full force of his imagination; 
he detects their significance, he disengages 
and throws aside whatever is accidental and 
meaningless; he remakes them in conditions 
that are never known in life, conditions in 
which a thing is free to grow according to its 
own law, expressing itself unhindered; he 
liberates and completes. And then, upon all 
this new life - so like the old and yet so 
different, more like the old, as one might say, 
than the old ever had a chance of being - upon 
all this life that is now so much more intensely 
living than before, Tolstoy directs the skill 
of his art; he distributes it in a single 
embracing design; he orders and disposes. And 
thus the critic receives his guidance, and his 
work begins. 11 4 
This long quotation illustrates the importance for 
Lubbock of the artist's act of creation. As a consequence no 
matter how much emphasis is placed on the work that the reader 
must do to recreate the novel, such re-creation is always 
dependent on the prior creation of the artist. In order to 
understand the logic of this primary creation there is no more 
obvious text for us than Genesis and indeed the first four verses 
provide us with the necessary terms and relationships with which 
to construct that logic: 
4. Percy Lubbock. The Craft of Fiction pp.17-18. 
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11 In the beginning God created Heaven and Earth. And the earth was without form and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep. And the 
spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters. And God said, Let there be Light. And God saw 
the light that it was good: and God divided the light from the darkness." 
It should be noticed that both God and Tolstoy have to 
perform a twofold operation - the first is the act of creation 
and the second is the erasure of the marks of that act. Given 
the "formless expanse 11 (Lubbock), 11 the earth without form and 
void" (Genesis) the creator divides and this division is the 
production of "trophies" or 11 light 11 • But these first creations 
still bear the mark of the formless, still carry with them a 
reference to another heterogenous order. In the second operation 
"God divided the light from the darkness", Tolstoy "directs 
the skill of his art; he distributes it in a single embracing 
design; he orders and disposes. 11 This need for a double 
operation is the need to preserve a moment of presence and origin 
unsullied by difference and process. For the first product 
remains ineradicably marked by its definition in terms of 
difference - the formless void from which it is divided and 
which it is not. There is, therefore, a need for a second 
operation by which the whole thing is defined internally leaving 
no outside, no difference, no heterogeneity. God now divides 
the darkness from the light and it is his creation of division 
which constitutes them both - the formless void has been 
completely covered over. What is striking about Genesis is not 
only that it reveals the intimate links between origin and 
I. i. 
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presence - it is the presence of everything to God that 
guarantees the possibility of an origin - but also that it 
demonstrates the link between such a moment of presence and 
origin and the possibility of comprehension; the production of 
light. We will see in the next chapter how heavily a writer 
like George Eliot relies on the metaphor of light to justify 
her writing and one could say further that the whole tradition 
of what I shall call classic realism involves notions of 
presence and origin and the light that is produced from that 
moment. As such, classic realism remains firmly wedded to the 
religious attitude - to the search for an original plenitude 
always since lost and dispersed in the Fall. It is exactly 
insofar as Joyce's 11 nightynovel 11 (54.21) is opposed to this 
moment of light and breaks definitively with all concepts of 
origin and presence that it can be regarded as the most 
irreligious book every written. Similarly Ulysses can be seen 
as a constant attempt to reintroduce the night into the day, 
the difference into origin and the process into presence. Early 
on Stephen talks of Averroes and Moses Maimonides, "dark men in 
mien and movement, flashing in their mocking mirrors the obscure 
soul of the world, a darkness shining in brightness which 
brightness could not comprehend." (p.34) and in the library he 
tries to combat all notions of creation, origin and presence 
with his attack on fatherhood, 
11 Fatherhood, in the sense of conscious begetting, is unknown to man. It is a mystical estate, an 
apostolic succession, from only begetter to only 
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begotten. On that mystery and not on the madonna 
which the cunning Italian intellect flung to the 
mob of Europe the church is founded and founded 
irremovably because founded, like the world, 
macro- and microcosm, upon the void. Upon 
incertitude, upon unlikelihood. Amor Matris, 
subjective and objective genitive, may be the 
only true thing in life. Paternity may be a 
legal fiction." (p.266) 
If we now return to Lubbock it can be seen that the 
author, the creator, has everything present in his mind and 
this presence is the origin of the work. Thus Lubbock can talk 
of the author as confronted by the whole presence of life, 
reality, etc. from which he makes a selection which embodies 
(as the bread embodies the body and blood of Christ) this moment 
of presence. The reader, however laboriously, has simply to 
read: 
11 No selection, no arrangement is required of 
him; the new world that is laid before him is 
the world of art, life liberated from the 
tangle of cross-purposes, saved from arbitrary 
distortion. Instead of a continuous, endless 
scene, in which the eye is caught in a thousand 
directions at once, with nothing to hold it to 
a fixed centre, the landscape that opens before 
the critic is whole and single; it has passed 
through an imagination, it has shed its 
irrelevancy and is compact with its own meaning. 11 5 
It is the coherence of the work which it is essential for 
both author and reader to understand; "The book is not," 
emphasises Lubbock, 11 a row of facts, it is a single image. 116 
s. ibid p.19. 
6 . ibid p. 6 2 . 
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And with this idea of a single image, generated in the moment 
of originating presence, we can pose all the questions of 
technique that are necessary. For, on this view, all technique 
is required to do is convey the moment of insight in its most 
effective form. Lubbock explicitly states the problem when he 
writes in the following terms of the author's relations to the 
work: 
"I suppose his unwritten story to rise before him, its main lines settled, as something at first entirely objective, the whole thing seen from without - the linked chain of incident, the men and women in their places. 0
7 
The problem then becomes one of rendering this already 
existing situation so that it becomes obvious to .. the reader. 
What does not occur to Lubbock is that the relationship between 
technique and subject matter, between form and content, is a 
dialectical one. He does not consider this possibility because 
to do so would be to introduce process, time and change and, 
thus, ruin the moment of presence on which the work is ostensibly 
founded. Beckett's strictures on those who divorce form from 
content apply word for word to Lubbock: 
11 And if you don't understand it, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is because you are too decadent to receive it. You are not satisfied uriless form is so strictly divorced from content that you can comprehend the one almost without 
7. ibid p.74. 
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bothering to read the other. This rapid 
skimming and absorption of the scant cream 
of sense is made possible by what I may call 
a continuous process of copious intellectual 
salivation. The form that is an arbitrary 
and independent phenomenon can fulfil no higher function than that of stimulus for a tertiary or quatary conditioned reflex of dribbling comprehension. 11 8 
It is through a close attention to Joyce's texts that 
we shall begin to understand, in more detail, this bald 
assertion of the relation between form and content. For the 
moment, however, it is necessary to draw out some of the 
implications of Lubbock' s view of the relationship betwee.n 
subject matter ~nd technique; content and form. For the aim of 
~ the techniques~ to purify and make present the subject matter 
and this purification is seen in terms of the removal of the 
author. It is here that the famous distinction between 'telling' 
and 1 showing 1 plays its vital role. Throughout his book 
Lubbock is concerned to distinguish between two kinds of 
narration, one of which he names pictorial and the other 
dramatic. He himself states the opposition with perfect clarity 
in the following passage: 
11 It is a question, I said, of the reader's 
relation to the writer; in one case the 
reader faces towards the story-teller and listens to him, in the other he turns towards 
8. S. Beckett. "Dante •.. Bruno. Vico ... Joyce." in Our Exagmination Round his Factification for Work in Progress. p.13. 
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the story and watches it. In the drama of the stage, in the acted play, the spectator 
evidently has no direct concern with the author 
at all, while the action is proceeding. The 
author places their parts in the mouths of the players, leaves them to make their own impression, leaves us, the audience, to make 
what we can of it. '.rhe motion of life is before 
us, the recording registering mind of the author is eliminated. 11
9 
While Lubbock admits that no novel can simply be drama, 
his thesis is that the greater the author's success in hiding 
himself in his own work, the greater the success of the novel. 
Now it may be thought that, in his wish to eliminate the author 
from the novel, Lubbock does not subscribe to that dominance of 
the author which I located as one of the central features of the 
work of Leavis and Richards. However, the author's disappearance 
fulfills exactly the same function in Lubbock's work as his 
super-normality does in Richards - and that function is, para-
doxically, to ensure the author's dominance. Richards has to 
make the author super-normal because the emphasis in his work is 
on the subject who produces the work. Insofar as each work is to 
have a common meaning guaranteed by our common human nature then 
the author, in order to control his meanings, must be as normal 
as the next man. In Lubbock the emphasis is on the object, on 
the situation - the object which rises up before the authorts 
eye and which he must then commit to paper in such a way that 
others will see it too. But in order for others to see it clearly 
he must remove all merely personal influences which might cloud 
9. Percy Lubbock. op.cit. p.111. 
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the objective picture - he must write himself out of the story. 
But it is exactly in his writing out, in this process of 
effacement, that the genius and dominance of the writer operates. 
It is the skill with which he effaces himself which makes a 
great author - the skill with which he lets the real present 
itself (as, in the original moment, it presented itself to him). 
The job of the author is to control his technique so that he 
disappears and the best form is arrived at - form being defined 
by Lubbock as that which makes the most of its subject-matter. 10 
We can notice here a discrepancy within Lubbockts 
position. While on the one hand he wishes to endow the artist 
with the power of creation, on the other he wishes to emphasize 
the independence of the object described. What, in effect, he 
does is to place all his emphasis on the second moment of 
creation - the elimination from the created object of any sign 
of the heterogenous order from which it finds its definition in 
the first moment of creation. There is a consequent lack of 
emphasis on the author as original creator and a greater attention 
td the author as the recorder of revelation. The central nature 
of the artistic activity becomes the presentation of the real real 
hidden in the formless reality of everyday life. This division of 
realities, which can be seen at work in the passage quoted above 
when Lubbock talks of the greater reality of Tolstoy's selection, 
is the central feature of empiricism and indeed Lubbock's whole 
account of the novel is best understood as an empiricist account. 
10. ibid. p.40. 
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In Lire Le Capital, Louis Althusser locates the specific 
feature of empiricism not in the confrontation between subject 
and object which comes anterior to any knowledge (though to be 
sure empiricism relies on this), but rather in the characterization 
of the process of obtaining knowledge. This sets up a certain 
relationship between the object known and the knowledge, in which 
the knowledge is defined by the object of which it is knowledge: 
"Tout le proc~s empiriste de la connaissance 
reside en effet dans l'op~ration du sujet denommee abstraction. Connaitre, cYest 
abstraire de l'objet r~el son essence, dont la possession par le sujet est alors dite 
connaissance. 11 11 
What Althusser is concerned to point out is that the whole 
conception depends on a play between two notions of real (and 
ultimately two notions of object) and that this play suppresses 
and eliminates the process at work in the production of knowledge. 
11. Louis Althusser, Etienne Balibar. Lire Le Capital vol.1 p.39. "The whole empiricist process of knowledge lies in fact in that operation of the subject named abstraction. To know is to abstract from the real object its essence, the possession of which by the subject is then called knowledge." Althusser points out, in the same argument, that the structure of empiricism is simply the profane transcription of the religious myth of the epiphany. Lubbock, as I have indicated, tends to hover between considering the work as creation and considering it as revelation. What is of interest is that both exist within the same double movement whereby the object created or revealed must have the marks of difference left by the creation or revelation erased. Stephenrs famous exposition of the theory of epiphanies reveals adequately the twofold nature of the operation. Firstly the object must be separated from the void, then it must be understood as itself -when both these operations are complete the object is epiphanised. See Stephen Hero. pp.217-218. 
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Lubbock 1 s account starts out with the real - the continuous 
endless scene, in which the eye is caught in a thousand 
directions at once. However having discarded the inessential 
and the irrelevant, he ends up with the real real - the landscape 
that is whole and single, compact with its own meaning. What 
must be hidden by the author is the process by which we arrive 
at this single but whole landscape; for, of course, on this 
account the process is completely superfluous as the 'real real• 
is there all along simply waiting to be seen. Thus, for Lubbock, 
any concept of process is reduced and eliminated. It is here 
that we can begin to question a certain realist tendency at work 
in almost all critics of the novel. We could say, against the 
traditional analysis, that the novel does not reveal the real 
but is constituted by a set of discourses which (in the positions 
allowed to subject and object) produce a certain reality. 
Together with this emphasis on production we can recall another 
crucial Marxist term - that of contradiction. For it is not 
simply that there is one discourse which produces a certain 
reality - to take that position would be to invite a fall into 
an idealism complementary to the empiricism just discussed. 
What is always in question when we analyse a text is a set of 
contradictory discourses transformed by specific practices. Thus 
the discourse of Irish nationalism appears in the Cyclops chapter, 
but the effects generated by the montage in which it appears 
makes a simple nationalist position untenable for the reader. 
It is neither a question of the writer using a transparent 
discourse to render the real, nor of him inventing a discourse 
so 
which produces a real. Instead we can understand the writing of 
a text as involving a work, a practice, a transformation on the 
discourses available. That one such practice, which I shall 
term classic realism, involves the homogeneisation of different 
discourses through their relation to one dominant discourse is 
a matter of historical but not normative interest. I hope to 
demonstrate with reference to Joyce how these contradictory 
discourses and the practices that articulate them together -
transform them - have certain political effects. For the moment, 
and against a traditional realist emphasis, one could say that 
it is the contradictory positions available discursively to the 
subject which constitute, at any given time, together with the 
positions made available by non-linguistic practices, the 
reality of the social situation. 
It is contradiction which Lubbock wishes at all costs to 
conceal and indeed it is coherence which furnishes him with his 
crucial emphasis. For Lubbock a work must be completely 
coherent and no rent or tear should spoil its compact meaning 
and allow a fall into contradiction. This emphasis on the 
importance of coherence can be seen in those passages where 
Lubbock talks of the final weakness of War and Peace. Insisting 
on the unreconciled opposition between the story of growing up 
(embodied in the central characters of the novel) and the theme 
of the broad march of history, Lubbock states his objections as 
follows: 
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"I can discover no angle at which the two stories 
will appear to unite and merge in a single 
impression. Neither is subordinate to the other, 
and there is nothing above them (what more could 
there be?) to which they are both related. Nor 
are they placed together to illustrate a contrast; 
nothing results from their juxtaposition. 11 12 
What is necessary to save the story is some third term which 
would bind everything together into unity. Anything which is 
not unity is conf~sion and as such to be condemned. Lubbock ends 
his account of War and Peace with the following words: 
"Here, then, is the reason, or at any rate one of 
the reasons, why the general shape of War and Peace 
fails to satisfy the eye - as I suppose it 
admittedly to fail. It is a confusion of two 
designs, a confusion more or less masked by Tolstoy's 
imperturbable ease of manner, but revealed by the 
look of his novel when it is seen as a whole. 11 13 
Simply to oppose two attitudes we could recall Brecht's 
comment that if he had a fault it was that he had never been able 
to bear anything but contradiction. 14 So firstly, one might 
confront on a personal level a passion for unity and a passion 
for contradiction. But, in fact, we can go further than that. 
Simply to condemn unity and locate it as the spurious goal of an 
essentially religious conception (religion being understood as 'I 
12. Percy Lubbock, op.cit. p.33. 
13. ibid. p.39. 
14. Bertolt Brecht. 
my own lack of German 
Brecht's theoretical 
translations. 
~ Les Arts et la revolution p.41. Unhappily 
and the paucity of English versions of 
works have necessitated my use of French 
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that which will deny, at all costs, difference, contradiction, 
negativity in favour of a moment of origin and presence where 
the divided self was (and will be) made whole) leaves us with 
the problem of discriminating between texts. For it cannot be 
correct merely to replace unity as a criterion of value with 
contradiction, for then one could simply justify any text on the 
basis of finding some features of it contradictory. At this 
point contradiction would come to function in exactly the same 
way as the notion of coherence; that is to say without any 
objective specifications whatsoever - it is always open to the 
critic to find a set of relationships which make any work coherent. 
If, however, we turn to Marx in order to discover a sufficiently 
precise and elaborate concept of contradiction, we find that 
although Marx is aware of the many sided-nature of contradiction 
(see for example, his analysis 
~&=-) he of the peasantry in The 18th Brumaire of Louis never produces a theoretical 
elaboration of this many-sidedness. As Louis Althusser writes: 
" toute l'exp~rience r~volutionnaire marxiste 
d~montre que si la contradiction en general (mais 
elle est d~jA sp~cifi~e: la contradiction entre 
les forces de production et les rapports de 
production, incarnee essentiellement clans la 
contradiction entre deux classes antagonistes) 
suffit a definir une situation Oll la revolution 
est 11 il llordre du jour" elle ne peut, par sa 
simple vertu direct.e, provoquer une 11 situation 
revolutionnaire", et a plus fort raison une 
situation de rupture revolutionnaire et. le 
triomphe de la revolution• !I lS 
15. Louis Althusser, Pour Marx pp.97-98 11 ••• the whole revolu- !-
tionary Marxist exper:ience -deirwnstrates that if contradiction in l 
general (but it is already specific: the contradiction between 
the forces of production and the relations of production, 
essentially embodied in the contradiction between two antagonistic 
classes) is sufficient to define the situation when revo+ution 
is 'the task of the dayt, it cannot of its own simple direct power 
induce a 1 revolutionary situation', nor a fortiori a situation of 
revol1.:1.ti,.)nary rupture and the triumph of the revolution. 11 
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It was Lenin who, in his writings on the Russian 
revolution postulated that although there was a constant 
contradiction at work in capitalism and its imperialist develop-
ment, there ~further factors which were needed to explain 
moments of revolutionary change. 16 This moment arrived when a 
whole set of contradictions, heterogenous amongst themselves, 
brought their combined weight to bear on the economic and 
political order and thus provoked a revolutionary situation in 
a particular state. Russia in 1917 was such a state, with its 
contradictions between the most advanced capitalist production 
and the most backward feudal relations in Europe, with an 
absolutism in contradiction with a bourgeois order which had 
already produced its own proletarian opponent, with an imperialist 
world order so shattered by the first war that it could not bring 
its full force to bear and with many further contradictions which, 
heterogenous as they were, added to the pressure being applied to 
the old order. Althusser, in the essay already quoted, has 
attempted to develop Lenin 1 s insight and certain of Mao Tse Tung's 
remarks in "On Contradiction" through the Freudian concept of 
overdetermination. Overdetermination is the concept used by 
Freud to account for the fact that the neurotic symptom or the 
symbol in the dream is never the unambiguous representation of a 
16. The theme of the set of autonomous contradictions, united in 
producing a revolutionary situation, is constant in Lenin's 
reflections on the Russian Revolution from his first comments on 
the February revolution, "Letter from Afar" (No.1) in Collected 
Works vol.23 pp.297-308, to his last thoughts before his death, 
"Our Revolution" op.cit. vol.33. pp.476-479. Althusser provides 
a brilliant summary of the arguments op.cit. pp.92-96. 
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single unconscious content. For Freud, the symbol or symptom 
is the nodal point of a whole tissue of conflicts which can only 
be separated out through the investigation of the structure in 
which they are defined. Theey-mptom thus serves as a compromise 
formation between different conflicts, which conflicts will be 
inscribed several times over in the patientls behaviour and 
psychic productions. 
This multiple determination should not, however, be 
confused with an infinity of possible meanings. Freud, himself, 
explains it with reference to certain languages, particularly 
ideographic ones, in which the written sentence has a limited 
plurality of meanings which depend on the tone, pitch, etc with 
17 which the written words are pronounced. Althusser uses 
Freudts concept to articulate Lenin's position and to break with 
an Hegelian reading of Marx in which all contradictions are 
finally reducible within a given totality to a unifying determina-
tion. Against Hegel, Althusser wishes to emphasize the autono-
mous nature of certain levels of contradiction which however all 
bring their force to bear in a given conjuncture - as there is 
an autonomy of the various psychic conflicts which, however, 
combine to produce the symptom. 
If we return from this detour to ask how contradiction 
can be used as a criteri~within literary criticism, we can 
answer that one can distinguish, on the one hand, a whole 
17. Sigmund Freud. op.cit. vol.XV. pp.230-231. 
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variety of contradictions at the level of style, characterization, 
narration and, on the other, the contradiction between a dominant 
ideology and its competitors. It is when a number of contra-
dictions of the first type combine and weigh upon the second that 
we can talk of overdetermination and of a literary revolution -
one that breaks at every level with the dominant forms. The 
~ 
criteri• that we can now oppose to Lubbock's ideal coherence and 
unity is one of a set of contradictions, which in their united 
force, break with a previous discursive order. An ideology (a 
discursive order) might be defined as a set of discourses which, 
although containing contradictions, allows the production of 
apparently homogenous positions for the subject to take up. It 
is when we come to examine Joycets texts that we will be able to 
make these general statements more specific and delineate the 
precise nature of the break that Joyce 1 s practice operates, but, 
for the moment, turning back to Lubbock and Tolstoy we can 
remark that it is perhaps no accident that the whole book is 
split between the story of individuals and the story of history. 
For when, if not in the period after 1848, did the relation of 
the individual to history become a problem? Can we not learn 
from the fact that War and Peace is written almost contemperan-
eously with Capital? - Capital, that first text of a science of 
history which will decentre the individual into certain effects 
of the class struggle, and will place that struggle as the major 
determinant of historical change. 18 The question, then, to be 
18. War and Peace was finally published in 1869, Capital in 1867, 
both were written during the eighteen sixties. 
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asked about War and Peace is not whether we can find a third 
term which will render the disparate stories homogenous but 
whether the primary ideological contradiction (Who makes history?) 
enters into relation with other specifically poetic ones. 
It may be remarked that, on this approach, we would be 
very likely to end up with the same value judgement on Tolstoy's 
novel as that advanced by Lubbock but the difference of criteria 
will become of substantial importance when we are discussing 
texts such as those of Joyce. We can understand the importance 
of the change of criteria if we consider the crucial question 
that Lubbock poses to the novelist. Talking of Meredith and his 
use of the first person Lubbock asks and the question is worth 
listening to: 
"Does he contrive to conceal the trouble, does he 
make us exceedingly unconscious of it while we 
read the book? 11 19 
The aim is to conceal the trouble - to leave the unconscious 
unconscious. What, however, one can propose in opposition to 
this concealment, is not that the author should show us the 
trouble (how could anyone show us the unconscious?) but rather 
that he should make that trouble speak - that he should produce 
a lapse, a joke, a symptom. The change of sense (from sight to 
hearing) is to emphasize the mistake Lubbock makes in talking of 
19. Percy Lubbock, op.cit. p.137. 
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the novel form simply in terms of vision. To understand fully 
the implications of this mistake, it is necessary to consider 
briefly the analysis of vision offered by Jacques Lacan in 
Le S~minaire XI. For Lacan, vision offers a peculiarly 
privileged basis to an imaginary relation of the individual to 
the world. 20 This imaginary relationship is characterised by 
the plenitude it confers on both subject and object, caught as 
they are outside any definition in terms of difference; given in 
a full substantial unity. The centrality of the imaginary for 
the operation of the human psyche can best be understood through 
d t d . f th . h 21 an un ers an ing o e mirror-p ase. Somewhere between the 
sixth and eighteenth month, the small human infant discovers its 
reflection in the mirror; an apprehension of unity all the more 
surprising in that it normally occurs before motor control has 
ensured that unity in practice. The specular relation thus 
established, which provides the basis for primary narcissism, is 
now transferred onto the rest of the human world where every 
20. Considerable use is made in this thesis of the work of the French psycho-analyst Jacques Lacan. Each Lacanian concept is explained as it is introduced into the text but the central terms can be found defined in a continuous discourse in Colin Maccabe, 
"Presentation of fThe Imaginary Signifier'" Screen vol.16 no.2. Summer 1975 pp.7-13. The analysis of a Holbein painting which is discussed in this chapter can be found in 11 Du regard comme objet petit a" in Le Seminaire XI pp.65-109. My understanding of the issues-has benefited from Christian Metzr article "The Imaginary Signifier" Screen vol.16 no.2 Summer 1975. pp.14-76 and an 
unpublished paper on the concept of the imaginary by Jacqueline Rose of University College, London. 
21. A full exposition of the mirror phase can be found in Jacques Lacan. Ecrits pp.93-100. 
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other is simply seen as another version of the same - of the 'I' 
which is the centre of the world. The philosophical correlative 
of this psychic stage can be found in solipsistic theories. It 
is only with the apprehension of genital difference that the child 
leaves the comfortable world of the imaginary to enter into the 
world of the symbolic. The symbolic is understood by Lacan (after 
Livi-Strauss) not as a set of one to one relationships but as a 
tissue of differences which articulate the crucial elements 
within the child's world. It is the acceptance of a potential 
lack (castration) which marks the child's access to the symbolic 
and to language. Language in the realm of the imaginary is 
understood in terms of some full relation between word and thing; 
a mysterious unity of sign and referent. In the symbolic, 
language is understood in terms of lack and absence - the sign 
finds its definition diacritically through the absent syntagmatic 
and paradigmatic chains it enters into. As speaking subjects we 
constantly oscillate between the symbolic and the imaginary -
constantly imagining ourselves granting some full meaning to 
the words we speak, and constantly being surprised to find them 
determined by relations outside our control. But, if it is the 
phallus which is the determining factor of the entry into 
difference, difference has already troubled the full world of the 
infant. The imaginary unity has already been disrupted by that 
cruel separation from those objects originally understood as part 
of the subject the breast and the faeces. The phallus becomes 
the dominating metaphor for all these previous lacks. Lacan 
defines the centrality of the phallus for the entry into the 
L 
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symbolic and language when he describes the phallus as: 
11 le signifiant destine a designer dans leur 
ensemble les effets de signifie, en tant que 
le signifiant les conditionne par sa prtsence 
de signifiant. 11 22 
The signified here is exactly the imaginary full meaning constantly 
contaminated by the signifier's organisation along constitutive 
and absent chains. 
In Le S~minaire XI, Lacan attempts to demonstrate the 
relation between the symbolic and the imaginary at the level of 
vision and to demonstrate the existence of lack within the scopic 
field (this lack being the existence of desire within the visual 
field - a desire which can find satisfaction in a variety of 
forms.) Taking the picture of Holbeints entitled The Ambassadors, 
Lacan comments on the death's head which is hidden in the 
picture by a trick of perspective and which is only visible from 
one particular angle. The rest of the picture is caught in the 
world of the imaginary - the spectator is the all-seeing subject 
and, as if to emphasize the narcissistic nature of this relation, 
Holbein fills the picture with emblems of vanity. However, the 
death's head, perceived when leaving the field of the picture, 
re-introduces the symbolic. For the death's head draws attention 
22. Jacques Lacan. op.cit. p.690. 11 the signifier destined 
to designate the effects, taken as a set, of signified, insofar l 
as the signifier conditions these effects by its presence as 
signifier." 
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to the fact that we see the picture at a distance and from a 
particular angle. For the all-seeing vision we have the 
particular look. For the objects which are simply and substantial-
ly there we have a set of differential relationships; a set of 
traces left by a paint brush; an organised area of space which, 
from one particular point, can be read as an object. That the 
object thus seen should be a skull is in no way surprising when 
we consider that the entry into the symbolic could be easily 
described as the recognition of the world independently of my 
consciousness - to the recognition, that is, of the possibility 
of my own death, 23 Holbeinis picture demonstrates a congruence 
between the organisation of language and the organisation of the 
visual field. Just as the constitutive elements of language 
must be absent in the moment of speaking so the constitutive 
nature of the distance and position of the viewing subject must 
be absent from the all-embracing world of vision. The Ambassadors 
re-introduces the look into vision. As such it bears witness to 
the separation (castration) on which vision is based but which it 
endlessly attempts to ignore. 
The intervention of the symbolic in the imaginary is 
already in evidence at the very opening of the mirror-phase. For 
the infant verifies its reflection by looking to the mother who 
holds it in front of the mirror. It is the motheris look that 
23. It is in this context that one can understand Lacan's reported 
interest in Tom Stoppard's Rosencrantz and Guilderstern are Dead. 
He has described the play in conversation as "la pitce la plus 
lacanienne que j'aie jamais vue. 11 
·:::;¥5' : :t 
>'c.:f> 
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confirms the validity of the infant's image and with this look 
we find that right at the foundation of the dual imaginary 
relationship there is a third term which already unsettles it. 
The mother verifies the relationship but at the cost of already 
introducing a look, a difference, where there should only be 
similitude. That this look, which both sets up and potentially 
destroys the full visual field, is felt as castration can offer 
us an understanding of why, traditionally, the eye is always evil. 
We are now in a position to understand why Lacan claims that the 
visual is organized in terms of a look - defined by the other's 
look it is not - and of the blot (la tache) which is the term 
Lacan uses to illustrate the fact that any visual field is 
already structured so that certain effects will be seen. 
writes: 
II la fonction de la tache et du regard y est 
·a la f ois ce qui le commande le plus secretement, 
et ce qui echappe toujours a la saisie de cette 
forme de la vision qui se satisfait d'elle-meme 
en s'imaginant comme conscience. 11 24 
La can 
Lubbock 1 s emphasis on the visual must be understood as an 
attempt to place the novel in the imaginary and to refuse its 
disfigurement by any scar which would introduce the symbolic. 
Writing in its constant exteriority is constantly menacing to a 
24. Jacques Lacan. Le Seminaire XI, p.71. "··· the function of 
the blot and of the look is, at one and the same time, that which 
commands the most secretly, and that which always escapes the grip 
of, that form of vision which finds its contentment in imagining 
itself as consciousness." 
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world of imaginary plenitude and must, therefore, be repressed 
at all costs. 25 In its place a visual world is instituted, but 
a visual world from which the look, any trace of castration, has 
been expelled. At this stage, it might be objected that this 
cannot be Lubbock of whom we are talking; is it not Lubbock who 
introduced the look, or, to put it in more English terms, the 
point of view? The distinction, however, between the look and 
the point of view is the same distinction as that between the 
symbolic and the imaginary. The point of view is always related 
to an object. But, insofar as the object is a given unity, there 
is always a point of over-view from which the object and all the 
points of view can be seen. Thus, for example, Lubbock in 
Chapter XI of his book can give a total description of the 
situation in Henry James' The Ambassadors and a description of 
the point of view from which Strether sees it. Whereas the 
point of view is related to an object, the look is related to 
other looks. The look 1 s field is not defined by a science of 
optics in which the eye features as a geometrical point but by 
the fact that the object we are looking at offers a position from 
which we can be looked at - and this look is not punctual but 
shifts over the surface. It is thus important that it is a head 
that looks back at us from Holbein's painting. It might be added, 
in parenthesis, that in order to develop Lubbockts undoubted 
insights into Henry James' novel, we would have to search the 
novelist's The Ambassadors until it, too, began to look back at us. 
25. For a more detailed consideration of the threat posed by 
writing see Chapter 5. 
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It is an attachment to the imaginary which links 
literary theorists as seemingly disparate as Lubbock and Richards 
and which unites Joycean critics of every persuasion. In the 
shade of the imaginary, language is turned into a pure trans-
parency commanded by the conscious subject and it is this 
conscious subject who renders language adequate to the evident 
object. Schematically, and in order to facilitate our move 
from Richards and Lubbock to the Joyce critics, we could 
characterize the results of this view of language in three theses. 
Theses which, in their generality, are intended to cover not 
simply Joyce critics, but the very activity of literary criticism 
itself: 
1. The text is understood as aiming or tending 
towards coherence and it is coherence that renders 
a work's inner essence. 
2. The author is theorized as creator: homogenous 
source of the text. 
3. The first two theses guarantee that we must talk 
of a text's truth in relation to a fixed and separate 
exterior. (Whether this exterior will be the world 
of public experience or the world of the author's 
imagination will depend on how we interpret the first 
two theses). 
Starting with coherence, we can see that whether it is 
the coherence between sound and sense in Richards (poetry is 
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exactly evaluated in terms of the bringing into coincidence of 
the use of the word as symbol and all its various occurrences 
as sign) or narrative coherence in Lubbock, it is in both a basic 
requirement. It is coherence that Leavis fails to find in Joyce 
but which the myriad of Joycean critics have found in abundance. 
Arnold GoldmanYs book The Joyce Paradox illuminatingly demonstrates 
the attachment to coherence. Although Goldman is aware that the 
majority of Joycean critics have taken one feature of Joyce 1 s 
texts and used it as the cohering principle through which to read 
the rest of the texts, he re-duplicates their basic assumptions 
at a different level. Thus he can declare that "the full spectrum 
of critical opinion is, as is usually true of the hyberbolic 
literary forms, a projection of thematic conflicts within the 
26 
work" but then he simply finds a super-theme which fulfils 
exactly the same function. Goldman distinguishes two main 
readings of Joyce: on the one hand, there is a symbolist reading 
in which every event and action in Dubliners, A Portrait or 
Ulysses merely portrays or betrays the essential nature of Dublin 
and their inhabitants, and, on the other, there is a realist 
reading in which the characters are given a certain freedom of 
choice and their development is of importance. The Joyce Paradox 
suggests that rather than plumping for one or other of these 
readings we should see Joyce's texts as a constant balancing of 
these oppositions: 
26. Arnold Goldman, The Joyce Paradox, p.138. 
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"I hope to prove that a 'symbolistt reading of 
Joyce 1 s Portrait of the Artist will be essentially 
different from a •realistic' reading. It will be 
a further task to describe their relationship and 
to show that this relationship is by way of a 
description of the novel's meaning. 11 27 
Goldman is fully aware of how the stylistic changes within 
Ulysses resist coherence and, unlike many Joyce critics, he takes 
serious notice of the fact that the styles 11 approach, more and 
more radically, discrete and often incompatible modes of vision. 1128 
But just as the contradiction between symbolist and realist be-
comes the major theme of the texts, so the use of language within 
Ulysses becomes merely expressive of this and other conflicts, 
11 between 'symbolic' and 'realistict presentation, 
between literary parody (of high and low literature) 
and the parody, or extension of common speech, 
between the super-conscious and the sub-conscious. 11 29 
Goldman attempts to find a" 'dialectical suspense' 11 in which 
11 the opposing forces exist in permanent contradiction1130 in order 
to find an explanation which takes account both of Joyce's texts 
and the conflicting readings they generate. However, by making 
form expressive and by locating a super-theme, Goldman has merely 
reproduced a coherence for the texts at a higher level. Every 
27. ibid. p.24. 
28. ibid. p.99. 
29. ibid. p.117. 
30. ibid. p.107. 
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feature of the text is determined by one theme and, whether one 
calls this theme a contradiction or not, it functions as a 
unifying explanation of the texts. The ipermanent contradiction' 
is something to be represented, not a radical heterogeneity which 
produces a break in the very methods of representation. 
It is when we realize that coherence is guaranteed by the 
work representing or expressing a theme that must be separable 
from it, that we can understand how a commitment to a text's 
coherence entails a commitment to an author (in the full 
ideological sense already discussed) and to a correspondence 
theory of truth. The commitment to the author is the necessity 
to locate this separable theme somewhere - the author's 
consciousness is the only possible site for this in an age when 
supernatural forces are discounted. And, equally, the truth of 
the work is determined by the correspondence between what must be 
represented and the representation (whether what must be 
represented finds it unity in some original movement of the 
author's consciousness or in a reality which is then grasped by 
the author is, for our purposes, unimportant). Goldman, through 
his attachment to coherence, is driven to postulate an homogenous 
creative source for the text. Ulysses, for example, is held to 
represent at every level - stylistic, symbolic, philosophical -
the problems that concerned Joyce with regard to freedom and 
determinism. That Goldman understands these problems as problems 
which are directly posed by experience, entails that he places 
Joyce within a realist tradition. It is, perhaps, no accident 
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that Goldman does not write about Finnegans Wake, for with 
Joyce's final text it becomes almost impossible to read it in 
terms of a classic realism, unless one is going to push the ideas 
of expressive style to a ridiculous limit. Style can be read 
as expressive of certain conflicts in reality when those conflicts 
find an expression within the content of the text - it is more 
difficult to hold this position when the content of the text 
becomes as 'contaminated' by style as it does in Finnegans Wake. 
Goldman realises this difficulty when he writes: 
"I have, however, stopped short of discussing 
Finnegans Wake. Whether the Wake confronts at 
a different level problems like potentiality 
for human development or evades them altogether 
• t II is moo. 31 
The attachment to realism entails that Goldman can use 
Kifikergaard to explicate Joyce without postulating Joyce I s 
knowledge of KiErkergaard. As KiErkergaard and Joyce are both 
confronting the same human reality - one can compare their texts 
without any presumption of interaction. Clive Hart, however, in 
a book like Structure and Motif in Finnegans Wake has no such 
option. Other texts are valuable only insofar as Joyce used 
them because coherence, which is retained by Hart as a basic 
presupposition, is now only marginally considered in terms of an 
exterior reality (unified through a consciousness) and is 
31. ibid. p.viii. 
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centrally defined by Joyce•s ideas about the world independently 
of these ideasr truth. Madame Blavatsky 1 s Isis Unveiled and 
modern sub-atomic physics have the same status because Joyce used 
them - the criteria for use, when not direct from Joyce or his 
acquaintances, is through repetition within Finnegans Wake. 
Whereas, in Goldman, the truth of the text is seen through a 
correspondence with the order of things in the world - an order of 
things grasped by the author - for Hart, such reference to the 
world becomes practically otiose. What matters is Joyce's 
conception of the world - once we have identified that then the 
work can be seen as the representation of that conception. Hart's 
central concern is to demonstrate the coherence of Finnegans Wake: 
"A good deal of the excitement in reading Finnegans 
Wake derives from the gradual mental resynthesis of 
;-;;;mplete and highly organised world •.• 11 32 
The work on language is either seen in terms of the expression of 
several enumerable meanings or when those meanings threaten to 
become infinite the form is seen as imitative of some exterior 
reality: 
II a certain random element of unpredictability 
was necessary to Finnegans Wake if it was adequately 
to reflect the new world of physics of which Joyce 
was trying to build up a faithful verbal analogue.n 33 
32. Clive Hart, Structure and Motif in Finnegans Wake, p.15. 
33. ibid. p.65. 
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Wherever the text might threaten to overrun concepts of 
representation there is always some large enough abstraction 
which the form is held to be imitating: 
11 From the initiating spermatic flood of creation, 
•riverrun', to the soft syllable 'the' - the most 
common in the English language - on which it comes 
to its whimpering end, the great mass of Finnegans 
Wake represents eternity; at the opposite extreme 
it seems to represent the fleeting infinitesimal 
moment during which it used to be thought that even 
the longest dream took place. 11 34 
One might consider, at this point, that although we can 
find the assumptions of coherence and the author at work in Hart, 
it is more difficult to understand how truth can operate within 
the schema. However, given that truth is established through 
the correspondence between the text and Joyce 1 s conception of 
the world, then statements about this relation could be false on 
two counts. Firstly, we might identify something in the text 
which could not possibly have been in Joyce's mind - hence Hartis 
concern with whether Joyce had actually read the texts used for 
explication ( Goldman rather hopes Joyce had read Kierl.€:rgaard but 
it is not essential to his argument35). Secondly, we might 
claim that the representation could have been more efficient and 
more coherent: 
11 Many readers feel that they could improve on 
trifles of the text, tightening up correspondences 
34. ibid. pp.69-70. 
35. Goldman, op.cit. pp.66-69. 
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here and there and thickening the texture still 
more. 11 36 
That Joyce 1 s attitudes to his own sources was radically 
different from the one advanced by Hart can be grasped by 
indicating that he obviously considered the Russo-Finnish war of 
1940 as integral a part of the text as any historical events 
that had occurred before the publication of Finnegans Wake. 37 
The sources should not be understood as something to be represented 
but as methods of escaping traditional conceptions of represen-
tation. Writing to Carlo Linati about Ulysses Joyce wrote: 
"Each adventure (that is, every hour, every organ, 
every art being interconnected and interrelated in 
the structural scheme of the whole) should not only 
condition but create its own technique. 11 38 
Here, far from being understood in terms of representation, 
the whole of the elaborate matrices of the book, the Homeric 
parallels, the organs of the body, the story that is told, are 
understood as methods of breaking with the author's control of 
language. In some ways these methods and those like them used in 
36. Clive Hart, op.cit. p.34. 
37. Hart refers to Joyce 1 s view in passing, op.cit. pp.27-28, when 
he attempts to laugh Joyce's foibles off. Joyce's attitude does, 
however, pose a real problem for a critic, who is, in some sense, 
bound by his theory to take account of what Joyce said. Full 
details of Joyce's attitude to events occurring after the 
publication of Finnegans Wake can be found in Eugene Jolas art. 
cit. p. 17. 
38. James Joyce. Letter to Carlo Linati. 6 September 1920· .. Leti:,,eris, 
vol.1, p.147. 
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Finnegans Wake recall the cut-up techniques, used particularly 
by William Burroughs as a means of avoiding the stereotyped 
repetition of a reality already given; as a means of revealing 
the processes by which that reality is produced. 39 For while 
the conscious subject is caught within a fixed area, formed 
within orders of discourse which reduce the world and the self 
to a 'comprehensible' content, it is possibly by the juxtaposition 
of various forms to fracture those discourses in their evident 
reality and make them appear as discourses - as areas of identity 
and sense. Joyce himself could be said to have seen his own 
practice as a kind of 1 cut-up 1 when he wrote, "I am quite content 
to go down to posterity as a scissors and paste man for that 
seems to me a harsh but not unjust description.11 40 
The critic who has perhaps most thoroughly understood the 
strategy of Joyce 1 s texts and yet has never pushed that under-
standing to its conclusion is Hugh Kenner. All the strengths and 
weaknesses of Kenner 1 s position is evident in the short section on 
Joyce in The Stoic Comedians. Kenner rejects traditional 
conceptions of representation explicitly: 
39. 
11 Joyce 1 s techniques - it is one of his principal 
lessons - are without exception derived from his 
subject, often excerpted from his subject. They 
are not means of representing the subject, and 
imperfectly; they are the subject's very members 
laid on the page, in eloquent or ludicrous collage." 41 
See William Burroughs. The Job, pp.27-56. 
40. James Joyce. 
vol.1. p.297. 
Letter to George Antheil 3 January 1931 Lett~rs 
41. Hugh Kenner. The Stoic Comedians, p.50. 
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Kenner refuses, however, to push the consequences of the collage 
to its limit. Instead of questioning the position of the writer 
(and subsequently the reader) in a text deprived of a represen-
tational standpoint, he lapses back into the traditional notion 
of the author outside the text controlling its correspondence 
with reality. The collage is explained through an authorial 
attempt to achieve a realism which takes account of the printed 
word by repeating it, and Joyce 1 s refusal of representation 
becomes an attempt actually to put the reality of our post-
Gutenburg era on the page: 
"This is the comedy of inventory, the comedy of 
the closed system, in which we constantly recognize 
known things in new fantastic guises; and it is 
the dead end which Joyce triumphantly prosecuted 
until it became exactly the image of the city he 
loved for its variety and distrusted for its poverty 
of resource. 11 42 
Once again we find coherence (1 the closed system') which corresponds 
correctly ~exactly the image 1)to a reality perceived by an author 
( 'the city he loved ..• and distrusted'i Kenner 1 s weakness could 
be pin-pointed by reference to the fact that he understand's 
Joyce's practice as collage and not montage; for Kenner the 
objects are simply arranged they are not juxtaposed in such a way 
as to re-articulate both subject and object. 
What is most striking about all these critics is the 
security with which they organize the text and then compare it to 
42. ibid. p.66. 
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whatever the text is meant to be a representation of. The 
critics presuppose that there is a language (their own) which 
can cover both world and representation without any problem. 
This security of position can most clearly be seen in the diagram 
where Goldman attempts to give a spatial representation of the 
difference between a Joycean and a traditional philosophical novel: 
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What is striking about Goldman 1 s diagram is that the 
interpretative discourse is simply moved a level upwards, while 
maintaining the same relations with the text. Its position is 
not troubled by the changes at the other levels - it remains the 
synoptic discourse which, from a position outside the text orders 
and articulates it, even if, in Ulxsses, the chapter styles 
become one of the elements to be organised. The belief in a 
transparent and representational discourse available to the writer 
is re-duplicated in the critic's attitude to his own discourses. 
These are seen to pose no problem as the critic assigns meaning 
and truth to a text; establishing a set of fixed relations which 
constitute the text as object. The text, however, does not 
exist independently of the discourses which surround and articulate 
it. Joyce was completely correct when he thought that the future 
was as much a part of Finnegans Wake as the past - just as Donners 
poetry is changed by T.S. Eliot's verse and criticism, so 
Paradise Lost can assume new configurations after the birth of a 
science, psycho-analysis, which takes as its object the 
articulation of knowledge and desire. The critic can no longer 
rest secure in the adequacy of his discourses for if he does then 
he will rest secure in a set of assumptions which are produced 
behind his back; a set of assumptions which are the constitutive 
darkness that his light refuses to comprehend. Philippe Sollers 
has written of this situation in the following terms: 
11 Nous vivons dans le faux jour d 1 une langue morte 
aux significations born~es: nous manquons le jour 
dans la mesure ou nous manquons la nuit que nous 
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sommes. Mais nous ne sommes pas autre chose que 
ce mouvement nocturne et diurne du lisible et de 
l'illisible, en nous, hors de nous, - et cela nous 
ne voulons pas le savoir.n 44 
The critic, in fact, becomes involved in a constant struggle - a 
work on and a transformation of the critical discourses which 
constitute him as critic, and this practice of criticism is 
constantly tearing texts from their old meanings in order to make 
them live again. This practice is not self-generating but is 
constantly criss-crossed by other contradictions and conflicts. 
Crucial to the writing of this thesis is those most active and 
growing points in English writing (e.g. the work of William 
Burroughs and J.G. Ballard) and the most active contemporary 
reflections on language, notably the works of Jacques Lacan and 
Jacques Derrida. 45 
44. Philippe Sollers. Logiques. p.240. 11 We live in the false 
light of a dead language. A language stripped of meaning and of 
ideologically limited reference. We fail to see the day we are 
not as we fail to see the night we are. But we are nothing more 
than that movement nocturnal and diurnal between what can and 
cannot be read both in- and out- side us and of which we wish to 
know nothing." 
45. Both Lacan and Derrida have acknowledged their debt to Joyce 
as a precursor of their work. Lacan sees Joyce as the first to 
enter into a radical experience of language as the play of the 
signifier: 11 • • • apr~s tout 1 r Ef crit comme pas-a-lire, c' est Joyce 
qui ltintroduit, je ferais mieux de dire: l'intraduit, car a faire 
du mot traite au-dela des langues, il ne se traduit qu 1a peine, 
d'etre partout ega:J\ient peu a lire. 11 Le Seminaire XI p.252. 
Derrida, whose wor~ is constituted by an endeavour to read the 
history of philosophy as the history of a discourse which desires 
to fix its own limits, has also signalled his debt to Joyce and 
indeed has described his own texts as a footnote to Finnegans Wake. 
La Dissemination. p.99. 
I i 
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JAMES JOYCE AND THE REVOLUTION IN THE WORD 
11 scriptum sum" James Joyce. Joyce's Ulysses Notesheets in the British Museum. ed. Phillip F. Herring. p.214. 
CHAPTER 3 
FROM GEORGE ELIOT TO DUBLINERS: 
THE END OF A META-DISCOURSE. 
If we remember the argument advanced in the first chapter, 
it is necessary if we wish to talk of revolution with regard to 
Joyce 1 s texts to talk of a revolution in and not of the word. To 
understand a "practice of writing which alters the very ways in 
which signs are produced and defined111 we could consider how the 
unproblematic discourse of the critic, the meta-discourse which 
turns all form into content 2 , becomes impossible to sustain under 
the pressure of Joyce 1 s writing. None of the discourses which 
circulate in Ulysses or Finnegans Wake can master and make sense 
of the others. Instead the content is continually becoming form, 
as the text, instead of falling back into the innocent repetition 
of a given content, investigates the process by which the content 
is produced - the discursive structuration of reality. The 
absence of a meta-discourse in Joycets work might be best 
approached by a reflection on the fact that, from his earliest 
writings, Joyce refused to use what he called "perverted commas113 . 
While those sections in a work which are contained in inverted 
commas may offer different ways of regarding and analysing the 
world, they are negated as real alternatives by the unspoken (or 
more accurately the unwritten) prose that surrounds them. The 
1. supra p. 32. 
2. See supra pp.28-29. 
3. James Joyce. 
vol.3. p.99. 
Letter to Harriet Shaw Weaver.11 July 1924-Letters 
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narrative prose is the meta-discourse that can state all the 
truths in the object discourse - those marks held in inverted 
commas - and can also explain the relation of this object 
discourse to the world. The meta-discourse can thereby explain 
the strange methods by which the object discourse attempts to 
express truths which are straightforwardly conveyed in the meta-
discourse. An unwritten prose (a meta-discourse) is exactly that 
discourse which, while placing other discourses between inverted 
commas and regarding them as certain material expressions which 
express certain meanings, regards those same meanings as finding 
a transparent expression within the meta-discourse itself. 
Transparent in the sense that the meta-discourse is not designated 
as material: instead it is de-materialized in order to achieve 
perfect representation - to let the identity of things shine 
' through the window of words. For insofar as the meta~discourse.is 
treated itself as material, it, too, can be re-interpreted; new 
meanings can be found for it in a further meta-discourse. The 
problem here is that of the perpetual separation between what is 
said and the act of saying; a separation which must be considered 
as both temporal and spatial. As the space, which in the 
distance from eye to page or from mouth to ear, allows the 
possibility of mis-understanding, as the time taken to traverse 
the page or listen to a sentence, which ensures the necessity of 
a deferred interpretation of words which are only defined by what 
follows. The problem is that although when we say a sentence the 
meaning (what is said) seems fixed and evident, in fact what is 
said does not exist solely for that moment and is open to further 
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interpretations. Even in this formulation of the problem I 
have presupposed an original moment when there is strict 
contemporaneity between the saying and what is said, but the 
difficulty is more radical for there is no such original moment. 
Separation is always already there as we cannot locate the 
presence of what is said - distributed as it is through space, 
nor the present of what is said - distributed as it is through 
time. 
It is this separation that the unwritten text attempts to 
anneal, to make whole, through denying its own status as writing - •· 1 
as marks of material difference distributed through time and 
space. Whereas other discourses within the text are considered 
as materiaJswhich are open to re-interpretation, the narrative 
discourse pretends simply to allow reality to appear and thus 
denies its own status as discourse. This relationship between 
discourses can be taken as the defining feature of the classic 
realist text. The normal criterion for realism (whether a 
discourse is fully adequate to the real)merely accepts the 
conception of the real which the classic realist text proposes 
for its own project. Thus a traditional anti-realist position 
that no discourse can ever be adequate to the multifarious nature 
of the real assumes the classic realist division of language and 
reality. The classic realist text should not, however, be 
understood in terms of some homology to the order of things but 
as, a specific hierarchy of discourses which places the reader in 
a position of dominance with regard to the stories and characters. 
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However, this position is only achieved at the cost of a certain 
fixation, a certain subjection. We can see this discursive 
organisation at work in a writer such as George Eliot. 
In the scene in Middlemarch where Mr Brooke goes to visit 
the Dagley's farm we are presented with two discourses. One is 
the educated, well-meaning, but not very intelligent discourse of 
Mr Brooke and the other is the uneducated, violent and very 
nearly unintelligible discourse of the drunken Dagley. But the 
whole dialogue is surrounded by a meta-discourse (which being 
unspoken is also unwritten) which places these discourses in 
inverted commas and can thereby discuss these discourses' relation 
to truth - a truth which is illuminatingly revealed in the meta-
discourse. The meta-discourse reduces the object discourses into 
a simple division between form and content and extracts the 
meaningful content from the useless form. Thus when we approach 
the end of the chapter, we read the following passage: 
4. 
11 He (Mr Brooke) had never been insulted on his own 
land before, and had been inclined to regard himself 
as a general favourite (we are all apt to do so, 
when we think of our own amiability more than of what 
other people are likely to want of us). When he had 
quarrelled with Caleb Garth twelve years before he 
had thought that the tenants would be pleased at the 
landlordis taking everything into his own hands. 
Some who follow the narrative of his experience may 
wonder at the midnight darkness of Mr Dagley; but 
nothing was easier in those times than for an hereditary 
farmer of his grade to be ignorant, in spite somehow 
of having a rector in the twin parish who was a 
gentleman to the backbone, a curate nearer at hand who 
preached more learnedly than the rector, a landlord who 
had gone into everything, especially fine art and 
social improvement, and all the lights of Middlemarch 
only three miles off. 11 4 
George Eliot. Middlemarch. vol.2. p.188. 
In this passage we are given the necessary interpretations 
for the discourses that we have just read. Both the discourse of 
Dagley and Mr Brooks are revealed as springing from two types of 
ignorance which the third discourse can expose and reveal. Thus 
we have Mr Brooke's attitude to his tenants contrasted with the 
reality which is available to us through the narrative prose. 
The discourse is not allowed to speak for itself but rather it 
must be placed in a context which will reduce it to a simple 
explicable content. And in the claim that the narrative prose 
has direct access to a final reality we can find the claim of the 
realist novel to present us with the truths of human nature. The 
ability to reveal the truth about Mr Brooke is the ability that 
guarantees the generalisations of human nature. And here once 
again we can find that theoretical intersection in which the claim 
to communicate coincides with the claim of a common human nature 
and with certain claims about the real world and the activity of 
science. But it is not only Mr Brooke's discourse which is 
interpreted, there is also the "midnight darkness" of drunken 
Dagley. The metaphor employed in the passage exactly contrasts 
the darkness of Dagley's discourse with the daylight clarity of 
the prose that surrounds and interprets it. An additional point 
to notice in this passage is the method by which Dagley 1 s accent 
is rendered phonetically. This emphasis on the material sounds 
of Dagley 1 s discourse are directly in proportion to the difficulty 
in understanding it. The material of language is essentially a 
material that obscures. It is insofar as the narrative prose is 
not material that the truths of the world can shine through it. 
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When we move onto the irony of the passage which expresses 
its mock astonishment at the fact of Mr Dagley 1 s ignorance when 
surrounded by such illuminating figures (and having 'all the 
lights of Middlemarch 1 only three miles away), this irony works 
through the knowledge we already have of the situation and in no 
way damages the narrative's claim to be representing reality 
without intermediaries. There is a kind of irony (we will come 
to it later in our reading of Joyce) illr which~- ni •s works 
without any fixed rules for re-writing the ironic passage. 
lack of interpretative rules is exactly what makes for the 
This 
difficulty of reading Joyce 1 s texts. However, in this example 
from George Eliot we can find the more classical irony; in which 
the irony is established by the distance between the original 
sentence and the sentence as it should be, in the light of the 
reality made available to us elsewhere in the text. For us 
readers there is no astonishment that such midnight darkness as 
Mr Dagley should exist not three miles from Middlemarch because 
the lights of that town have been exposed as shadows by the 
greater light of the text itself. 
The conviction that finally the real can be laid out and 
examined through some perfectly transparent discourse is to be 
found in the preface to Middlemarch where George Eliot states 
that "who that cares much to know the history of man and how the 
mysterious mixture behaves under the varying experiments of Time, 
has not dwelt, at least briefly, on the life of St Theresa ... 115 
S. George Eliot. op.cit. vol.1. p.1. 
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This discourse is that of objective science - the text will be 
a report of one of those experiments and the conclusions will be 
laid out with scientific objectivity. The view of science here 
implied is, it must be noticed, of a piece with a view of the 
immutable quality of human nature. For as language disappears 
and absents itself from the stage, we can clearly see the two-
faced character Janus, the god of communication, one face that 
of human nature and the other that of the external physical world. 
To transform language into pure communicative absence is to 
transform the world into a self evident reality where, in order 
to discover truth, we simply have to look. This complete refusal 
to interrogate the form of the investigation, the belief in the 
transparence of the language being used can be clearly seen on 
those occasions (frequent enough) when George Eliot reflects on 
that form. Thus in Middlemarch at the beginning of Chapter 15: 
"A great historian, as he insisted on calling 
himself, who had the happiness to be dead a 
hundred and twenty years ago, and so to take his 
place among the colossi whose huge legs our 
living pettiness is observed to walk under, glories 
in his copious remarks and digressions as the 
least imitable part of his work, and especially 
in those initial chapters to the successive books 
of his history, where he seems to bring his armchair 
to the proscenium and chat with us in all the lusty 
ease of his fine English. But Fielding lived 
when the days were longer (for time, like money, is 
measured by our needs), when summer afternoons were 
spacious, and the clock ticked slowly in the winter 
evenings. We belated historians must not linger 
after his example, and if we did so, it is probable 
that our chat would be thin and eager, as if 
delivered from a camp-stool in a parrot-house. I 
at least have so much to do in unravelling certain 
human lots and seeing how they were woven and 
interwoven, that all the light I can command must be 
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concentrated on this particular web, and not 
dispersed over the tempting range of relevancies 
called the universe. 11 6 
Although, at first sight, George Eliot would appear to be 
questioning her form, the force of the passage is to leave us 
convinced that we have finally abandoned forms to be treated to 
the total unravelling of the real. Fielding 1 s digressions, which, 
as it were, placed his fictions as fictions, are held to have 
been due to the "lusty ease of his fine English"; that is to a 
certain style. It is interesting to note in this context that 
pleasure ("lusty ease" in language) is linked to a certain 
obscuring of reality. Fielding insisted on calling himself an 
historian but the import of the passage is that he was not a real 
historian in the sense that he was too preoccupied with his own 
position on the stage, "the proscenium", to si fCJ present the 
real to his readers. But "we belated historians" who no longer 
have any style, whose "chat would be thin and eager" can merely 
unravel the real. 
The digression itself is no real digression because, 
situated in the middle of the narrative, its function is merely 
to efface itself; to testify to the reality of the story in which 
it is held. Where in Fielding the digression testifies to the 
written nature of the work, situating the narrative as 
construction, in Eliot the digression situates the narrative as 
pure representation, in which the author could not interfere 
because the author can no longer speak. In the same way the 
6. ibid. pp.213-214. 
85 
disclaimer of the "tempting range of relevancies called the 
universe" in no way damages the narrative's claim to be 
representing the world as it really is; because the particular 
"web" is going to be fully revealed. And significantly, once 
again, we find the metaphor of "light", which is what the text 
is going to produce. These disclaimers have the function of 
ensuring, like the wealth of irrelevant detail which is heaped 
up in the text, the innocence and absence of a form and a 
language in which content might be distorted. We are persuaded 
that language and form have disappeared, allowing light to shine 
on the previously obscured world. Another example of the same 
kind of effect can be found in Daniel Deronda: 
7. 
"She spoke with dignity and looked straight at 
Grandcourt, whose long, narrow, impenetrable eyes 
met hers, and mysteriously arrested them: 
mysteriously; for the subtly-varied drama between 
man and woman is often such as can hardly be 
rendered in words put together like dominoes, 
according to obvious fixed marks. The word of all 
work Love will no more express the myriad modes 
of mutual attraction, than the word Thought can 
inform you what is passing through your neighbour's 
mind. It would be hard to tell on which side -
Gwendolen's or Grandcourtis - the influence was 
more mixed. At that moment his strongest wish 
was to be completely master of this creature - this 
piquant combination of maidenliness and mischief: 
that she knew things which had made her start away 
from him, spurred him to triumph over that 
repugnance; and he was believing that he should 
triumph. And she - ah, piteous equality in the need 
to dominate! - she was overcome like the thirsty 
one who is drawn towards the seeming water in the 
desert, overcome by the suffused sense that here in 
this man's homage to her lay the rescue from helpless 
subjection to an oppressive lot. 11 7 
George Eliot. Daniel Deronda. vol.2. pp.38-39. 
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Once again, the objections against the form of describing 
reality, 'the obvious fixed marks' of writing are swept away as 
we get taken beyond that 'word of all work Love' to be presented 
with the very mystery of the drama. The spectre of words 
deforming reality is raised only to be dissolved by the rising 
sun of the prose, a very common strategy in realist novels of the 
nineteenth century where within the realist, and hence unwritten, 
text the common example of that which is most unreal is the novel, 
the written text. 
It would be a distortion to consider George Eliot's texts 
as completely caught within the transparency of what I have 
defined as the classic realist text. Within her novels there are 
always images which counter the flat and univocal process which 
is the simple shewing forth of the real. Casaubon's key to all 
the mythologies, Romola's blind father and, perhaps most powerfully 
of all, the Hebrew language which rests uninvestigable at the 
centre of Daniel Deronda, question and hold in suspense the 
project of Eliot's text. Romola 1 s blind father, who stands in the 
same relation to the girl as does the author - the relationship 
of creator - reveals within the text the inability of the author 
to see the world she is creating. The impossibility of writing an 
historical novel is thereby admitted at one level of the text 
while, at another, the meta-discourse tries to deny the distance 
between itself and the discourses of the 15th century Florentine 
burghers. Similarly Deronda's discovery of the Jewish language 
and the poems of Mordecai troubles the meta-discourse insofar as 
87 
the Jewish language constitutes an area outside its control. 
(It is significant that Deronda hears the news that Mordecai's 
work is in Hebrew with 'anxietyr 8 ). Indeed the meta-discourse, 
in its inability to state all the truths in the object discourses, 
forfeits its claim to be a meta-discourse. 9 
The problems and method of reading a realist text may be 
usefully compared to the problems an analyst faces with a 
neurotic's discourses and the methods which he utilises to 
disengage significant interpretations from those discourses. The 
neurotic has a number of psychic productions which result from 
conflicts within the psyche. These productions (dreams, symptoms) 
are described and explained by the neurotic in discourses which 
render the dreams coherent and the symptoms rational. He invites 
the analyst to offer him an explanation of the symptoms or the 
dreams within these explanatory discourses. The analyst, however, 
has, as it were, to disengage the symptoms and the dreams from 
these explanatory discourses and in this disengagement to show 
not only how these explanatory discourses are themselves 
productions of the same conflict but also to locate that very 
8. ibid. p.336. 
9. It is through an analysis of the sense in which both Daniel Deronda and Romola are written at that limit of realism where the realist project becomes impossible (Romola at the limit of time -the historical distance between the 15th and the 19th century -and Daniel Deronda at the limit of space - as the text cannot encompass the Jewish language so it cannot encompass Israel which is too great a distance from England) that we may seek to understand the traditional critical dislike for these novels. cf. F.R. Leavis. The Great Tradition. pp.47-52 and 79-125 . 
• 
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conflict in the relationship between the explanatory discourse 
and the dreams or symptoms. 
Let us take, for example, the analysis of the dream and 
examine the formal structure of this analysis, remembering that 
this formal structure is realised in the analytic situation as a 
complex and dialectical process in which each element of the 
analysis interacts with the other. The patient relates a dream 
which sounds coherent. Starting from that element in the dream 
which lacks the coherence of the rest of the material (this might 
be an addition or a hesitation) the analyst attempts to disengage 
the dream from the operations of the secondary revision. The 
secondary revision is exactly the explanatory discourse in which 
the dream is placed. Starting from the productions of the primary 
operation in the dream work (the displacement, condensation and 
considerations of representability) the secondary revision renders 
the material coherent. Therefore, when the analyst has stripped 
away the operations of the secondary revision from the dream, the 
dream has actually been altered and it is this altered dream that 
the analyst begins to analyse. In the process of the analysis 
certain key conflicts will become apparent. These conflicts are 
caused by the fact that certain unconscious desires cannot find 
access to consciousness. The fact that they cannot find access to 
consciousness is revealed in the dream by gaps where the censorship 
has refused to allow an element of the dream through. It is these 
gaps that the secondary revision attempts to cover over because 
these gaps stand witness to the existence of these unconscious 
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desires and to the activity of repression. Now these unconscious 
desires will find expression in the secondary revision but, more 
importantly, it is in the need of the secondary revision to 
accomplish its work that lies the very conflict itself - the need 
to deny the existence of these desires which consciousness refuses 
to accept. There are therefore two stages of the same process at 
work here. We have the original repression of the desire because 
it is unacceptable to consciousness and then we have the further 
repression of the fact it has been repressed. The analyst, 
therefore, attempts in one and the same moment to bring the 
existence of these unconscious desires to the consciousness of the 
neurotic and to persuade the neurotic to abandon the explanatory 
discourses which linked all the results of repression to reality. 
For the neurotic is constantly ignoring the results of repression 
and thus denying the existence of unconscious desire through an 
appeal to reality which justifies the dreams or symptoms. 
One can indicate how this comparison can be used to read a 
realist text by a further brief consideration of one of George 
Eliot's texts. One can regard the content of the story (the 
dialogues, events etc.) as the original psychic productions and 
the form of the story (the narrative meta-discourse) as the 
secondary revision; the explanatory discourse, which attempts to 
justify the content in terms of an appeal to reality, at the same 
time that it unifies and makes coherent the content. In Daniel 
Deronda, for instance, the content is placed by the form within a 
certain problematic - who are Daniel's parents, where does he come 
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from, who is he and what shall he do? One way, then, of reading 
Daniel Deronda is to accept the problematic offered by the meta-
discourse and with it the relationship of dominance between the 
meta-discourse and the content (the meta-discourse dominates the 
content through an appeal to reality). The reader can then 
insert his own discourse in that fixed relationship and condemn 
the story in relation to reality as his discourses determine it. 
This condemnation can be further theorized in terms of George 
Eliot 1 s lack of moral courage in following the dilemma through or 
wrong ideas brought on by a contact with Zionism or whatever. The 
other way, I have suggested, is to pick on some weak point in the 
text and through this to attempt to read the relationship between 
the meta-discourse and the object discourses as neurotic - that is 
to say that the meta-discourse attempts to deny in the name of 
reality those gaps in the text which gave evidence of unconscious 
desire. 
Thus if we start with the Jewish language as the weak 
point within the text we can see the Jewish language as 
significant not because Deronda really is a Jew but because it 
offers as mother-tongue the undifferentiated plenitude which is 
an escape from the law of the father (this escape can be condoned 
because Sir Hugo is not really his father) which seeks to fix an 
identity on the son. Within England and English Deronda must 
choose a career - define himself in terms of difference, but the 
mother offers a future in which there will be no difference - his 
full being will flower in Israel. This escape from the domination 
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of the father (the law of difference signalled by the possession 
or non-possession of the phallus) can be further read back into 
the story of Gwendolen 1 s conflict with Grandcourt. For what does 
Grandcourt do but attempt to define Gwendolen and what does 
Gwendolen do but kill Grandcourt (of course she doesn't really 
kill him)l Thus in the text of Daniel Deronda we can read the 
desire to transgress the law of the father but at the same time 
the attempt to deny that desire. The denial is to be found in 
the meta-discourse which attempi:S to explain and justify everything 
in terms of an evident reality but this discourse itself in its 
desire to be an in-different language points the way to our 
analysis of the text in terms of the desire to transgress the 
law of the father and seek plenitude (a life not defined -
beyond difference). 
Lest anyone think that this pretends to be a final analysis 
of Deronda it is necessary once again to refer back to our model 
of the analyst analysing a neurotic. As with a dream it will be 
necessary to return again and again to the original text (the 
dream as retold by the patient) and to seek fresh gaps in the 
narrative with which the text can be re-read and the interpretation 
each time will be determined by whether the desire uncovered can 
be located in many parts of the text - not least within the meta-
discourse itself. It is in terms of the multiplicity of fissures 
within a given classic realist text that one might approach the 
question of its value. It is insofar as the text bears witness 
to its own activity of repression - insofar as the repressed makes 
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a return - that one can evaluate such texts. 10 But whereas we 
have to read against the meta-discourse in a realist text, 
Joyce 1 s texts, without inverted commas, lack any final and 
privileged discourse within them which dominates the others 
through its claim of access to the real. If we continue briefly 
the use of psycho-analytical theory as a model we can say that 
whereas the realist text is a neurotic discourse, Joyce 1 s texts 
are psychotic discourses. For the neurotic attempts to repress 
certain desires and ignores the compromise formations which find 
their way into consciousness through an appeal to 'reality', 
whereas, in the psychotic, the desires dominate the ego and the 
ego therefore produces discourses which ignore reality (delusions). 
(Later in this chapter when we will push this analogy further we 
will see that Joyce's texts can best be characterized neither as 
neurotic~or psychotic but as perverse). His earliest prose 
writings, the Epiphanies, lack any appeal to reality which would 
define what,... the writing produces. The conversations and 
situations which make up the epiphanies lack any accompanying 
explanation or context. In place of a discourse which attempts 
to place and situate everything we have discourses which are 
determined in their situation simply by the reader. 
And it is within this perspective that we might consider 
the distinctions that Joyce draws in his youthful paper 'Drama 
and Life' between a drama which comes complete with its own 
10. For an example of a full analysis of a classic realist text 
and its fissures see Roland Barthes• S/Z. 
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interpretation and caught within the stereotype of its age, 
a drama which Joyce describes as purveyor supplying plutocrat 
with a "parody of life which the latter digests medicinally in 
a darkened theatre1111 and the drama of Ibsen which gives us the 
pleasure "not of hearing it read out to us but of reading it for 
ourselves, piecing the various parts and going closer to see 
wherever the writing on the parchment is fainter or less 
legible 11 • 12 Thus the contrast for Joyce is between a text which 
asks to be read in a certain way and a text which is determined 
by our reading. 
The lack of a dominant discourse which places such 
emphasis on the reader in Epiphanies can also be found at work 
in Dubliners. In Dubliners we can read the .banality and 
paralysis of Dublin without at any stage the writing doing the 
interpretative work for us by offering a point of insertion for 
our own discourses in an agreed hierarchy of dominance. The 
text works paratactically, simply placing one event after another, 
with no ability to draw conclusions from this piacing. It is 
important to recognise that these are not stories 'about' Dublin 
in the sense that Dublin is an entity understood and referred to 
outside the text. Rather it is a question of the reader 
producing Dublin through the interaction of his own and the 
text's discourses. The movement of the text is not that of 
11. The Critical Writings of James Joyce. Edited by Ellsworth 
Mason and Richard Ellmann. p.44. 
12. ibid. p.50. 
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making clear a reference already defined and understood; of 
fixing the sense of an expression. Instead the text dissolves 
the simple sense of Dublin as a city, as a context within which 
people live their lives, and replaces it with the very text of 
paralysis. It is for this reason that Joyce could talk of a 
"special odour of corruption which, I hope, floats over my 
stories1113 (my emphasis) and in this "floating" we have the 
specific refusal of a fixed sense which is conveyed by the text -
which is the message inscribed in the code. The meaning of the 
text is provided by the reader's own discourses although the 
text determines that a certain odour of corruption will float, 
always in suspension, over any such meaning. If we take for 
example 1 Ivy Day in the Committee Room' we find no purchase in 
the text which will enable us to grasp its import. The refusal 
of the narrative to do more than report spatial positions, or 
give information strictly relevant to what is happening from 
moment to moment, leaves the dialogue between the various 
occupants of the committee room suspended in a vacuum of sense, 
a vacuum that must be filled by the reader. Parnell simply 
becomes a function of the text; held in play between the various 
dialogues. The narrative discourse offers no move outside the 
committee room which will give the sense of Parnell or of the 
dialogues which turn about his name. 
Although the narrative discourse rests between the various 
13. James Joyce. 
vol.2. p.123. 
Letter to Grant Richards.15 October 1905 Le~ters 
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dialogues it is instructive to see some of the methods by which 
it questions and negates itself. And this negation is not the 
simple effacement of the realist text but a process through which 
the narrative discourse works its own destruction. For example 
there are two moments at the beginning of the text where an 
unexplained reference is made to the ivy leaves worn by Mr Hynes 
and Mr O'Connor. And these two references, standing out as they 
do from the flat level of the text in which what is described is 
in no way surprising, set up an expectation that the explanation 
of why these leaves are being worn will also explain why the 
ordinariness of the room is being written about. But this 
expectation is dissolved as the explanation comes from within 
the ordinariness of the room and offers no transcending 
explanation of the whole action. 
It is perhaps revealing with regard to this story to look 
at the one occasion on which the narrative abandons external 
description and does present us with the explanation of what is 
happening. Mr Crofton's silence is described in the following 
passage: 
14. 
11 Mr Crofton sat down on a box and looked fixedly 
at the other bottle on the hob. He was silent 
for two reasons. The first reason, sufficient in 
itself, was that he had nothing to say; the second 
reason was that he considered his companions 
beneath him. 11 14 
James Joyce. Dubliners. p.146. 
Instead of a dialogue we can read in this passage the explanation 
of a silence but this explanation places the silence within the 
various stereotypes that circulate within the text. And it is as 
a collection of stereotypes without an explanatory discourse, 
which will contain these stereotypes within a narrative prose, 
that one can situate the essentially ambiguous nature of Dubliners. 
The narrative, in its refusal of a discourse which will explain 
everything, resists the reduction of the various discourses to 
one discourse shared by the author and the reader. It is in 
this context that we can understand Joyce's use of indirect free 
style. Other stories in Dubliners may appear to use more 
traditional realistic devices in which the narrative goes behind 
i. I 
a set of actions and explains them. But the explanation is 
always within the same discourse that the major character uses 
when speaking and thus there is no hierarchy of dominance into 
which the reader can comfortably insert himself. The position we 
take with regard to the discourses of the text is not mapped out 
for us and as a result there is no unquestioned discourse in 
which we can comfortably read the repetition of our 'evident' 
selves and our 'evident' reality. 
The final sentence of the story, "Mr Crofton said that 
it was a very fine piece of writing", reproduces the whole 
ambiguity of the text. For the first time someone's words are 
reported in indirect speech and with this move the narrative 
language of the text, for the first time, masters the discourses 
that flow back and forth in the committee room. But this mastery, 
97 
coming in the final sentence of the text, does not make clear 
what has been happening and, while testifying to its power at a 
formal level, simply emphasises the lack of a position from 
which we can read the poem on Parnell's death or the whole story. 
It is in this context that one might profitably compare the kind 
of irony engendered by Joyce's text with the more evident irony 
used in the George Eliot passage quoted above. While we know 
exactly how to re-write the George Eliot passage, it is almost 
impossible to re-write the Joycean one: because the text offers 
us no discourse in which to re-write it. We are th_e:efore forced 
to re-write it in our own discourses but this personal re-writing 
is difficult because we must situate our discourses as dominant 
the text will not undertake this situation for us. And in that 
moment where we become aware of the imposition of our discourses 
on the text we also become aware of the stereotype within our 
own discourses. The agreements which we presume and never 
question make their appearance at that point where the agreements 
no longer operate. Dubliners generates, through this lack of a 
meta-discourse, an endless irony between the stereotypes of the 
canvassers in the committee room and the stereotypes of our own 
discourses. Where in the realist text we find a central discourse 
controlling the other discourses (and it must be emphasized that 
it is the position of this discourse vis 1 vis the other discourses 
that matters and not its content), in Dubliners we can read merely 
the various discourses which produced a city at a given historical 
moment and which, besides their contemporaneity, escape any 
unifying force other than the discourses of the reader. 
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It could reasonably be objected to this account that what 
is still left unexplained is the persistence of the 'odour of 
corruption' . But the odour of corruption is the result of the 
functioning of stereotypes which in their paralysing effect 
refuse to allow any new relations between the subject and his own 
discourses. It is this paralysis which seizes hold of Eveline on 
the quay. Eveline is unable to escape from a life of servitude 
to her father because finally she cannot allow herself to be 
defined except in terms of the demands addressed 
to h~~~eOS-~ 
father. But insofar as she is simply defined by the demands.Ashe 
cannot find any space in which her own desire could speak - it is 
for this reason that she is literally speechless at the end. But 
if, in the fixity of stereotypes, we can locate the source of the 
odour of corruption (the frustration of desire) it must be 
noticed that the reading subject is neither placed in the same 
position as Eveline nor is there a position from which to read 
her discourses. 15 And it is in the distance between the position 
of Eveline and the position of the reading subject that the text 
provides the experience of the other side of neurosis namely 
perversion. Freud often talked of the neuroses as the negative 
15. By an exemplary coincidence it is with exactly the same image 
of an odour of corruption that the psycho-analyst Moustafa Safouan 
attempts to describe the sensations of a psycho-analyst when he 
first listens to a neurotic patient: "Et quand, de re"ponse en 
reponse, une odeur se leve a cette place de la jouissance, qui 
n'est plus de dechet mais de pourriture qu 1 est-ce qu'il reste 
comme issue? Rien d'autre que ce qui a determine l'entr6e 11 
"De La Structure en Psychanalyse 11 p.297 in Qu 1est-ce que le 
structuralisme? ed. Francois Wahl. ; 
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of perversions and Joyce's writing is perhaps best defined as 
16 perverse. 
The perverse nature of the Joycean text can most evidently 
be seen at work in the opening story of Dubliners - 'The SistersY. 
It is interesting, for our purposes, to compare the two versions 
that we have of this story. In the first version of the text 
which was printed in the Irish Homestead in 1904 we can find 
most of the details which appeared in the final version of the 
events and conversations which immediately followed the death of 
Fr. Flynn. What, however, is almost entirely missing from this 
first text is the reflections of the 'I' persona over and above 
his immediate reactions. This is evident if we compare the 
opening paragraphs in the two texts: 
1. "Three nights in succession I had found 
myself in Great Britain street at that hour, 
as if by Providence. Three nights also I had 
raised my eyes to that lighted square of 
window and speculated. I seemed to understand 
that it would occur at night. But in spite of 
the Providence that had led my feet, and in 
spite of the reverent curiosity of my eyes, I had discovered nothing. Each night the square 
was lighted in some way, faintly and evenly. It was not the light of candles so far as I 
could see. Therefore it had not yet occurred." (Irish Homestead) 17 
2. "There was no 
the third stroke. 
the house (it was 
lighted square of 
hope for him this time: it was 
Night after night I had passed 
vacation time) and studied the 
window: and night after night 
16. cf. Sigmund Freud. The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. vol.7. pp.165 and 231. 
17. James Joyce. The Irish Homestead. August 13, 1904, p.676. 
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I had found it lighted in the same way, faintly 
and evenly. If he was dead, I thought, I would 
see the reflection of candles on the darkened 
blind for I knew that two candles must be set 
at the head of a corpse. He had often said to me: 
I am not long for this world, and I had thought 
his words idle. Now I knew they were true. Every 
night as I gazed up at the window I said softly 
to myself the word paralysis. It had always 
th~ sounded strangely in my ears like the word gnomon 
1:ti)Euclid and the word simony in the Catechism. 
But now it sounded to me like the name of some 
maleficent and sinful being. It filled me with 
fear, and yet I longed to be nearer to it and to 
look upon its deadly work." 1g 
In the second text we find that introduction of the theme 
of paralysis and this word together with 'gnomon' and rsimony' 
provides a collection of signifiers which are not determined in 
their meaning by the text. The difference between the situation ~~ ~ 
of the reader in the~ and~ text is crucially different. 
In the first passage the reader is placed in a state of ignorance 
(what is the situation the text is describing? What is the 
significance of the lights? etc.) but this ignorance is what the 
rest of the text will dissipate (It is the death of a priest etc.) 
but in the second text the reader is introduced to a set of 
signifiers for which there is no interpretation except strangeness 
and an undefined evil. There is here what one might call a 
certain excess of the power of signification (the production of 
a surplus of meaning) which occurs again with the second major 
addition in the final version: the dream the narrator has in 
which the dead priest pursues him: 
18. James Joyce. Dubliners. p.7. 
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'But the grey face still followed me. It 
murmured; and I understood that it desired to confess something. I felt my soul receding into some pleasant and vicious region; and there again I found it waiting for me. It began to confess to me in a murmuring voice 
and I wondered why it smiled continually and 
why the lips were so moist with spittle. 1 19 
Once again we find a certain excess of meaning in the priest's 
act of confession. The gap between the act of signification 
(saying, writing) and what is signified (said, written) is 
accentuated and in this gap the reader's own discourses are left 
to circulate. This distinction between the signifier and the 
signified is what marks the radical difference between the texts 
of Joyce and those of George Eliot. In Eliot 1 s texts this 
division is elided at the level of the meta-discourse which 
attempts to suppress the act of signification (the act of writing) 
to leave a predetermined signified in place. And this signified 
(this meaning) in Eliot's texts is the evident reality of things. 
Even if the reader disagrees with the explicit identifications of 
the meta-discourse (one can argue about Dorothea's character), it 
is exactly the position of the meta-discourse vis a vis the rest 
of the text that allows for the disagreement. Because there is 
an elision of the distance between the act of writing and what is 
written - so similarly there is an elision of the act of reading 
and what is read. The reader is placed in a position where he 
simply sees what is there in the text and can ignore the productive 
19. ibid. p.9. 
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effect of his own discourses. 
We have noted that the desire at work in George Eliot's 
texts (or at least in Daniel Deronda) is that finally there will 
be no difference - that there will be oneness. But this is 
exactly the neurotic negation of desire, for desire depends 
entirely on difference - on the establishment of an object that 
can be desired insofar as it does not appertain to the subject -
insofar as it is radically other. And this difference (this 
separation) is not achieved insofar as there is a discourse 
which unifies all the others - the meta-discourse. Desire is 
thus left without an object because there is nothing in the text 
which is absent. The multitude of objects which appears in 
Eliot 1 s texts do not appear as one side of an opposition of 
which the other is always absent but rather each thing appears 
as sameness; as its own thing in itself. It is this lack of an 
absence that constitutes the repression of desire. Joyce's text 
is very different because although reality is constituted by the 
ever present demand of the father, the Church, the past - the 
subject can institute difference through splitting himself and 
can thus create an object which is absent and other and which 
can be desired. Far from identity being fixed by an appeal to 
reality which fixes the subject - thus the mother tells Deronda 
who he really is as the text tells the reader who we really are 
there is a split in the subject which allows desire to function. 
This desire can be defined as perverse (involving as it does the 
lack of any other independent of the subject) and it must be 
ii 
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remembered that it is perversion which is the fundamental mode 
of sexuality in Joyce - there is no example of 'normal' sexual 
intercourse in the whole of his work. Even in Finnegans Wake, 
when H.C.E. and A.L.P. copulate in the morning, H.C.E. fails to 
reach orgasm as is pointed out in the text by the famous 11 You 
never wet the tea 11 (585.31). 
The splitting of the subject is achieved exactly through 
the distance between the 1 1 1 of what has been said and the 
subject of the act of saying. And it is this split which is 
effected by those moments in the text of Dubliners when the 
reading subject is no longer assured in his situation but 
experiences his own discourses as productive of meaning. The 
particular signification that will be associated with paralysis 
or the act of confession depends on the significant oppositions 
of the reader's own discourses. And the reader will thus be 
placed in the situation of reading his own discourses. This 
situation with all that it carries of a fundamental alienation 
is the one experienced by the narrator with regard to the word 
paralysis. 'I said softly to myself the word paralysis' - it is 
in the distance between the speaking and the hearing of the word 
that desire is instituted - 'I longed to be nearer to it'. 
What is essential to grasp in the articulation of Joyce's 
texts is that there is no position within them where the reading 
subject can insert himself to consume some paralysed reality. 
Before the ever present demand of this reality the writing subject 
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institutes desire through splitting himself and thus instituting 
an object which is absent and can be desired. The reading 
subject must follow the positions taken up by the writing subject 
and in the split this instituted can begin to read his own 
discourses - not as some transparent window onto an evident 
reality but as a set of significant oppositions in which the 
subject's world is constituted and in which, if the subject 
begins to listen attentively to them, he can hear his desire 
speak. It is this attention to the forms of discourse which 
characterizes Joyce's practice of writing. Stephen Heath has 
written of the displacement from classic realism to such a 
practice in the following terms: 
"This shift is not to be understood in the 
traditional terms of a change from tsocial realism' 
to 'psychological realism' or whatever, but in 
terms of the deconstruction of the very 'innocence' 
of realism. Its foundation is a profound experience 
of language and form and the demonstration of that 
experience in the writing of the novel which, 
transgressed, is no longer repetition and self-
effacement but work and self-presentation as text. 
Its 'realism' is not the mirroring of some tReaII'tyt 
but an attention to the forms of intelligibility in 
which the real is produced, a dramatization of 
possibilities of language, forms of articulation, 
limitations, of its own horizon. 0 20 
What is important about this attention is that it is also, 
always, a transformation. In Dubliners the banality of everyday 
discourse is removed from its quotidian normality and transformed 
into a text which can be analysed. This analysis cannot, however, 
20. Stephen Heath. The Nouveau Roman. p.22. 
105 
be constructed in terms of some external truth which the text 
represents or embodies. Instead we should consider it in terms 
of the lines of force that constitute the text and which engage 
with those same forces in our own discourse. 
correspondence but struggle. 
Truth is no longer 
CHAPTER 4 
THE END OF THE STORY: 
STEPHEN HERO AND A PORTRAIT 
Truth as struggle. No longer is it a question of 
correspondence but of the forging of positions of judgement -
the establishment of areas where correspondence is installed. 
Forging, here, is~ appropriate word - both force and forgery. 
Jim the Penman, the forger, is exactly he who places himself in 
another's position and understand its contours not as natural 
and given but as a continuous production. Julia Kristeva, 
within a continuing work on the specificity of the poetic use of 
language, has considered these different conceptions of truth in 
terms of a distinction between symbol and sign. The symbol: one 
to one correspondence between word and thing; a corr~spondence 
always guaranteed by God in one or other of his guises. The 
sign: a constantly shifting world where the fundamental 
discontinuity between signifier and signified hesitates and 
refuses the movement towards an exterior truth to discover its 
own systematicity - the area of its own truth. 1 The symbol is 
the guarantee of the realm of simple disjunction: the word either 
does or does not represent a state of affairs. The exit from 
this realm (the fall from grace) is the experience of the sign; 
experience of a world where a system of differences constantly 
open to re-articulation defines the word and where, therefore, 
1. See Julia Kristeva. Le Texte du Roman. pp.25-35. 
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the simple either-or is held in a state of suspension. The 
experience and development of the non-disjunctive nature of the 
sign is, for Kristeva, one of the essential tasks in the struggle 
against platonism and christianity; a struggle which already has 
many fronts: 
"L'ideologeme du signe, en effet, non-disjonctif 
et transformationnel, est a la base des grands 
moments que notre culture a enregistres. Citons parmi eux: la conception de la n~gation et de la permutation dialectique chez Hegel et Marx; le developpement de la linguistique apres Saussure 
et de la logique apres Pierce, c 1 est-a-dire la 
constitution de systemes formels qui n'ont pas de support ideologique, ethique OU Veridique en dehors d'eux-memes mais integrent leur 1 verite' dans la construction simultanee de leur modele; 
et enfin, la constitution de la semiologie comme 
nouveau mode de pensee absorbant dans le signe (le modele) les differents systemes signifiants."2 
More familiarly for us in England, it is the work of 
Wittgenstein which constitutes this reflection on the sign and 
the consequent change in the location of truth. Michael Dummett, 
in an article signalled as a commentary on Wittgenstein3 , has 
2. ibid. p.190. "The ideologem of the sign, in effect non-disjunctive and transformational, is at the base of the great moments that our culture has recorded. Amongst them one could cite: the concept of negation and dialectical permutation in Hegel and Marx, the development of linguistics since Saussure and logic since Pierce, that's to say the constitution of formal systems which have no ideological, ethical or veridical support exterior to them but integrate their "truth" in the simultaneous 
construction of their model; and finally, the constitution of 
semiology as a new manner of thinking, absorbing in the sign (the model) the different signifying systems." 
3. Dummett ends his article thus: "Of course the doctrine that meaning is to be explained in terms of use is the cardinal doctrine of the later Wittgenstein; but I do not think the point of this doctrine has so far been generally understood." Article entitled "Truth". Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Vol. 59. (1958-59) p.162. 
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formulated the new organisation of truth thus: 
"We are entitled to say that a statement P must 
be either true or false, that there must be 
something in virtue of which either it is true 
or it is false, only when Pisa statement of 
such a kind that we could in a finite time bring 
ourselves into a position in which we were justified either in asserting or in denying P; 
that is, when P is an effectively decidable 
statement. 11 4 
Dummett, thus rejects an disjunctive analysis of discourse in 
favour of a non-disjunction which can only be resolved by a 
"bringing of ourselves into position". The elaboration of this 
play between discourse and position was forced on Wittgenstein 
after he had proposed, in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 
what will probably prove to be the last of the great correspondence 
theories of truth. Wittgenstein's correspondence theory was 
original in that it did not involve a• homology of word and 
thing at the level of ordinary speech, for this ordinary speech 
was a complex function of simpler elementary propositions, the 
analysis of which was made possible by Frege and Russell's 
development of the propositional a~d predicate calculus. 
structural homology was asserted which related elementary 
Thus a 
propositions to states of affairs (Sachverhalte). The states of 
affairs are combinations of simple objects; the elementary 
propositions concatenations of names. (2.01,4.22) Names are 
4. ibid. p.160. 
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considered as that linguistic form whose only relation is to 
the object it names (a mistake Wittgenstein later identified as 
a confusion between the bearer of a name and its meaning). Given 
this one to one correspondence between object and name all that 
was further needed was a similarity of form between the 
combination of objects and the concatenation of names. This 
similarity is understood through a consideration of how a picture 
represents, a consideration which finds its clearest expression 
at 2.17: 
"What a picture must have in common with reality, 
in order to be able to depict it - correctly or 
incorrectly - in the way it does, is its pictorial 
form. 11 
Similarly in order for language to depict, there must be an 
identity between the form of language (logical form) and the form 
of reality. 
The meaning of an elementa,ry proposition is II given by a 
condition of reality, a state of affairs, which is the truth-
condition of the proposition115 and the truth-conditions are 
exactly the permutation of the disjunction of a proposition and 
its negation. This is what allows Derek Bolton to argue that 
the essential novelty of the Tractatus is as follows: 
5. Derek Bolton. A Study towards an understanding of the 
Philosophy of Wittgenstein. Unpublished Cambridge Ph.D. thesis, 
p.34. 
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"This simple interdefinability (the fact that 
all sixteen truth functions of two elementary 
propositions can be defined using only negation 
and conjunction i.e. P v Q = df. - (-P & -Q)) 
reminds us that all propositions represent the 
existence and non-existence of states of affairs. 
This is the central point, to which all the 
apparatus of truth function theory is only 
corollary. The theory enables us to express in 
a clear and advantageous way, the fact that given 
elementary propositions, we may negate them, and 
add them together. The novelty is that in 
specifying the sense of compound propositions we 
avoid, as it were, fresh reference to reality, to 
the states of affairs they represent. Instead 
their sense, what they represent in reality, is 
given by appeal to the truth conditions of 
elementary propositions." 6 
But not only does this anchoring of language in elementary 
propositions avoid the need to refer to reality again, it also, 
and more importantly, avoids conceiving of language as a system 
of signs defined diacritically; it establishes the meaning of 
language as representation - independent of any inter-linguistic 
relations. Wittgenstein's doubts about the Tractatus, expressed 
in conversations with the Vienna circle, began when he realised 
that the discourse of colour, which looked as though it should 
contain elementary propositions ("This is red" does not suggest 
the possibility of further analysis) could not, in fact, be 
defined through a combination of negation and conjunction. 
"This is red 11 did not simply enter into a disjunct with "This is 
not red" but implied the statement 11 This is not green". In other 
words it was impossible to disengage the colour propositions one 
6. ibid. p.36. 
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from another in the way that the Tractatus had envisaged. 7 
This problem prompted Wittgenstein's return to philosophy 
and the rest of his work constitutes a constant interrogation of 
language as system and set of heterogenous systems; an 
interrogation which takes place at the level of form and content. 
But although language is considered as a system, its systematicity 
is still something outside experience - something strange; "The 
system of language 11 , writes Wittgenstein, "is not in the category 
of experience. 118 The only reason we need to pay attention to 
language as system is as therapy for the philosophical disease 
brought on by a "one sided diet 11 9; it is through attempting to 
find a single system for the heterogenous multiplicity of systems 
that we fall into error. The aim of philosophy in its new role 
as therapy is to lead us back into the areas where language is 
obvious, where "The chain of reasons has an end, 1110 where language 
becomes transparent within its appropriate practice. 11 This is 
the "bringing into position" which Dummett mentioned - A statement 
7. Charles Larmore of Yale University, in an unpublished paper 
entitled "Use and Representation in Wittgenstein" summarises these 
arguments from Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis, Shorthand notes 
of F. Waissman. ed. B. McGuiness. 
8 . Ludwig Wittgenstein. Philosophical Grammar. p. 170. 
9. Ludwig Wittgenstein. Philosophical Investigation. p.155e 
10. Ludwig Wittgenstein. The Blue and Brown Books. p.143, 
11. For a brilliant exposition of Wittgensteints arguments on this theme see D. Bolton op.cit. ch.7. 
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becomes effectively decidable within a practice which provides 
criteria of judgement. What is interesting is that, for 
Wittgenstein the perception of language as system, as non-
disjunctive discourse, is only needed as a cure for the 
philosophical disease; in some sense, normality is always "being 
in position". However, it is not simply disease that leads us 
from position to system - this movement is constantly forced on 
us by the very nature of the sign. Nor is it simply a question 
of finding those customary non-linguistic practices where 
discourse becomes transparent, where everything is rendered 
coherent; it is also a question of forging new practices and the 
discourses appropriate to them - moments, exactly, of incoherence. 
Michael Foucault, in a diametrically opposed thesis, regards the 
bringing of discourse into position, the bringing of interpretations 
to an end, as an operation of violence rather than a move back 
into a comfortable order. 12 
Thus while Wittgenstein opens up the non-disjunctive nature 
of the sign, it is always as part of a process of sickness and 
cure. This procedure is exactly the process of narration and it 
is narrative that Wittgenstein uses to give an example of how 
system (discourse) is effaced from experience: 
12. Mich el Foucault. "Marx, Freud, Niet{che". VIIe Colloque Philosophique International de Royaumont. 1967. Cahiers de Royaumont. Philosophie No.6. pp.183-192. For earlier considera-tion of these problems, see C. Maccabe, "What is wrong with philosophy?" Granta, Vol.75 No.3. February 1970, pp.6 & 7 and 
"The problems of living in an Interpreted World", Radical Philosophy No.2. Summer 1972, pp.9-11. 
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"Certainly I read a story and dontt give a hang about any system of language. 11 13 
Here the reading of a story is opposed to an understanding of 
language as system, a systematicity which lies outside "the cate-
gory of experience". Joyce gives us the experience of system, of 
a discourse which is constantly forging positions, but he can only 
do that through a destruction of that which hides the sys:em - the 
story that narrates - which through its coherence gives us an 
evident position: 11 A sentence in a story gives us the same satis-
faction as a picture" 14. Satisfaction of the imaginary, plenitude, 
narcissism - the story is that which restores a fullness whose 
loss is its own condition of possibility. 11 Innombrables sont les 
rJcits du monde 11 , writes Barthes 15 and if we are to isolate the 
13. Ludwig Wittgenstein. Philosophical Grammar. p.171. Charles Larmore argues at the end of his paper that Wittgenstein's attach-ment to a transparence of language could most usefully be inter-rogated from the perspective that Freud opens up of a subject who is never in control of 'his' own language: "One assumption of any theory of representation, which I have not yet mentioned, and which is apparent throughout Wittgenstein's writings, is what I shall call a certain 11 egocentrism11 • The only way I can "live" in a system of signs is that, when the signs efface themselves from perception, in order to show what they represent, it is from~ perception that they efface themselves. And for this reason, Wittgenstein writes that I use a sign. Wittgenstein could never really come to terms with Freud's claim that we can 11 live 11 within systems of signs that the perceiving "ego" is not in a position to~·" 
14. Ludwig Wittgenstein. Philosophical Grammar. p.171. 
15. Roland Barthes. "Introduction a l'analyse structurale des r~cits. 11 Communications. No.8. 1966 p.1. "Innumerable are the stories of the world." This chapter takes much of its inspiration from the closing stctBment of this remarkable article: "Bien qu 1 on n'en sache guere plus sur 1 1 origine du r~cit que sur celle du lang age, on peut raisonnablement avancer que le recit est contemporain du monologue, cr~ation, semble-t-il, posterieure a celle du dialogue; en tout cas, sans vouloir forcer 1 1 hypothese phylogenetique, il peut etre significatif que ce soit au meme moment (vers l'age de trois ans) que le petit de 1 1 homme 11 invente 11 a la fois la phrase, le recit et 1 1 0edipe. 11 
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way in which the story exhibits the structure of awareness of 
the non-disjunctive nature of the sign and the repression of that 
awareness, which I have sketched as the basis of Wittgenstein's 
reflections on language, then it is necessary to distinguish 
amongst these innumerable stories. In particular we need to 
isolate those features of stories that participate most fully in 
this movement of awareness and repression. Schematically, and 
within the perspective here chosen, we can divide our approach to 
stories into two. On the one hand we can see the story as the 
assertion of a set of disjunctions whose permutations produce 
actions. V. Propp and A.J. Greimas have attempted to formalise 
these permutations in various ways. Propp in terms of a 
combinatory of functions, which are defined as "an act of a 
character, defined from the point of view of its significance for 
the course of the action1116 ; Greimas in terms of actants "that is, 
in terms of narrative agents treated as the modes of assumptions 
of functions 11 • 17 On the other hand we can consider the story as 
the assertion of a set of disjuncts, which are held in suspension 
until finally an identity is asserted and the original 
disjunction denied. Julia Kristeva attempted to contrast these 
approaches as the difference between the epic and the novel in 
Le Texte du Roman. The epic is pure combination in which all the 
oppositions are known before and after the text; the position from 
16. V. Propp. Morphology of the Folktale. p.21. 
17. Cleanth Peters. "Structuration of the novel text: method and analysis. 11 Signs of the Times. ed. Stephen Heath, Colin Maccabe., Christopher Prendergast. p.62. 
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which to read the text is given anterior to the text in the 
ideological world of religion. As reader of an epic we know that 
the hero is good and the villain is bad and that these two worlds 
cannot overlap and contaminate each other; the disjuncts are 
constantly maintained in the world of the symbol - guaranteed in 
their truth by a separate and exterior realm. The novel 
suspended these disjunctions for the course of the narration - is 
the hero good or bad? - only to affirm a final identity - the hero 
is good . In her later work La Re'volution de Langage Po~tique , 
Kristeva abandoned these distinctions and placed both within the 
category of narration which was now centrally dependent on the 
1 f d . . t. 18 c osure o lSJUnc ion. While it is true that a rigid 
distinction is impossible, there is an important difference to be 
theoretically maintained. While all classification has a certain 
arbitrariness let us propose a distinction between epic, which is 
linked to story-telling, and classic realism, which is linked to 
narration. What is central to the second form is both the 
elaboration of non-disjunction and the denial of this elaboration; 
the deep experience of differ ence together with a pressure to deny 
that experience . The elaboration of truth as struggle between 
text and performer (writer/reader) goes together with a desperate 
assertion that the text exists only in correspondence to a truth 
that is given in the world (which is also the assertion of a 
separate role for writer and reader ) . It is a heterogeneity and 
a surplus which provides the impetus for narrative - a heterogeneity 
18 . cf . Julia Kristeva . La Re'volution du Langage Po~tique . pp.86-89 . 
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which must both be overcome and prolonged. At the start there 
is an incoherence between word and world {illusion) which is 
then resolved (knowledge). The passage from innocence to, if 
not guilt {but guilt will always be there as the index of a 
desire which has been worked over and repressed) then to knowledge. 
But this is a passage which is denied as process - the knowledge 
is always already there as the comforting resolution of the 
broken coherence {in this sense narration is always a suspense 
story). Stephen Heath has described this suspended state on 
which narrative depends, as follows: 
"The paradox of such a narrative is then this: 
aimed at containment, it restates heterogeneity 
as the constant term of its action - if there is 
symmetry, there is dissymmetry, if there is 
resolution, there is violence; it contains as 
one contains an enemy, holding in place but 
defensively, and the strategic point is the 
implacable disjunction of narrative and discourse, 
enonce and enonciation, the impossibility of 
holding entirely on the subject-position of the 
one the subject-process of the other •.• 11 19 
In its passage from an incoherence to a coherence which is 
always guaranteed in advance (in its passage from innocence to 
knowledge, in its passage from confusion to identity), the novel 
is always the story of lost illusions: Illusions Perdues. 
Balzac's novel here demonstrates, dramatizes this movement of 
narrative that requires the production of and desire for a 
19. Stephen Heath. 11 Film and System: Terms of Analysis" Part 1. 
Screen. Vol.16 no.1. Spring 1975. pp.49-50. 
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coherent position (to figure an identity and to enjoy the 
security of knowledge) but, at the same time, wants to know 
nothing of desire and production. Indeed it is in the very 
miscognition of knowledge as security that we can locate the 
neuralgic point of narration. Knowledge always involves the 
breaking of an imaginary unity of subject and object, it is 
belief that guarantees it. One has only to reflect on the 
logical grammar of knowledge and belief statements to grasp this 
point: To say 11 I know that x 11 is to involve myself in a system 
of differences independent of my subjectivity, but nothing 
exterior can disturb the statement that "I believe that x 1120 
In Balzac's novel the position allocated by the formal 
interrelationships discussed in the previous chapter is guaranteed 
by a process of placing the reader in position - albeit by a 
process that is concealed. The discourse charged with the 
relating of the narrative does, of course, have this formal 
relation of control over the object discourses that circulate 
in the text. Thus, for example, a pun will be spelt out lest 
the meta-discourse be troubled by an ambiguity21 but it is a pun 
within the meta-discourse itself which opens up the world of non-
disjµnction and which guarantees the time of the narrative on the 
condition that it will be finally resolved. The problem that the 
20. The way in which weaknesses in Wittgenstein's Later Position 
become totally debilitating in some of his disciples can be seen 
in Malcolm's attempt to conflate knowledge and belief in 
"Knowledge and Belief" in Knowledge and Belief Ed. A. Phillips 
Griffiths pp.69-82. 
21. Honore de Balzac. Oeuvres Completes. Vol.12. p.268. 
i. 
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text demands shall be solved is, here as always, the problem of 
sexuality; specifically: (both objective and subjective genitive) 
the desire of the mother. This desire is the excess - an orgasm 
which, in its lack of place, disturbs an homogenous order. 
Freud in his Studies in Hysteria talked of the fact that 11 the 
great majority of severe neuroses in women have their origin in 
the marriage bed1122 , and expressed surprise that 11 the case 
histories I write should read like short stories. 1123 But there 
should be no surprise: narration is always the masculine 
reappropriation of the hysterical, the feminine - its process 
is the closure of heterogeneity. It is when Freud stopped trying 
to write these stories that psycho-analysis proper begins. 24 
For Balzac's text, it is Madame de Bargeton who erupts as a 
heterogeneity both sexual and social into the lives of the two 
poets; this eruption is explicitly ma~ked by the text as a lack 
,, of sexual satisfaction, for her husband has been 11 endommage 11 
by his earlier sexual exploits and suffers from an 11 impuissance 
22. Sigmund Freud. 
Psychological Works. 
23. ibid. p.160. 
The Standard Edition of the Complete 
vol.2. p.246. 
24. Originally Freud demanded that his hysterical patients told him stories of a primal traumatic encounter with sexuality. It 
was when he realised that these stories had to be considered as phantasy - the circulation of the subject along a signifying 
chain - that psycho-analysis begins. cf. Letter to Wilhelm Fliess. 
no.69. The Origins of Psycho-Analysis. pp.215-218. The editor 
of the Standard Edition marks the shift thus: "In the years immediately following the studies Freud abandoned more and more 
of the machinery of deliberate suggestion and came to rely more 
and more on the patient's flow of "free associations"." vol.2. p.xviii. No longer the demand by the analyst for a story to be 
told but a silence around which discourse can explore its own 
contours. 
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d'esprit. 1125 . Further Madame de Bargeton is evidently old enough 
to be Lucien's mother and her sexuality, which can find no other 
outlet reveals itself above all in the mother-tongue: 11 Elle 
prodiguait d~mesur~ment des superlatifs qui chargeaient sa 
conversation oa les moindres choses prenaient des proportions 
gigantesques 11 • Language becomes sexual where it is a question 
of woman: 11 car il faut violer pour un moment la langue, afin 
26 de peindre des travers nouveaux que partagent quelques femmes. 11 
(my emphasis). Thus the problem of woman is also the problem of 
language - of difference. The novel turns around a set of 
suspended disjunctions: Chardon or de Rubempr~, thistle or daisy, 
spike or not spike27 • Lucien, as hero, is constantly caught up 
in this movement, he is both male and female, both good and bad, 
both unscrupulous and honourable. But, at the same time, the 
narrative always maintains that he is chardon, spike, - always 
maintains his real identity at every level. Lucien's desire to 
call himself de Rubempr~ is the world of illusion that the novel 
must lose so that it can begin to write itself. In particular 
it is Lucien's attachment to the female world that must be worn 
down in the course of the narrative. The novel is written from 
the position Lucien will occupy at the end of the novel when he 
25. Honor~ de Balzac. op.cit. vol.11. p.212. 
26. ibid. p.214. 
27. The meaning of chardon as thistle is spelt out in the spoof 
poem. vol.12. p.320 but the other meaning of chardon - spike -
remains unspoken within the text. 
:i 
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can understand Vautrin's lesson which he takes from Otway's 
Venice Preserved: 
11 As~tu compris cette amiti~ profonde, d'homme a homme, qui lie Pierre a Jaffier, qui fait 
pour eux d'une femme une bagatelle, et qui 
change entre eux tousles termes sociaux? 11 28 
He will gain the name of de Rubempr~ but it will be a name 
conferred by a father: 
11 Je · veux aimer ma cr~ature, la fa ~onner, la 
p~trir a mon usage, afin de l'aimer comme un 
p~re aime son enfant. Je roulerai dans ton 
tilbury, mon gar1on, je me rejouirai de tes 
succes aupres des femmes, je dirai: - "Ce beau jeune, c'est moil ce marquis de Rubempre, je l'ai cr~e et mis au monde aristocratique; 
sa grandeur est mon oeuvre, il se tait ou parle 1 ma voix, il me consulte en tout. 11 29 
Illusions Perdues thus traverses the classic path of narrative 
in that it is a desperate attempt to deny sexuality, the knowledge 
of which provides its first impetus. Philippe Sollers analyses 
this denial of sexuality as the creation of a false father: 
28. 
29. 
"Un faux pere ••• mis la .•• a seule fin d'eviter 
fantasmatiquement que la mere n'ait pas le 
phallus, qu'elle soit genitale, qu'elle jouisse. 
Ce pere est une mere. Phallique. Lepere, lui, 
ibid. p.552. 
ibid. p.553. 
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serait en realite un nom. Mais, de cela, nul n'a plus peur que l'id~aliste. 11 30 
The Name of the Father which is the name without a bearer is the 
-
index of language as system of difference and inauguration of 
desire. It is the separation of the name of the father from its 
bearer which is, for Lacan, the crucial event for a successful 
entry into the symbolic order. If, however, we can find a 
bearer for this name then we can ignore difference i.e. ignore 
the mother. This father is, for the narrative of Illusions 
Perdues, David S6chard. It is his passage from the world of 
maternal into which he throws himself at the beginning of the 
novel (adoration of Lucien with Eve and Madame Chardon) to the 
world of the paternal (reproof for Lucien with Eve and Madame 
Chardon) which is the counterpart of Lucien's movement from 
ignorance to knowledge. The name of the father - Chardon - is 
given body, substantified, by David who absorbs it by marrying 
Eve and thus excludes Lucien from the feminine world he has 
always inhabited. It is the work that the narrative has done in 
providing a function for the father that enables Vautrin to take 
it up. Balzac's novel does, however, end in some suspense, for 
Lucien has not entirely left the world of the feminine. His 
scoffing of Vautrin's offer by reminding him that the abbt of 
Vermont had led Marie Antoinette to the scaffold and the fact 
30. Philippe Sollers. Sur Le Mat~rialisme. p.61. "A false father set up for the sole purpose of avoiding fantasmatically the mother not having a phallus, of avoiding her being genital, her coming. This father is a mother. Phallic. The father in reality is a name but no one is more afraid of that than the idealist." 
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that, amid the welter of surnames that end the book, Lucien's 
name appears without any definition, both refuse total closure. 
This final lack of the name of the father has a double 
determination. Firstly as part of a larger text, the narrative 
must re-introduce a certain heterogeneity to ensure that another 
volume can begin. Secondly as an index of a desire that still 
retains some force, the narrative cannot finally close itself -
it leaves a limited plurality as possibility. 
The classic realist text does not, however, simply produce 
a different economy of desire from that found in epic but also 
submits the reader to a different temporal order. The constant 
disjunction in epic keeps the enonce separate from the 
~nonciation. The story-teller remains independent of the epic 
which is no more than a simple succession of events. The epic 
can be told by anybody at any time. In the classic realist text 
it is the final closing of the non-disjunction in an identity which 
makes the narration possible: the enonciation is only made possible 
from the end of the time of the ~nonce'. In other words the end of 
the story becomes the inevitable progress of the narration. This 
introduction of meaning into time (the meaningful progression of 
events) is the transformation of epic into history i.e. the 
production of the cl~ic realist text. For this reason the classic 
realist text is both historicist - each level finds itself 
determined by the central movement of the narration - and (with 
perhaps the inevitable corollary of historicism) it.is also 
written from a present which has no future - the apogee of the 
I 
, I 
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triumphant progress of time. This necessity to place everything 
in the past in order that the text can display its own order 
involves the appropriation of the public realm of events: 
Lucien's face is explicitly bound up with the political movements 
and crises of the 1820s. 
Finally we must notice that it is this suspension of 
disjunction which allows the investigation of psychology. The 
opposition of d'Arthez to Lousteau is both posed and then 
suspended in Lucien who is both d'Arthez and Lousteau. The 
novel's end is his discovery of his true self - a problem that 
does not arise for the hero of an epic given in a set of static 
disjuncts. The endless meanderings of the psychological novel 
are made possible by the organisation of discourse described 
above. With Joyce we enter into a new organisation, a new order 
which is neither an epic nor a form of classic realism, but 
instead involves the transformation of both these terms. 
It is in the perspective opened up by a consideration of 
narrative that we can understand the rupture between Stephen Hero 
and A Portrait of the Artist as a young man. The first is 
caught within the classic realist text, the second announces a 
fresh start which has no beginning, but offers instead a rhythmic 
destruction (deconstruction) of the previous economy of discourse; 
word without end or beginning. 31 I have attempted to identify 
31. 11 Mon hypoth.ese, en effet, est que Finnegans Wake est un mot, 
un seul et immense mot mais en ~tat de dJrapage, de lapsus. 11 
Philippe Sollas. Tel Quel no.64. Winter 1975 p.18. 
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narration as the constant movement towards the place of 
knowledge from which narration can occur i.e. the smoothing of 
an incoherence which is always already guaranteed from the 
start. Problem of sexuality, of difference, of women - problem 
which is both asserted and then denied - it is this which is the 
basic movement of narration, it is this also which is the 
principal force at work in Stephen Hero. 
Dublin and Stephen are described from the position of 
knowledge to which the text tends, although the fact that the 
story remains unfinished is an index of the difficulties within 
the text; an incoherence which refuses to resolve itself into a 
simple position. Because it lacks not only an end but also 
beginning we cannot trace the logic of the narrative in its 
entirety but Emma Clery figures as that disorder which threatens 
Stephen's world and which must, therefore, be smoothed over and 
ironed out. The outburst when he confronts her with his desire, 
is the product of illusions which must be unmade by the progress 
of the text - an unmaking which involves the creation of the 
false father - Ibsen. 32 The same illusion can be found in the 
attempt to learn Irish, and, its unmaking, in the trouble 
caused by the mother tongue: "Stephen found it very (hard) 
troublesome to pronounce the gutturals but he did the best he 
32. In some sense this would be the ending of Stephen Hero: 
a flight from Ireland and then a meeting with Ibsen who would 
make Stephen his spiritual heir. 
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could. 1133 This trouble with women receives a partial solution 
(as in Illusions Perdues with the death of Coralie) through the 
annihilation of women: Isabelle suffers the penalty of having 
"acquiesced in the religion of her mother1134 (my emphasis). As 
with the mental annihilation of Emma Clery, this death provides 
part of the place at which the narrative must arrive to write 
itself. 
But the narrative's final failure to arrive at that place 
can perhaps best be understood through a consideration of the 
temporality within the text - the difficulty posed by history. 
Classic realism can be understood as working with that division 
of language characterised by Emile Benveniste as discours and 
histoire. For Benveniste the distinction is between that form 
of language (discours) in which the speaking subject is implied -
where an 1 I 1 appears which is interchangeable with a 'you' 
(possibility of identification and exchange) - and a form of 
language in which the speaking subject is not involved - where 
"il s t agit de la presentation des f aits survenus 'a un certain 
moment du temps, sans aucune intervention du locuteur dans le 
/ "t 1135 reci. Benveniste axes his distinction between the past 
33. James Joyce. Stephen Hero p.65. 
34. ibid. p.131. 
35. Emile Benveniste. Probl~mes de Linguistique Gernfrale. p.239. 
"It's a question of the presentation of facts which have occurred 
at a certain moment without any intervention of the speaker in 
the story." The distinction finds a full exposition in the essay 
from which this quote is taken "Les relations de temps dans le 
verbe fran~ais 11 pp.237-250. It is sympathetically criticised 
from a position similar to my own in Julia Kristeva. Le Texte 
du Roman p.179. 
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historic and the compound past in French. Lacking such a clear 
distinction of verbal forms in English one would have to content 
oneself with organising the distinction around forms of language 
in which 1it 1 or Ythere 1 functioned as an impersonal subject and 
those where the interchangeable personal pronouns govern the 
verbs. But Benveniste's distinction, while useful at one level, 
obscures the fact that at a deeper level all histoire is already 
discours - that the impersonal mode of narration offers a certain 
set of exchanges with the reader - offers a position. The 
suspense of classical narration is the interplay between these 
two uses of language. The lit' of histoire must join the tIY of 
the discourse at the end - where the story will be written from. 
This disjunction between the 'itY and the YIY is constantly 
played with in the classic realist text; a play which is only 
allowed on the condition that they will fuse into one. It is 
this that guarantees progression: a continuous present in which 
there is a suspended disjunction (the narrative tells us both 
that Lucien will fail in Paris, and also that Lucien thinks he 
will succeed - we move between the two) but this movement is 
disposed - laid out - from their eventual union. The dialectical 
movement of history requires an Absolute present from which it is 
written. If we look at Stephen Hero we will be able to see its 
difficulties as so many difficulties of narration involving new 
orders of discours and histoire i.e. the problem of history: 
"By all this society liberty was held to be the 
chief desirable; the members of it were fierce 
democrats. The liberty they desired for themselves 
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was mainly a liberty of costume and vocabulary: 
and Stephen could hardly understand how such a 
poor scarecrow of liberty could bring (to their) 
serious human beings to their knees in worship. 
As in the Danielsi household he had seen people 
playing at being important so here he saw people 
playing at being free. He saw that many 
political absurdities arose from the lack of a just 
sense of comparison in public men. The orators 
of this patriotic party were not ashamed to cite 
the precedents of Switzerland and France. The 
intelligent centres of the movement were so 
scantily supplied that the analogies they gave out 
as exact and potent were really analogies built 
haphazard upon very inexact knowledge. The cry 
of a solitary Frenchman (A bas l'Angleterre) at a 
Celtic re-union in Paris would be made by these 
enthusiasts the subject of a leading article in 
which would be shown the imminence of aid for 
Ireland from the French government. A glowing 
example was to be found for Ireland in the case 
of Hungary, an example, as these patriots imagined, 
of a long-suffering minority, entitled by every 
right of race and justice to a separate freedom, 
finally emancipating itself. In emulation of that 
achievement bodies of young Gaels conflicted 
murderously in the Phoenix PaPk with whacking 
hurley-sticks, thrice armed in their just quarrel 
since their revolution had been blessed for them 
by the Anointed, and the same bodies were set 
aflame with indignation (at) by the unwelcome 
presence of any young sceptic who was aware of the 
capable aggression of the Magyars upon the Latin 
and Slav and Teutonic populations, greater than 
themselves in number, which are politically allied 
to them, and of the potency of a single regiment 
of infantry to hold in check a town of twenty 
thousand inhabitants. 11 36 
Here, discours and histoire refuse to be maintained as a 
suspended disjunction to be resolved in unity at the end but 
instead contaminate each other. Not the slide from Lucien to 
the narrative and back, but instead a constant disruption of 
36. James Joyce. op.cit. pp.66-67. 
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histoire by StephenYs discours. This confusion between discours 
and histoire, between personal and impersonal.. can be seen in the 
long passage between "He saw" and "a young sceptic" where the 
readers are in the realm of the impersonal,only to find themselves 
back in the personal. This confusion poses a problem of knowledge 
because there is no gap between Stephen and the narrative - no 
suspended disjunction which must be collapsed into unity - which 
is the indispensable guarantee of the whole business of narration. 
It could be said that this is simply another way of describing 
indirect free style. The problem, however, is that the 
imprecision of the term indirect free style covers a variety of 
discursive organisations. The place of the histoire of the 
narration and the discours of the hero can appear to be joined 
together (various forms of first person narration) if the 
discours of the hero at the beginning of the novel is different 
from the histoire it will become at the end when the text can be 
written. If the first person novel is of such a kind (i.e. if 
it is written backwards) then it is merely a version of the 
classic realist text which always has an end. This end is the 
moment at which the possibility of exchange and identification 
are fully defined: the tIY, tyou•, •het, Yshet of discours are 
finally shown to be in an identical position as the Yit 1 of 
histoire. The reader is allocated the same place on all sides -
happy ending. It is this happy ending, and its promise, which 
obscures histoire as discours and defines any discours simply from 
the point of view of histoire - in terms of truth or falsity. 
(Epic is distinguished from classic realism in that it does not 
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have the pressing necessity of an end - our positions vis 1 vis 
the discours of the characters is obvious from the world outside 
the epic). 
A discursive organisation which contains no promise of an 
end reveals its own contours and organisation, and at this moment 
histoire becomes impossible - it is unmasked as discours. It is 
significant that it is at the moment that Marx abandons Hegelian 
historicism (history as suspended disjunction, movement of the 
dialectic towards the Absolute) that it becomes possible to study 
society as system. 37 Stephen Hero is caught between these two 
moments and histoire keeps collapsing into discours only to 
struggle on again. This disease, this impossibility of suspense 
has a name: paralysis. 
It is easy to say that this is the result of shallow 
egotism on Joyce's part or lack of subtlety or failure of 
sensibility but so to do is to ignore a fundamental disorder of 
discourse for some of its effects. If discours is jammed on 
histoire then paralysis ensues. The difficulty of this paralysis 
reveals itself symptomatically as a difficulty of pronouns - the 
difficulty of those exchanges necessary for identification. 
Turpin Hero could begin in the first person and end in the third 
37. The debate about Marx's historicism has been long and 
violent over the last few years. For a statement of the position 
here asserted see Louis Althusser. Lire le Capital. Section V. 
pp.150-184, and the brief discussion supra pp 52-54. 
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because of the interchangeability of pronouns and the resultant 
possibility of identification. It is this suspended exchange 
that Balzac•s novel is based on - we are both within the discours 
of Lucien and the histoire of the narration, on condition that 
they will finally become the same. In Stephen Hero the 
disjunction is no longer possible and it is this disorder which 
makes Stephen Hero such a clumsy book. The discourse charged 
with the narrative can dominate the other discourses but it has 
become conscious of itself as discourse and thus the resulting 
writing jars: 
"When a demand for intelligent sympathy goes 
unanswered he (it) is a too stern disciplinarian 
who blames himself for having offered a dullard 
an opportunity to participate in the warmer 
movements of a more highly organised life. So 
Stephen regarded his loan of manuscripts as 
elaborate flag practices with phrases. 11 38 
In this passage the impersonal use of the verbs presumes a 
situation which can be explained and understood in terms of a 
common reality available to reader and text. The events of the 
text are subsumed under a set of agreements i.e. the promise of 
the end. The meta-subject of histoire is the guarantee of the 
solidity of the classic realist text and we can slide between it 
and the discours of a Lucien secure in their final identity. But 
the meta-subject - the •it' of the narration is becoming impossible 
to sustain and, for this reason the subject 'he' can no longer 
38. James Joyce. op.cit. p.88. 
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be identified - 1 he' becomes an index of strangeness rather than 
a comforting identity. As this 'he' surfaces, the meta-subject 
is destroyed and the result is final - no more agreements; no 
more ends; no more stories. Balzac can be sure of this end 
because he assumes that all societies which are not true 
monarchies will fail. A Marxist writer (and during some of the 
period that he was composing Stephen Hero and A Portrait Joyce 
would call himself a socialist 39) can never posit an end to 
history because history can have no end1° All that can be done 
from a Marxist position is to investigate the discourses of the 
day - an investigation which in its radical interrogation will 
always be revolutionary, a revolution of the word. 
A Portrait opens with a story - typical in that it is 
told by the father and that it provides in its structure an 
identification - 11 He was baby tuckoo. 11 4 1 But the text then 
39. See Richard Ellmann. James Joyce pp.247-248. See also 
various letters, written from Rome in 1906, to Stanislaus Joyce. 
Letters vol.2, pp.148, 173-4, 187-8. Ellmann describes the end 
of the first short draft of A Portrait of the Artist as a Young 
~ (written for Dana in 1904 and published in The Workshop of 
Dedalus. ed. Robert Scholes and Richard M. Kain. pp.40-48) as 
11 a stirring peroration compounded of Zarathustra, a dash of Marx 
and Joyce." op.cit. p.152. 
40. For the concept of a process without end(s) see Louis 
Althusser. 11,Remarque sur une categorie: 11 Proces sans Suj et ni 
Fin(s)" in Reponse a John Lewis. pp.69-76. Althusser_ opens this 
brief note with the comment that 11 Cette formule ( 11 proces sans 
Sujet", 11 proces sans Sujet ni Fin(s) 11 ) a tout ce qu'il faut pour 
heurter les "evidences" du sens Commun, c•est-a-dire (Gramsci) 
de l'ideologie dominante, done de se faire des adversaires 
convaincus a peu de frais. 11 
41. James Joyce. A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man. p.7. 
132 
constitutes so many struggles against identification, so many 
evasions of the paternal -..and· so many attempts to accectl.to the 
feminine. Counter to the classic realist text A Portrait is the 
product of the desire to make of the father only a name and thus 
acceed to a chain of differences where one is not fixed to a 
single point but can come and come and come again. 
The problem of Stephen Hero is that the neutral histoire 
is constantly interrupted by a discours and this interruption 
destroys the movement of the narrative. But what is a problem 
in Stephen Hero becomes the constitutive principle of A Portrait. 
Montage of discourses, A Portrait refuses to tell us stories. 
Simply to take Stephents encounters with the university 
authorities, one can remark that in Stephen Hero these are all 
given strong diegetic motivation in terms of the recognition by 
the college authorities of Stephen's identity as a rebel and as 
a dangerous opponent. As such these encounters become 
confrontations or battles of identities, so many attempts to 
be recognised by a father. In A Portrait, the absence of diegetic 
motivation allows system to appear instead of position, discours 
instead of histoire. Thus we can focus on the different words to 
describe the same thing (tundish, funnel) and the different 
pronunciations which mark the divide between Stephen and the dean: 
11 
- The language in which we are speaking is his 
before it is mine. How different are the words 
~, Christ, ale, master 1 on his lips and on mine! 
I cannot speak or write these words without unrest 
of spirit. His language, so familiar and so 
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foreign, will always be for me an acquired 
speech. I have not made or accepted its words. 
My voice holds them at bay. My soul frets in 
the shadow of his language. 11 42 
With this appearance of discourse, there is a lack of 
position for the reader to occupy. No longer the assumption of 
a sure identity (the nature of which is deferred until the end) 
reading becomes a perpetual displacement. If Stephen still longs 
for a purely expressive language, the reader is denied that 
possibility by the juxtaposition of the five sections without any 
overriding unity. Deprived a final resting place our own 
discourse becomes incoherent but also open, it becomes a process 
without end. 
Narratively any possible ending (assertion of identity, 
union of discours and histoire) is taken up and ironised. Thus 
the heroic end of the first section becomes the joke of the 
second in a movement that gets repeated throughout the text. In 
a reciprocal moment, the psychological investigation of what our 
hero will become (Stephen or Maurice, Stephen or Cranly, Stephen 
or Cosgrave) is transformed so that the other major characters, 
far from possessing some full identity, determine certain forms 
of address - practice a certain punctuation of Stephen's discourse. 
42. ibid. p.194. In Stephen Hero this encounter is because the dean 11 to whom the energence of these unusual qualities had been duly reported, spoke one day to Stephen with the purpose of 
"sounding" him. 11 (p.33). Interestingly the dean loses both his 
name and the appelation "Father" in A Portrait. 
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Lynch•s punctuation is a certain mechanical materialism: as 
Stephen discourses on his aesthetic theories, Lynch interrupts 
with comments about his lack of money and they are both 
interrupted by the passage of commerce: 
11 A long dray laden with old iron came round 
the corner of sir Patrick Dun's hospital 
covering the end of Stephen's speech with the 
harsh roar of jangled and rattling metal. 
Lynch closed his ears and gave out oath after 
oath till the dray had passed. 11 43 
Cranly spaces Stephen's words with a certain feminity: he talks of 
a mother's love and it is during this final conversation of the 
book that a woman's singing breaks into the passage of their 
thoughts. Stephen acknowledges that Cranly felt 11 the sufferings 
of women 11 • 44 
But if the father is held at bay, he is not finally 
pulverised, dissolved, anatomized - he continues to menace a 
certain identity. Although the name is separated from its bearer, 
there is always the hope that a true bearer who will merge with 
the name can be found. 11 Fosterchild114 5 Stephen will search for a 
mythical father: for a Dedalus who will occupy the name fully. 46 
43. James Joyce. A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man. p.213. 
44. ibid. p.249. 
45. ibid. p.101. 
46. If one were to recast A Portrait in terms of a bio-graphy, 
then one might say that, despite James' search, there was no 
father who was not exceeded by the name Joy; even the Viennese 
Freud. 
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These contradictory pressures can be found at work on the side 
of the feminine. A Portrait in its hesitation of any identity, 
marks a distinct openness to the feminine; term which ensures 
the circulation of phantasy rather than a fixed position. The 
woman standing in the door at the end of Davin's story is the 
exemplar of this moment of circulation, caught on the border 
between inner and outer the woman disturbs any simple symmetry 
between the two: 
"The last words of Davin's story sang in his 
memory and the figure of the woman in the story 
stood forth, reflected in other figures of the 
peasant women whom he had seen standing in the 
doorways at Clane as the college cars drove by, 
as a type of her race and his own, a batlike soul 
waking to the consciousness of itself in darkness 
and secrecy and loneliness and, through the eyes 
and voice and gesture of a woman without guile, 
calling the stranger to her bed. 11 47 
But the woman's lack of a name48 points towards the idea of the 
woman as simple plenitude; counterpart of the father who will 
fill up the name. This idea of woman as plenitude finds 
demonstration in the passage just quoted where there is a 
hovering between the idea of the woman as full symbol for the 
young artist and the function of the woman as the point of 
disruption of any such discourse. It is the passage between the 
47. James Joyce. op.cit. pp.186-187. 
48. Emma Clery becomes E---- C-----. ibid. p.72. 
a name hesitates any final attitude towards her. 
on page 238 has its hesitation on page 256. 
This lack of 
The dismissal 
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plenitude of woman and the mythic father which the text both 
undertakes and refuses. This double movement does indicate 
the possibility of a final exit but, still caught within 
disjunction, this exit is that of perversion. The neurotic, 
having accepted the disjunction of the sexes wants to deny any 
possibility of their conjunction together for he cannot bear 
the idea of mixture. The pervert, however, plays in the space 
of opening up and closing down this disjunction - endlessly 
deferring any final resolution. Thus the five episodes 
circulate by promising a conclusion that is never reached and 
refusing the expected coherence and correspondence in a 
markedly perverse struggle. It is this perversity that allows 
a minimal pleasure to be taken in the mother-tongue: 
"He closed his eyes, surrendering himself to her, 
body and mind, conscious of nothing in the world 
but the dark pressure of her softly parting lips. 
They pressed upon his brain as upon his lips as 
though they were the vehicle of a vague speech; 
and between them he felt an unknown and timid 
pressure, darker than the swoon of sin, softer 
than sound or odour." 49 
There are endless discussions of A Portrait which 
circulate around the attempts to find the position of the author 
49. ibid. p.104. 
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in this 11 authorless 11 work.SO All such attempts ignore the fact 
that the structure of the work allows for no such authorial 
stance and that this same structure denies one to the reader also. 
The reader is constantly at~ as discourse after discourse is 
forced on him/her without any fixed hierarchy to ensure the 
control and distance necessary to a position. If we wish to take 
seriously this question of Joyce's position in the work then it 
is perhaps Brecht who provides the most appropriate and literal 
answer in his comments about his novel The Business Deals of 
Mr Julius Caesar: 
"My own activity seems to me to be of a wider 
range and more diverse than our theorists of 
realism believe. I feel myself to be very 
badly served by them. I am working at present 
on two novels, a play and a collection of poems. 
One of the novels is historical and requires 
extensive research in Roman history. Now the 
SO. Wayne Booth so describes the work on page 326 of The Rhetoric 
of Fiction. He then attempts to discover whether we should share 
Stephen's view of his flight (p.327) because, if we do not know 
what attitude we are to take to it, then we run the risk of 
retreating into "babbling and incommunicable relativism" (p.328). 
The assumption throughout Booth's consideration of A Portrait is 
that Joyce had a definite attitude to Stephen that he was trying 
to express and A Portrait is judged a magnificent failure because 
"Even if we were now to do our homework like dutiful students, 
even if we were to study all of Joyce's work, even if we were to 
spend the lifetime that Joyce playfully said his novels demand 
presumably we should never come to as rich, as refined, and as 
varied a conception of the quality of Stephen's last days in 
Ireland as Joyce had in mind." (p.336) The traditional defence 
against this attack is to take the argument one step further back 
and say that Joyce intended to communicate ambiguity cf. Morris 
Beja. Dubliners and A Portrait of the Artist as a Youn Man. 
A selection of Critical Essays. ed. Morris Beja Casebook Series) 
p.26. 
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novel is the territory of our theorists. 
But I am not being malicious when I say that 
for my work on this novel: The Business Deals 
of Mr Julius Ceasar, I have been unable to 
get any help from them. I can see no use for 
this accumulation of personal conflicts which 
the bourgeois novel of the last century borrowed 
from drama, for these long scenes, with painted 
backcloth and the evocation of interiors. For 
large sections I use the diary form. For other 
parts it has been necessary to change the "point 
of view". As for my own personal point of view, 
it appears in the montage of the two different 
points of view of the fictional narrators." 1 (The first "point of view" appears in Englisll 
in the original text) (my emphasis) 
This, then, is Joycets position (in the montage, in the 
arrangement) but this is no position but an articulation, the 
articulation which is the 'I' at the end of the text. Turpin 
Hero in its passage from 'I' to 'he' establishes the necessary 
equivalence for discours to become histoire: because all pronouns 
51. Bertolt Brecht. Sur la R~alisme. pp.89-90. I have directly 
translated from the French. "Our theoreticians" is, above all, 
a reference to Lukacs. The quotation is taken from an essay 
entitled 11 0n the formalist character of the theory of realism" 
which was written about 1938. About this time Lukacs' positions 
were becoming dominant within the Third International and Walter 
Benjamin in an entry dated 21 July 1938 notes that "The 
publications of Lukacs, Kurella et.al. are giving Brecht a good 
deal of trouble" Understanding Brecht. p.116. A full background 
to the political situation of Brecht, at that time, can be found 
as a preface to a selection of some of his writings against 
Lukacs in New Left Review no.84. March - April 1974 pp.33 - 38. 
For an attempt to recapture Brecht for a Lukacsian position and 
an attack on this attempt see Stanley Mitchell. "From Shlovsky 
to Brecht: Some preliminary remarks towards a history of the 
politicisation of Russian Formalism" and Ben Brewster "From 
Shlovsky to Brecht: A Reply11 both in Screen vol.15 no.2. Summer 
1974. Special Number: "Brecht and a Revolutionary Cinema" pp. 
74 - 103. 
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are fully interchangeable the impersonal 'it' of the narrative 
is constituted. In A Portrait we find the passage from 'he' to 
'I' in which histoire becomes discours and there is no easy 
equivalence between pronouns. The 'I' here is not the transparent 
position which can be exchanged against a 'you' but a montage 
of discourses i.e. a set of effects of language. The end of the 
text is the guarantee of its beginning as the artist is produced 
who will write it; in this endless circulation there is no 
moment of dominance from which the reader's discourses are 
invited to a complacent and suppressed entry. It is this lack 
of dominance which enables us to locate the author - not as a 
simple source who, outside the text, can identify himself and 
then communicate this identity through a discourse but rather as 
the play of possibilities produced by the various discourses of 
the text. The. discourses in question are .those of Catholicism 
and nationalism, of aesthetics and the artist which produces the 
'I' that ends the text, and immediately starts it again. 
It is in the perspective of a lack of a hierarchy of 
discourses, of a montage of different modes which forces work 
on the reader, that we can best understand Joyce's relationship 
to Flaubert - a relationship which is often discussed but usually 
in terms of a rather barren psychologism or an empirical search 
f . · 1 •t. 52 or s1m1 ari ies . In a "Lost Illusions» novel we have a clear 
52. The reference to Flaubert was explored in some depth by Hugh 
Kenner first in Dublin's Joyce and more fully in The Stoic 
Comedians. Richard K. Cross's-Flaubert and Joyce is a study whose 
psychologism can be immediately perceived in the sub-title: The 
rite of fiction, and the title of the first chapter: The Priesthood 
of Art - Two Vocations. 
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divorce between discours and histoire but, in Flaubert, this 
divorce is no , longer absolute and there is a consequent difficulty 
of interpretation53 . In L'Education sentimentale, and with even 
/ 
more emphasis in Bouvard et Pecuchet (work which becomes impossible 
to finish), there is no place for the reader to occupy. Flaubert 
stated that his desire was to write a book about nothing - 11 un 
livre sur rien1154 - and his texts tend increasingly towards a 
simple traversal of the rhythms and fixities of contemporary 
discourses. From this perspective Le Dictionnaire des Idtes Recues 
thus marks the apogee of his writing. There are no ends in his 
novels in the sense that there is no knowledge that the reader 
gains from the end with which he learns to understand the 
beginning. And this lack of knowledge is the product of the 
same process which leaves Frederic Moreau and Bouvard and 
P~cuchet as ignorant (or as knowledgeable) at the end of the books 
as at the beginning. 
The destruction (de-construction) of narration, of stories 
has as consequence the bringing to attention of discourse. Here 
we find Flaubert's endless and meticulous attention to the forms 
and contours of the sentence. It is the sentence that Barthes 
53. For Cross such difficulty is the inevitable result of 
subtlety: "In the case of a novel whose vision is as intricate 
as that of A Portrait of the Artist or L'Education sentimentale, 
the problem of interpretation becomes exceptionally acute." 
op.cit. p.37. 
54. Gustave Flaubert. Correspondance. vol.2. p.345. 
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argues is the basic unit of Flaubert's work55 , and one could 
mark the movement from Balzac to Flaubert as the change of basic 
unit. Balzac asks to be divided in terms of plot, Flaubert in 
terms of language. The collapse of histoire into discours is the 
impossibility to hold language at a safe distance as simple 
enonc~ in which one knows one's position, and instead we find the 
fall into the endless passage of ~nonciation, where there is no 
position to occupy. Deprived of an outside (an end) to the text 
in which one can place oneself securely, we have to read each 
sentence - we have to support and uphold its contours with our 
own body. It is the movement between this immersion in language 
and its partial rejection (the father still sought in A Portrait, 
the sense in which one can attempt to read L'Education sentimentale 
as Illusions Perdues) that constitutes that perverse vacillation 
which I have described in Dubliners and A Portrait. The endless 
splitting of the subject which continuously (re)finds a moment of 
unity; the constant calling into question of one's own discourses 
together still with a minimal promise of final security. It is 
in the light of a consideration of how Flaubert's writing opens 
up the world of discours and ~nonciation that one can understand 
his enigmatic remark - "Madame Bovary - C'est Moi 11 - as a 
linguistic and not a psychological statement. Deprived of a 
position we must be touched by the discourses that surround us 
and it is this contact which constitutes momentary access to the 
feminine. 
55. Roland Barthes. "Flaubert et la phrase" in Le Degr<f Zero de 
l'ecriture suivi de Nouveaux essais critiques. pp.135-144. 
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The movement from classic realism to this new category 
of writing can be located not simply in the passage from Stephen 
Hero to A Portrait but also in the passage from La Premiere 
Education sentimentale to L'Education sentimentale proper. The 
first book is almost a simple re-writing of Illusions Perdues -
56 
a phrase which punctuates the novel at every turn • Two heroes, 
Jules and Henry divide the novel. The one rests in the country, 
the second comes to Paris. Henry falls in love with Madame 
Renaud and flees with her to New York but he soon realises that 
the passion of love cannot last and returns to France having lost 
his illusions. Here already the text begins to pose problems. 
If Lucien can really be said to have acce~fed to knowledge 
(although there is always the problem that his weakness of 
character may entail a fall back into illusion), Henry's loss of 
a set of romantic stereotypes about love is simply the 
acquisition of a further set of stereotypes - those of the man of 
the world. This difficulty surfaces elsewhere in the text and 
with more insistence in the figure of Jules. Far from submitting 
56. Thus 11 ••• Henry esp~rait, il attendait, il r~vait, il 
souhaitait, il croyait encore a la volupte qui slecoule du regard 
des femmes et a toute la realite du bonheur de la vie, ~poque 
d'illusions, ou l'amour bourgeonne dans 1 1 ~me. 11 Gustave Flaubert. 
Oeuvres Completes. vol.1. p.290. Later "Jules s'enrichissait ainsi I 
de toutes les illusions qu'il perdait ••• 11 ibid. p.358 and "Il est 
un age ou l'on aime tousles vins, ou l'on adore toutes les femmes; 
alors, assis devant la vie comme autour d'un festin, on chante tous 
ensemble dans la joie de son coeur, les convives ont la meme 
gaiet~ et la m&me ivresse; mais une heure arrive ou chacun prend 
sa bouteille, choisit sa femme et s'enfuit chez lui, ~uis d 1 autres 
viennent boire aux m~mes illusions et se griser des memes 
esptfrances. 11 ibid. p. 360. 
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a woman to his name - becoming the father who can ensure the 
knowledge of the text - Jules is tricked by his first love and 
becomes immersed in bitterness. After vain attempts to cover 
every field of knowledge (precursor of the futile quest of 
Bouvard and Pecuchet) and thus accedL,to the knowledge which 
would guarantee the text, he finally becomes a writer57 • 
If, as I have argued, the process of narration is the 
smoothing over of the feminine by the creation of a coherence, 
then the narrative only half accomplishes its work. Although 
Madame Renaud is banished to her room from which she hardly ever 
comes out58 , there is no counterpart of this suppression of the 
feminine in particular there is no masculine assumption of a 
coherent knowledge in the text - Henry is as stupid at the end 
of the story as he was at the beginning. It should not surprise 
us, therefore, that the repressed returns elsewhere in the text 
in a movement of incoherence. Madame Renaud makes her return in 
the electrifying scene in which Jules, walking along a country 
road, is confronted by a limping dog which by its revolting 
appearance and behaviour attracts both his sympathy and disgust. 
Drawn towards it he is repelled when he attempts to stroke it: 
57. Whereas at the beginning Jules' writing is like Lucien 1 s 
(Lucien's great book is !'Archer de Charles IX, Jules' Le 
Chevalier de Calatrava) and, as such, controlled by the"""iii:eta-
discourse, the writer he becomes is not comprehensible to the 
text - his writing becomes a blind spot. 
58. Gustave Flaubert. ~ Oeuvres Completes. vol.1. p.371. 
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" l'impression chaude de cette 
nue et ru~use lui fit retirer sa 
d~gout, et il s'en 6carta avec la 
peau toute 
main de 
t II nausee. 59 
The dog, despite violent beatings, constantly returns and the 
moment when Jules gazes into its eyes is the vertiginous moment 
of the book - the vortex which leaves nothing in place - the 
moment which cannot be given any real diegetic motivation. The 
dog, and the narrative hesitates\considerably on this point 
(hesitation which is always the index of a repressed desire), is 
1
, 
that dog which Jules gave to his unfaithful lover Lucinde and 
which is thus identified with the feminine. More significantly, 
the dog's name of Fox brings the return of Madame Renaud (renard) 
signifying the repressed cannot be hidden. Hence the difficulty 
of the novel, sliding between a confident narration and, under 
various kinds of pressure, withering into a direct form of 
address (letters) or breaking out into dialogue60 . L'Education 
sentimentale itself resolves this problem through the constant 
hesitation of the end. There is no moment at which Madame Arnoux 
will be submitted to Frederic and thus no possibility of the 
smoothing of incoherence. The result of this hesitation is the 
endless experience of discourse as discourse, a perverse motion 
which is the only possible response to the paralysis of stereotype 
offered by the French bourgeoisie. 
59. ibid. p.352. 
60. The most striking example of this pressure is provided by 
Henry's parents - endless repetition of stereotypes. Before their 
banality the text breaks into dialogue (cf. ibid. pp.337-338 and 
340-341) much as, later, Bouvard and Plcuchet turn into a set of 
Encyclopedia entries. 
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CHAPTER 5 
A RADICAL SEPARATION OF THE ELEMENTS: 
THE DISTANCIATION OF THE READER IN THE SIRENS AND CYCLOPS. 
In the programme notes to Mahagonny, Brecht defines epic 
theatre as involving a radical separation of its elements and 
distinguishes three such elements in opera - the music, the text 
and the setting. 1 He expresses his desire for such a separation 
and his opposition to any integration of elements, in the 
following passage: 
11 So long as the expression 'Gesamtkunstwerk 1 
(or 'integrated work of art') means that the 
integration is a muddle, so long as the arts 
are supposed to be 'fused' together, the 
various elements will all be equally degraded, 
and each will act as a mere 'feed' to the rest. 
The process of fusion extends to the spectator, 
who gets thrown into the melting pot too and 
becomes a passive (suffering) part of the total 
work of art. Witchcraft of this sort must of 
course be fought against. Whatever is intended 
to produce hypnosis, is likely to induce sordid 
intoxication, or creates fog, has got to be 
given up. 11 2 
Brecht's objection to the 'integrated work of art' can 
best be understood as an objection to the hiding of the relation-
ship between signifier (the material image) and the signified 
(the meaning) - an objection which is based on the subjective 
effects of this concealment. It is possible, indeed in some 
sense inevitable, that the very distinction signifier and 
1. Bertolt Brecht. Brecht on Theatre. p.37. 
2. ibid. pp.37-38. 
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signified suggests a per fect one to one correlation between 
material image and meaning. Saussure, in the Cours de Linguistique 
G~n t rale, introduc~d the concepts with the aid of this diagram : 
Concept 
Image 
Acoustique 3 f 
and all later diagrams · are of a similar nature. 4 Although 
Sau.ssure emphasizes that both signifier and signified are 
defined diacritically the circle around them both suggests that 
there is some simple, indeed almost natural, relation between the 
two. No matter how often Saussure emphasizes the arbitrary 
nature of the sign, it is doubtful whether given his own 
formulation of its constitution it is possibl e finally to escape 
a certain belief in a natural one to one relation. GivEll this 
one to one relation it is doubtful if one can escape awarding a 
certain primacy to the signified - a primacy which finds its 
diagrammatic expression in the fact that the signified is placed 
~hove the signifier. Finally as a correlative of this dominance 
of the signified, there will be a tendency to ignore Saussure ' s 
strictures that signifier and signified are indissolubly 
entwined one with another (the famous image is the recto and verso 
of a piece of paper) 5 and imagine an autonomous world of the 
3 . Ferdinand de Saussure. Cours de Linguistigue G~n~rale . p.99. 
4 . cf. ibid. pp . 158 , 159, 162. 
5 . ibid . p. 157. 
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signified. The possibility of such an autonomous world encourages 
a mistaken belief in a relation of the subject (collective or 
individual) to the world of meaning, which is simple and unitary 
i.e. one of full access and comprehension. The signifier then 
becomes simply the instrument of communication between two 
individual subjects or two instances of the same collective 
subject, in either case both speakers bathing in the luxury of 
an evident logos. 
The problem, in Saussure's work, is that there are two 
conflicting conceptions of language side by side - both opposed 
to the reigning comparative school but with contradictory 
consequences at certain levels between themselves. Saussure's 
main purpose in the Cours is to found an object for linguistic -
la langue - in which each element finds its definition through 
the differential structure (Saussure calls it a system) in which 
it is articulated. This notion of language is opposed to any 
notion of language as representation of thought - the position 
held by the dominant comparative linguistics of the day. The 
comparativists held that the cause of c~ange in language was 
a degeneration of'this pure repvesentational state because of 
the exigencies of communication. 6 Against this view, Saussure 
argues for the primacy of communication in language7 . However 
6. See Oswald Ducrot. "Le Structuralisme en Linguistique. 11 in Qu'est-ce que le structuralisme? ed. Franjois Wahl. pp.33-34. 
7. Saussure takes the communicational situation as basic to the 
description of language. See op.cit. pp.27-28. 
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Saussure's belief in language as a differential structure and 
his belief in language as communication are at odds with one 
8 another. It should not be thought, however, that this problem 
can be simply resolved - for in the interplay between communication 
and structure, Saussure touched not simply on some insignificant 
feature of language but on the constitutive contradiction of 
human subjectivity. If his own conception of the sign pulls 
language back to a simple one to one relation and the subject to 
a full world of meaning, his radical insight into language as 
system denies the subject any such plenitude. Jacques Lacan has 
8. It is in the emphasis of one or other of these aspects of Saussure 1 s thought that the dispute between the functionalists and the glossematicians takes place. The functionalists attempt to investigate the systematic organisation of the signifier through effects at the level of the signified. The only differences that matter are those that produce a change in meaning; those that alter the communicational charge of a particular linguistic unit. "The phoneme can be defined satisfactorily neither on the basis of its psychological nature nor on the basis of its relation to the phonetic variants, but purely and solely on the basis of its function in the system of language. 11 N.S. Trubetskoy. Pr.inciples of Phonology. p.41. (my emphasis) 11 Une langue est un instrument de communication ••• 11 Andre Martinet. El6ments.de Linguistique Genirale. p.20. The problem with this approach is that the basic elements of the system have certain positive characteristics, although these are defined oppositionally (thus the phonemes are described as voiced/voiceless etc.), rather than being of a strictly differential or formal character. Hjelmslev~ rejecting such positive definitions as a misunderstanding of Saussure's radical insight that the object of linguistics is the form of language (insight which finds its clearest expression in Sa us sure t s metaphor of chess, Cours. p. 4 3 ), attempts a purely formal definition of a given language such that each element is simply defined by its relation of implication with other elements. See Louis Hjelmslev., Essais Linguistiques. Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague. Vol.XII. p.71 and the whole of the essay entitled 11 Langue and Parole" op.cit. pp.69-81. 
,·,, I, 
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attempted to develop Saussurets insight and correct this 
psychologistic weakness by recasting the diagram first proposed 
by Saussure into an algorithm of the form s. 9 The importance of 
s this reformulation can be summarised in three points. Firstly 
the primacy of the signified over the signifier is reversed -
a reversal which is marked by the capitalisation of the signifier 
and the italicisation of the signified as well as by their change 
of place. Secondly the use of an algorithm suggests two different 
levels rather than Saussure's faces and thus the unity of the 
sign is minimised in favour of the assertion of two heterogenous 
areas. Thirdly this heterogeneity and the radical discontinuity 
between the two levels is emphasized both by the removal of the 
circle and the accentuation of the bar. For the bar can never 
be fully crossed and its resistance refuses to any sign the 
possibility of transparency, as the signifier constantly moves 
along its own differential chains. lO 
9. "Pour pointer 1rJmergence de la discipline linguistique, nous dirons qu'elle tient, comme c'est le cas de toute science au sens moderne, dans le moment constituant d'un algorithme qui la fonde. Cet algorithme est le s~ivant: 
s 
s 
qui se lit: signifiant sur signifit, le sur repondant a la barre qui ;' I' en separe les deux etapes. 
Le signe ecrit ainsi, m6rite d'~tre attribu~ 1 Ferdinand de Saussure, bien quiil ne se r~duise strictement a cette forme en 
" 
aucun des nombreux schemas sous lesquels il apparait dans l'impres-sion des le~ons diverses des trois cours des ann~es 1906-1907, 1908-1909, 1910-1911, que la piete d'un groupe de ses disciples a r~unies sous le titre de Cours de Linguistique Generale: publication primordiale a transmettre un enseignment digne de ce nom, c'est-a-dire qu•on ne peut arr~ter que sur son propre mouvement. 11 Jacques Lacan. Ecrits, p.497. 
10. For a fuller exposition of the differences here mentioned see Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe. le titre de la lettre. pp.37-40. 
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The significance of Lacan's reading of Saussure is that 
there is now no possibility of the subject's full access to the 
world of meaning. Instead the subject is constantly caught and 
divided between two worlds (a division which is constitutive of 
them both). While at one level the conscious subject rests in the 
world of the signified, at another level there is an other and 
dominant subject which races along the differential paths of the 
signifier and constantly disrupts the imaginary unity of the 
first. What is important is that Lacan's insight enables us to 
read in the organisation of language, the fundamentally divided 
order of subjectivity. Fran9ois Wahl has brilliantly described 
this importance in relation to Lacan's analysis of Jakobson's 
thesis, in which language is constituted by the functioning of 
the two basic tropes of metaphor and metonymy (language being 
formed by a horizontal paradigmatic axis and a vertical 
syntagmatic axis): 
/ / 11 Une chose est de reperer la metaphore 
conune loi d'organisation du discours, de la fonder conune un des deux pSles fonc-
tionnels du langage, de la retrouver dans les proces de condensation du mythe OU du r~ve; une autre chose de lire, sous la 
substitution de signifiants qui fait la / substance de la metaphore, un transgort, 
une meta-phore du sujet: de reconnaitre 
ainsi la place d'un sujet (du signifiant, 
c'est-a-dire de l'inconscient) excentrique 
a celui qui, sous les especes du moi 
conscient, pretend parler; et d'en conclure qu'a se poser toujours dans le fonctionne-
ment indefiniment substitutif de la 
\ I I 
'1 :, 
' 
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signifiance, le sujet ne peut ~tre que 
toujours ailleurs, toujours avant." 11 
The subject, considered in these terms, is no longer a 
full unity but a constant set of displacements inaugurated by a 
primal (but never original) exclusion (castration) from a world 
that was never full until it became empty; which emptiness we 
constantly attempt to fill. The political consequences of such 
a recognition are enormous. For it signals, in some sense, the 
end of that idea of a full and self-sufficient individuality, 
12 which has been dominant for so long in the West, and heralds 
11. Francois Wahl. 11 Philosophie et Structuralisme 11 in Qu'est-
ce que le,structuralisme? ed. Francois Wahl. pp.393-394. "It is 
one thing to discover the metaphor'as law of organisation of discourse, to place it as one of the two functional poles of language and to find it at work in the processes of condensation in myths or in dreams; it is quite another thing to read, under the substitution of signifiers which is the substance of the 
metaphor, a transport, a meta-phor of the subject: to thus 
recognize the place of a subject (of the signifier, that's to say 
of the unconscious) excentric to he who, under the cover of the 
conscious ego, claims to speak; and to conclude from this that to 
continually pose itself in the indefinitely substitutive fonctionning of signification entails that the subject can only 
always be elsewhere, only always ahead." Jakobson's distinction 
can be found in "Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbance." in Roman Jakobson and Morris Halle. Fundamentals 
of Language. pp.69-96. 
12. To date the rise and fall of such notions is a hazardous work, possible only after the most arduous empirical research and 
theoretical reflection. Suffice then to guess that it is in the 
seventeenth century that one could locate the mutation that gives birth both to the category of the subject and to that notion of individuality. Cartesian philosophy, Newtonian physics and the grammar of Port Royal all involve very precisely that notion of 
a unified and individual subject of experience. It is the work of Locke which provides perhaps the most obvious example of the need for a category of the subject in the justification both of the new 
science and the new civil order - the order of the bourgeoisie who had acceeded to State power in England and already posed a 
certain threat elsewhere in Europe. 
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in its place - the ideal Brechtian crowd. Brecht's aim in his 
separation of the elements is to remove any possibility of an 
imaginary full individuality (such individuality is always seen 
in terms of witchcraft or drugs) and to replace it with a 
constant difference - constant separation. This distance or 
separation is the gap between the full imaginary unity of a 
character and the reality (which is indifferent to the character's 
phantasy of a rational progression to his life). It is the 
distance between the time of a life which appears to have its own 
logic (tragedy) and another historical time which ignores this 
imaginary logic. And it is also the separation which occurs 
between the spectator who casts himself in the full imaginary 
situation of a theatre-goer and the indifference of the play to 
that role. To accomplish this last task (and it must be said 
that this task is essential to the accomplishment of the others, 
for the spectator must be de-centred too, lest he provide a 
centre for the play in his judging consciousness) there must be 
a separation between the mechanisms of signification and what is 
signified. In other words we must be aware of ourselves as part 
of a crowd watching and looking at a play and this awareness will 
be the awareness of the differences and contradictions at play 
in the crowd and in ourselves. The spectator is thus constantly 
divided from himself - constantly distanced - and this division 
is the fundamental recognition of otherness • l.3 
13. " · · · la conscience accede au r~el non par son d~veloppement interne, mais par la decouverte radicale de 1 1 autre que soi. " Louis Althusser. "Le "Piccolo" Bertolazzi et Brecht - Notes sur un th:~~tr_e materialiste. 11 in Pour Marx. p. 144. 
I 
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This distance and division are conventionally hidden 
within classical theatre and are further occulted by various 
pressures in our society, a society concerned at all costs to 
establish an immutable human nature and a given reality. Jacques 
Derrida, in a series of brilliant and original works, has attempted 
to analyze the problem of the imaginary unity of subject and 
meaning and to de-construct this full relation through an attention 
to writing. It is writing which, in the history of Western 
philosophy, has functioned as the emblem of drug, parasite, 
supplement i.e. a heterogeneity which is always scandalous. 14 
Derrida has insisted that in the immediacy of the spoken word we 
can ignore the fact of language as constituted by material 
difference and find a moment in which truth will present itself. 
The precise form in which this truth is theorized whether as 
Platonic eidos, Cartesian clear and distinct ideas, Russellian 
knowledge by acquaintance or whatever is, in this context, 
unimportant. What these concepts share is a commitment to those 
notions such as correspondence and coherence which are menaced 
by writing, a fact which is recognised in philosophy by the 
distrust of the written word that Derrida demonstrates to be so 
general. Whereas in the spoken word we can pass to an interior, 
a single source of meaning, - the speaking subject,, it is 
impossible to accomplish this interiorisation with the written 
word. For writing always runs out of itself towards an outside 
14. See for example the analysis of Rousseau in terms of the 
suppl~ment in De La Grammatologie. pp.145-445 and "La Pharmacie 
du Platon 11 in La Diss~mination. pp.71-197. See also Marges (de 
la philosophie) passim. 
! • 
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that surrounds and defines it and it is only in terms of this 
outside that we can understand any sign. The individual letter 
gets its meaning from the letters and spaces that surround it 
and the book from the books and spaces that surroundf it. The 
emphasis is thus moved away from a meaning which is founded in 
a present and a presence, towards a conception of meaning which 
is produced in the movement through time and space. This threat 
to meaning is, of course, a threat to truth. For as the writing 
subject is fragmented into the play of differences constituted 
by the various discourses he is writing {and which depend for 
their meaning not on the individual subject but on their 
situation in time and space) so the presence, temporal and 
spatial, which is essential to the concept of truth is also 
fragmented into the play of differences. It is these differences 
which determine what objects will present themselves within a 
set of oppositions which are themselves always already 
constituted. It is in this perspective that we can grasp the 
force of Derrida's comment that: 
"Cette exp~rience de l'effacement du signifiant dans la voix n'est pas une illusion parmi d 1 autres -puisqu'elle est la condition de l'idee m~me de 
verit~·-·"15 
The immediacy of the spoken word sustains dually the 
notions of presence and origin essential both to a conception 
15. Jacques Derrida. De la Grammatologie. p.34. "This 
experience of the effacement of the signifier in the voice is not 
an illusion amongst others - for it is the condition of the very idea of truth ••• 11 
'11,'' 
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of truth as independent and to a conception of language as 
representation and communication. This twofold im-mediate 
nature can be characterised as follows: 
1. The spoken word as immediate founds a present which is 
marked by the unity of experience rather than by the movement 
of continual difference "through which all future plunges to 
the past. 11~~238) 
2. the spoken word is experienced as im-mediate that is to 
say that the medium of language (the vibrations which constitute 
the spoken word) is ignored as, in the existential situation, 
we perceive directly the presence of thoughts. 
The voice is thus an experience of a presence and present 
continually obscuring the reality of difference. 
Language as representation and truth as presence are two 
sides of the same coin. The idea of language as non-productive 
is dependent on the idea that truth originates elsewhere 
{correspondence between world and mind) and is simply communicated 
by language. Thus in answer to the infantile question "Where did 
thots come from?" (597.25) (Where do the thoughts we have or the 
children {tots) we produce come from?) the experience of the spoken 
word offers explanations in terms of origins in a full presence. 
Thoughts originate in the presence of the subject to himself in 
self-consciousness, the child originates in the presence of the 
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father at the moment of conception. Language represents the 
thought which exists independently of it and communicates this 
thought without interference; the son represents the father and 
communicates his seed without interference. But these answers 
are already infiltrated by a third term in the original question. 
11 Thots 11 also includes 11 Thoth11 , the Egyptian God of writing and 
with writing all such notions of representation are undermined. 
As writing runs ever outwards in that movement of exteriority 
already described, the meaning of a word, phrase or sentence is 
constantly being altered. Writing is thus represented in our own 
philosophical tradition (which Derrida analyses with such pain-
staking attention) as the very image of interference. It can 
only be interference because of the prior assumption of some 
natural state of pure representation or communication. However 
rather than interfering with some previously existing meanings, 
writing is in fact the producer of meaning. In an analogous 
fashion the mother can be thought as the productive element (the 
activity of difference) which makes of the child not the copy of 
the father but the product of an activity. 
It may be objected that this is "heady stuff 11 or that it 
16 is impossible to "export" such ideas across the Channel. 
16. These remarks have been made to me on the subject of Derrida's 
philosophy by Dr Phiiip Pettit of Trinity Hall, Cambridge and 
Professor Bernard Williams of King's College, Cambridge respective-
ly. For further considerations of the relevance of Derrida 1 s work 
in an Anglo-Saxon context see Colin Maccabe 11 Intr~diction11 and 
Charles Larmore "Readj.ng Russell, Readying Derrida' both in 
Cambridge Review Vol.95 No.2219, March 1974, pp.86-93. 
157 
But the distrust of writing as somehow in its materiality 
false and delusive and the corresponding idea of the voice as 
a guarantor of the presence of consciousness to itself and thus 
the guarantor of truth is, and has been, central in England. 
To take merely one example of the crucial importance of this 
distinction between the spoken and the written word in our 
cultural history, we can look at the concepts formulated by 
Leavis in the early Thirties concerning the idea of poetry as 
an imitation of speech. If, for example, one looks at an early 
article by Leavis on Milton one can find the opposition stated 
in very obvious terms. When talking of a piece of Milton•s 
verse that he admires, Leavis writes: 
"The texture of actual sounds, the run of vowels 
and consonants, with the variety of action and 
effort, rich in subtle analogical suggestion, demanded in pronouncing them, plays an essential part, though this is not to be analyzed in 
abstraction from the meaning. The total effect is as if words as words withdrew themselves from 
the focus of our attention and we were directly 
aware of a tissue of feelings and perceptions. 11 17 
In this passage one can read the distrust of words which in their 
materiality prevent the experience of the author (life) shining 
through. Leavis continues by remarking that despite his talent 
as a poet, Milton abandoned speech in favour of a particular way 
,of writing: 
17. F.R. Leavis. 
1933, pp.127-128. 
11 Milton's Verse 11 • Scrutiny Vol.2. No.2. Sept. 
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"It became of course, habitual to him; but 
habituation could not sensitize a medium so 
cut off from speech - speech that belongs to 
the emotional and sensory texture of actual 
living and is in resonance with the nervous 
system; it could only confirm an impoverishment 
of sensibility 11 18 
Indeed the whole opposition between the Metaphysicals and Milton 
which was so powerful in England for so long can be very largely 
seen as an opposition between the truth of the voice and the 
falsity of writing. By an exemplary coincidence this article on 
Milton comes from the same issue of Scrutiny as that which 
contains the essay on "James Joyce and the Revolution of the 
Word." 
Writing menaces any simple notion of origin - any simple 
notion of an author - and with it the complementary notions of 
correspondence and coherence. In The Sirens we find writing 
revealing its own contours and in the same moment we find the 
deconstruction of the voice as a moment of simple origin. The 
reader can no longer pass through signifier to signified, can no 
longer bat:min the imaginary unity of a full self but must 
experience himself as divided, distanced, as other. The Sirens, 
indeed must be read as an interrogation of the distinction 
between the spoken and the written, an interrogation which 
involves a deconstruction of any possible origins (either fathers 
or authors). This deconstruction has definite political effects 
18. ibid. p.130. 
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as it demonstrates a contradiction between writing and 
nationalism. 
The Sirens commences with 58 phrases of unequal length 
varying from the single word "Listen!" (p.329) to the seven 
short sentences of "Decoy. Soft word. But look! The bright 
stars fade. 0 rose! Notes chirruping answer. Castille. The 
morn is breaking. 11 (p.329) and the eleven phrases of "Avowal. 
Sonnez. I could. Rebound of garter. Not leave thee. Smack. 
La cloche! Thigh smack. Avowal. Warm. Sweetheart, goodbye! 11 
(p.329). Of these 58 phrases 57 of them occur within the body 
of the text although they are often transformed and altered 
in their appearance. Thus the very first phrase "Bronze by gold 
heard the hoofirons, steelyringing Imperthnthn thnthnthn" (p.328) 
gets distributed through the first two pages of the main body of 
the text. We find the "Bronze by gold, Miss Douce 1 s head by Miss 
Kennedy's head, over the crossblind of the Ormond bar heard the 
viceregal hoofs go by, ringing steel." (p.331) but Imperthnthn 
thnthnthn recurs a page later in 11 Imperthnthn thnthnthn, bootsnout 
sniffed rudely, as he retreated as she threatened as he had come.
11 
(p.332) while the exact phrase "heard the hoofirons, steelyringing11 
does not recur at all. Or, to take another example, the phrase 
"A moonlight nightcall: far: far. 11 (p.329) recurs on pages 
359-360 as "Sour pipe removed he held a shield of hand beside 
his lips that cooed a moonlight nightcall, clear from anear, a 
call from afar, replying". The 57th phrase in the opening "Done" 
(p.330) is the same word that closes the whole section on page 376. 
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What we can read in this passage is the interplay of 
letters and words as material. Far from attempting to efface the 
process by which meaning is produced Joyce is concerned to show 
how the mechanism of writing works. The first two and a bit pages, 
in which phrases without a context present themselves, refuse all 
possible meaning. The words deprived of a context in which we 
could read them (that is to say ignore them as signifiers in order 
to consume the signifieds that they communicate) become material 
objects which resting on the page resist our attempts to subject 
them to a certain meaning. Words without context cannot be read 
in terms of meaning because words derive their meaning, not from 
the fact that each word is charged with a certain thought, but 
from their position, in regard to other words, in the flow of 
whole sentences and paragraphs. A word is defined in terms of 
difference, the different letters that go to make it up, the 
different words that surround it and this difference is a 
difference which is activated across time and space through 
reading. Our attention is forced on our own activity as involved 
in the process of reading. No longer the simple consumption of a 
full unity but the constant movement of division. The important 
element to be grasped is the investigation of writing in time and 
space which this sequence undertakes. For the difference occurs 
both across the page and through time. The spatial organisation 
of letters is what determines meaning but this spatial organisation 
is grasped in its particularity, as difference, through time and 
it is always in a deferred moment that the reader grasps the 
meaning of various signs. This deferred moment is at work through-
'i i 
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out Ulysses where we constantly find phrases or words in new 
situations which cause us to re-read their earlier occurrences. 
But the Sirens is that section in which the deferred moment is 
the major productive principle at work. After the 57 opening 
phrases we have the command 11 Begin! 11 which institutes the process 
of writing, a process exaggerated throughout the Sirens. The 
repetition (our second reading) provides a large enough space of 
difference for the original phrases, and thus through time we 
can read their meaning. We cannot ignore the materiality of the 
letter because the words, no longer caught in a normal set of 
differences (which accord with our expectations and are thus not 
experienced as the distribution through space and time but rather 
as transparent windows onto reality, thought or whatever) are 
strange to us. The strangeness of the words is a strangeness of 
ourselves. They/we are no longer an evident source of meaning. 
In this emphasis on the materiality of writing, Joyce's 
text breaks with a notion of internal thought or external 
reality outside a materially existent socially formed language. 
Thus the use of the Greek e, the difference of material 
inscription marks the distinction between the text of Bloom and 
the text created by Bloom of Henry Flower. And as Bloom creates 
the character of Henry Flower so Joyce creates the character of 
Bloom, not in terms of creation and consciousness but in terms 
of production and language i.e. by the production of meanings 
through a practice of writing, a process of differentiation of 
material signs. And as the Greek e marks the different articu-
lation of space so, in the text, this distance is grasped through 
time in a deferred moment: 
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"On. Know what I mean. No, change that ee. 11 (p.360) 
"You know now. In haste. Henry. Greek ee."(p.361) 
There are many other instances where at macro-levels 
within the text the significance engendered by the material of 
words becomes a focus of attention. To take merely two examples 
on page 334 we read: 11 Bloo..._,whose dark eye read Aaron Figatner's 
name. Why do I always think Figather? Gathering figs I think.", 
and on page 346: 
11 
- You did, averred Ben Dollard. I remember those 
tight trousers too. That was a brilliant idea, Bob. 
Father Cowley blushed to his brilliant purply lobes. 
He saved the situa. Tight trou. Brilliant ide. 11 
In this second example not only are the words "situation", 
"trousers", and "idea" de-composed into material letters but the 
word brilliant too is defined by what follows, by the difference 
which comes afterwards in a deferred moment. In Homer's Odyssey, 
the Sirens represent that which cannot be described by the text, 
for the unity of the voice escapes the difference of writing. 19 
Within Joyce's text, however, the Sirens stands not as an 
19. See the descriptions of the Sirens in Homer. The Odyssey. 
trans. E.V. Rieu. pp.190 and 194. Heinz Wisman of the University 
of Paris IV has assured me that there is no description of the 
Sirens in the original Greek. As Joyce did not know classical 
Greek this may be of minor importance but all the translations 
I have consulted preserve the non-description of the Sirens 
although they sit 11 in a meadow piled high with the mouldering 
skeletons of men, whose withered skin still hangs upon their 
bones" op.cit. p.190. 
---~---~-----------------;:--
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example of the power of the voice and the spoken word but rather 
of the decomposition (in the musical sense of compose) of the 
voice and sound into the same play of material difference (play 
here considered in its mechanical sense, as the space in or 
through which a piece of mechanism can and does move) which 
constitutes writing. We have discussed the way in which the 
voice offers an experiential effacement of the material 
signifiers but it must be remembered that it is an effacement 
and not an abolition of this material. Marx was one of the 
first to emphasize the materiality of the spoken word when he 
wrote: 
"From the start the 11 spirit 11 is affected with the 
curse of being 11 burdened11 with matter, which here 
makes its appearance in the form of agitated layers 
of air, sounds, in short, of language. 11 20 
The Sirens can be read as the dramatisation of the materiality of 
language and it is Bloom as the writer in the drama who acts for 
the reader as the de-composer of the voice and music into 
material sounds. The voice is involved in the same play of 
difference through time and space that the text enacts in its 
practice of writing. Bloom, indeed, is identified as aiding the 
reading of this section when on page 360, in order to gain a 
pretext for writing he looks at the pages of the Freeman: 
20. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. The German Ideology. p.41. 
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"Down the edge of his Freeman baton ranged 
Bloom's your other eye, scanning for where 
I did see that." (my emphasis). 
It is Bloom who is the reader's other eye and is, at the same 
time, his other I. By introducing writing, Bloom reads the 
voice for us but this reading introduces difference - introduces 
otherness - to the reader. Bloom locates the voice and music 
in material terms for the reader: 
"The human voice, two tiny silky chords. 
Wonderful, more than all the others. 
That voice was a lamentation. Calmer 
It's in the silence you feel you hear. 
Vibrations. Now silent air." (p.357) 
now. 
Bloom de-composes the voice into the difference set up by the 
vibrations and their absence - the fundamental opposition on which 
the voice is dependent. Similarly it is Bloom who recognises 
the importance of time (the deferred moment) in understanding 
sound: 
"Numbers it is. All music when you come to 
think. Two multiplied by two divided by half 
is twice one. Vibrations: chords those are. 
One plus two plus six is seven. Do anything 
you like with figures juggling. Always find 
out this equal to that, symmetry under a 
cemetery wall. He doesn't see my mourning. 
Callous: all for his own gut. Musemathematics. 
And you think you're listening to the ethereal. 
But suppose you said it like: Martha, seven 
times nine minus x is thirtyfive thousand. 
Fall quite flat. It's on account of the sounds 
it is. 
Instance he's playing now. Improvising. 
Might be what you like till you hear the words. 
ii 
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Want to listen sharp. Hard. Begin all right: 
then hear chords a bit off: feel lost a bit. 
In and out of sacks over barrels, through wirefences, 
obstacle race. Time makes the tune." (p.359) 
Once again pure creativity "Improvising now" gives way to 
a production of significance through an operation of a set of 
oppositions through time and space - it is time that makes the 
tu:p.e, as Bloom insists again: "Beauty of music you must hear 
twice". (p. 367) 
Bloom, however, is not the only indicator of the 
materiality of sound. Pat, the deaf waiter, stands as an 
example of a figure deprived of the experience of the effacement 
of the signifier in the voice. He "seehears lipspeech11 (p.365) 
and this dependence on seeing the different shapes of the mouth 
which produce speech entails an awareness of the voice as a 
production of a set of differences. It is exactly this 
11 seehearing11 that is required for the 11 soundscript 11 (219.29) of 
Finnegans Wake.) Symmetrically the blind piano-tuner depends on 
the different vibrations caused by his ubiquitous tapping stick 
and must thus attend to the sound as material. But perhaps the 
most powerful image of the materiality of sound is the tuning 
fork which rests in the centre of the Ormond Bar as a reminder 
to the reader of the vibrations that produce sound. It is 
interesting to note within this perspective that Joyce appears 
to have told Gilbert that the tuning fork could be identified 
21 
with Bloom. 
21. Stuart Gilbert. James Joyce's Ulysses. pp.218-219. 
166 
Writing in the Sirens subverts any notion of full 
presence of reading through an attention to, and a dramatisation 
of, the exteriority and the materiality of writing. In the same 
movement it dramatises the voice and sound (it is in this sense 
that we can understand the sequence as an "imitation" of music) 
as the play of difference through time and space. But as this 
presence is subverted we lose not simply any coherent truth 
which corresponds to a separate reality but also the idea of any 
origin for the text. The author does not create the meanings 
which are then conveyed by the text. For as the meanings of the 
text are seen to be produced by the distribution of the words 
through space and time it is impossible to isolate the words of 
the text from the contemporary words surrounding it - the words 
of the reader. Despite appearances there is no definite limit to 
a book. The fact that we can read it involves it in a play of 
discourses which runs beyond the covers of the book and beyond 
any individual reader in the same moment. We cannot make the 
move to an author outside the text who produces meanings inside 
the text because we cannot locate the outside of the text. 
Although we can distinguish its physical limits, we cannot Yclose' 
the book. For if meanings are created through the interplay of 
words and discourses then there is no outside to the text - there 
are no words which are not implicated in the play of the text. 
Thus is the text caught up in time and in the movement of history. 
"' 
The attempt to move outside language and to find (found) the 
author as the creator of meanings is the attempt to fix meanings 
in an origin "outside" the text. This is an attempt which can 
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only become more and more desperate for if we cannot close the 
endless distance and difference opened up by the text then there 
is no longer any possibility of 'closing' ourselves. We become 
bodies of discourses which are constantly re-articulating 
themselves through time. 
The image with which we can elaborate this radical 
,r 
concept of text is the shell which Miss Douce has bfught back 
from the beach at Rostrevor and which adorns the shelf below the 
bar mirror"··· where hock and claret glasses shimmered and in 
their midst a shell." (p.332) Those in the bar who listen to 
the shell and who are caught up in the experience of speech, 
locate the sound as present in the shell and originating in the 
sea. For us, however, guided by our writer Bloom, the sound is 
produced by the process of listening: 
"The sea they think they 
roar. The blood is it. 
sometimes. Well, it's a 
islands." (p.363) 
hear. Singing. 
Souse in the ear 
sea. Corpuscle 
A 
Our ideas about what happens when we read a text are similar to 
the ideas of the drinkers about the shell. As we read a text we 
are convinced that the meanings that we read are present in the 
text and originate in the author. But just as what the drinkers 
in the bar hear is produced through the interaction of the shell 
and ear, so the meanings we read are produced through an 
interaction between our discourses and the discourses of the text. 
The sound is not present for the ear in the shell as the meanings 
'~ 
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are not present for the eye in the text. The sound is created 
between the shell and the ear but this 'betweent does not point 
to a specific place 'between' the shell and the ear but rather 
the whole process created 'between' (in the sense of together) 
the shell and the ear. 
The sea which the hearers wish to locate outside the act 
of hearing is, in fact, within it indeed it is constituted by 
it. It is not the sea of Rostrevor they hear but the sea of 
their own blood. There is no beginning, no origin outside the 
act of representation and therefore there is no full presence 
within the representational field but instead a play of 
differences in which each presence is defined metonymically by 
the absences that surround it. Thus we lose not merely such 
notions as correspondence and coherence but also the author, all 
displaced into the movement of writing. The lack of a simple 
beginning can be read in the text in the place of the command 
"Begin". This is the 58th phrase of the opening sequence and 
constitutes the beginning of the text we are reading, but the 
command is already caught up within the flow of language and 
cannot be situated outside it. There is no outside to the text 
where meaning originates before language - rather the text's 
meanings are constantly being produced in the act of reading; 
in the juxtaposition of the discourses of the reader and the 
text. 
The separation of the elements that Brecht demanded as 
.y 
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the condition of an epic and political theatre was, above all, 
directed against any "fusion". It is, of course, at that 
moment of the text that Bloom submits to the singing - to the 
effacement of the signifier - that such a moment of fusion occurs. 
Caught up in the signified everyone merges into a single identity: 
"The voice of Lionel returned, weaker but unwearied. 
It sang again to Richie Poldy Lydia Lidwell also 
sang to Pat open mouth ear waiting, to wait. How 
first he saw that form endearing, how sorrow seemed 
to part, how look, form, word charmed him Gould 
Lidwell, won Pat Bloom's heart." (p.354) 
It is this general fusion that provides the particular case of 
11 Siopold 11 (p.356). As everybody in the bar forgets difference 
to become a fictional unity (they are all Lionel), Leopold and 
Simon join together. It is with such a moment of identity that 
the interchangeability of pronouns is established: 
Well sung. All clapped. She ought to. "Come. 
Come. To me, to him, to her, you too, me, us. 11 (p.356) 
It is also, of course, famously, the moment of the illusion 
of fatherhood, the moment when the text finds an origin for itself 
as issued from the double loins of Leopold Bloom and Simon 
Dedalus. But, as with all such moments, the products of the 
effacement of the signifier involve moments of paralysis. This 
is demonstrated clearly in Circe when the mirror (emblem of the 
effacement of the signifier) is the cause of a fusion between 
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Stephen and Bloom; fusion which is paralysis (p.671). It is this 
paralysis which grips those drinking and talking in the bar but 
which Bloom can escape through writing. It is as Leopold begins 
to write to Martha that he takes up that unstable position in 
which every sign we produce sends back a message to us rather 
than communicating a meaning to another (who is the same). It 
is this unstable position that the reader is moved along through-
out the Sirens - it is as 11 letter selfpenned to one's other" 
(489. 33/34) that we must read the text. 22 
The political effect• of this divided and distanced 
subject is such that one cannot fall into the full unified 
identity offered by an absolute nationalism. As the drinkers 
listen in sentimental unity to the song of the Croppy Boy, Bloom 
considers Emmett's last words from the dock, those words which 
deny any possibility of writing until the achievement of nation-
hood. But this indicates exactly the paralysis of nationalism -
a paralysis of writing which is the only possible activity that 
can furnish a real liberation from the dominance of priest and 
king (priest and king being so many names for the signified). 
Bloom's response to Emmett's injunction, however, is to fart. 
Bloom's anality introduces a separation which cannot ignore its 
22. The formulation of Finnegans Wake is reproduced almost exactly 
in the formula which ~ranc;,:ois Wahl describes as 11 une des plus 
anciennes dont ait use Lacan: que son propre message, le sujet 
(~metteur) doit le recevoir de l'autre (le sujet r~cepteur), qui 
le lui renvoie sous une forme invers~e. 11 art. cit. p.399. This 
proposition can be found scattered throughout Lacants Ecrits -
particularly one might notice its appearance on the first page of 
the whole volume, p.9. or in the dosing paragraph of "Le 
se'minaire sur 'La Lettre Volfer II op.cit. p.41. 
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own process; the process of separation is too evident for the 
separated object to be takencS completely independent. It is 
this complete independence that is the condition of the normal 
use of language notably that the objects in the world may appear 
as independent (outside any process of difference or separation 
they simply present themselves). Before them the signifier 
dissolves to leave referent and meaning in direct contact, 
allowing a position of simple unity for the subject. Anality 
re-introduces separation there where it cannot be ignored and 
thus corrodes the evident signified, a corrosion which is the 
irruption of the signifier. An irruption which in the Sirens 
the form of the barrage of letters that are sprinkled through 
closing lines of the section. 23 The last word of the text is II 
but where Emmett gave it one meaning, the text adds the meaning 
that the sequence has finished and that Bloom has farted. This 
fissuration of "I have done" ensures that there is no final end 
to the text from which a one to one relation between signifier 
23. The argument here presented summarises extremely briefly 
Kristeva's argument in section A. 2. of La R~volution du Langage 
Po~tique pp.101-150, particularly sub-section 7. Kristeva 
describes the character who lives this resurgence of anality as 
follows: 11 Si on veut penser au 11 personnage 11 qui devient le lieu 
de ce proc~s, on obtient la repr6sentation intol~rfble pour la 
conscience normative, d'un polymorphisme qui connait toutes les 
perversions et n'adhere a aucune, qui traverse tousles vices et 
n'en assume aucun, in-identique, in-authentique, sagesse de 
l'artifice, sans interiorite, rejet constant" pp.142-143. 
172 
and signified can be imposed and this refusal of an ending is 
further emphasised by the fact that the "Done" refers back to 
the command 11 Begin 11 • No more than in any other Joycean finale, 
there is never a moment at which the text closes itself. 
The idea of music as the perfection of the voice is a 
common one at the end of the 19th century and it is insofar that 
music promises a moment of origin that it must be written through. 24 
By an exemplary coincidence it is at this same time that the 
revolutionary composer Eisler and the revolutionary writer Brecht 
were combining in order to de-originate both the voice and music. 
Walter Benjamin comments on this process as follows: 
"In other words, the task consisted in the 
'functional transformation' of the concert-
hall form of music in a manner which had to 
24. Nietzsche provides a symptomatic example of the conflation 
between music and the voice in this period. The Birth of Tragedy 
is written as a defence of Wagner and Bernard Pautrat in his book 
on Nietzsche remarks that "Durant toute cette period.e, la musique 
est pens6e comme une sorte de voix ideale, mode d'expression 
fminent et premier par rap2ort auquel toutes les autres voix 
pourraient etre jug~es et ivaluees. 11 Versions du Soleil. p.46. 
Nietzsche's texts also contain, however, the germs of a conception 
of writing which is in contradiction with the search for a pure 
expression. cf. Pautrat. op.cit. pp.48-122. It is these germs 
which allow Nietzsche to read his text with some pleasure 14 years 
later after he had broken with Wagner - see F. Nietzsche. 
The Birth of Tragedy and the Genealogy of Morals. pp.3-15. Joyce 
himself would appear to have shared this belief in sound (music) 
as the true expressive medium: "He read Blake and Rimbaud on the 
values of letters and even permuted and combined the five vowels 
to construct cries for primitive emotions." Stephen Hero. p.37. 
Later, however, he was to say that Rimbaud, although he had the 
artistic temperament, was "hardly a writer at all. 11 Letter to 
Stanislaus Joyce, about 24 September 1905.Letters. Vol.2 p.110. (my emphasis). 
17 3 
meet two conditions: that of removing, first, 
the dichotomy of performer and audience and, 
secondly, that of technical method and content. 
On this point Eisler makes the following 
interesting observation: 'We should beware of 
over-estimating orchestral music and thinking 
of it as the only high art-form. Music without 
words acquired its great importance and its full 
development only under capitalism.' This 
suggests that the task of transforming concert 
music requires help from the word. Only such 
help can, as Eisler puts it, transform a concert 
into a political meeting. The fact that such a 
transformation may really represent a peak 
achievement of both musical and literary technique -
this Brecht and Eisler have proved with their 
didactic play The Measures Taken. 11 25 
This passage of Benjamin's is perhaps the best introduction we can 
have to reading the Sirens. For the Sirens makes of the reader a 
Brechtian crowd, a crowd which is not a unity, but a set of 
divisions that divide across as well as along individual bodies. 
The Sirens dramatises the lack of a simple origin for a 
text - it deconstructs any possible author - and this dramatisation, 
deconstruction has immediate results. Deprived of the necessary 
interchangeability of pronouns, no dominant discourse can regulate 
and homogenise the heterogenous discourses that make up the 
characters. With the end of an agreed 'it' of narration, there 
can be no more characters - only the constant interplay of 
discourses. The Cyclops sequence demonstrates this clearly, for 
the text works as a montage of discourses, without; at any time 
25. Walter Benjamin. 
Brecht. p.96. 
11 The Author as Producer" in UnderstaE..9-ing 
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offering us a final meta-discourse (an author's impersonal voice) 
which could control the riot of language which composes the text. 
The consequence of this riot is the lack of a standard by which 
we can judge the correspondence of these discourses to an exterior 
reality and the consequent experience of incoherence. Joyce 
described the Cyclops section as proceeding "explanatorily1126 but 
as one discourse takes up and explains another there is nothing 
we can understand - we can only experience the interplay of 
language. The whole sequence works around a basic division 
between the narrative of the 'I' (the Nameless One) and the way 
this narrative is taken up and 'explained' by other discourses. 
But within this basic division there are further distinctions at 
work. Thus, within the discourse of the Nameless One, we can 
read the discourse of the Citizen and Bloom, not to mention a host 
of minor characters. The discourses of the counter-text are in 
no way uniform - varying from the legal (pp.377-378) through the 
Heroic (pp.378-380 and continuously throughout the section), the 
spiritualist (pp.389-390), the scientific (p.394), the academic 
(pp.403-4041 the parliamentary (p.409), the sports journalist 
(pp.412-414), the elizabethan (pp.436-437), the religious 
(pp.440-442), and the biblical (p.449). Not that this list is in 
any way exhaustive, there are several passages which are extremely 
difficult to describe exactly, such as the marriage of Jean Wyse 
de Neaulan and Miss Fir Conifer (social-arboreal?) or the 
26. James Joyce. 
vol.1. p.126. 
Letter to Frank Budgen. 19 June 1919. Letters. 
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enumeration of the beauties real and symbolic of the Citizen's 
handkerchief. 
To see exactly how the section works, let us look at 
the following passage which occurs on page 385: 
1 And lo, as they quaffed their cup of joy, a 
godlike messenger came swiftly in, radiant as 
the eye of heaven, a comely youth, and behind 
him there passed an elder of noble gait and 
countenance, bearing the sacred scrolls of lawJ 
and with him his lady wife, a dame of peerless 
lineage, fairest of her race. 
Little Alf Bergan popped in round the door and 
hid behind Barney's snug, squeezed up with the 
laughing, and who was sitting up there in the 
corner that I hadn't seen snoring drunk, blind 
to the world, only Bob Doran. I didn't know 
what was up and Alf kept making signs out of 
the door. And begob what was it only that 
bloody old pantaloon Denis Breen in his bath 
slippers with two bloody big books tucked under 
his oxter and the wife hotfoot after him, 
unfortunate wretched woman trotting like a 
poodle. I thought Alf would split. 1 
In these passages we can read two descriptions of the 
same event. We can see this more clearly if we rewrite the 
text in the following fashion: 
lst text 
And lo, as they quaffed 
their cup of joy 
a messenger 
godlike, radiant as the 
eye of heaven, a comely 
youth 
2nd text 
(This takes up the Nameless 
One's preceding lines) 
Alf Bergan 
little 
lst text 
came in 
swiftly 
and behind him 
and behind him 
an elder 
of noble countenance 
of noble gait 
bearing 
the sacred scrolls of law 
and with him his lady wife 
a dame of peerless linage 
fairest of her race 
176 
2nd text 
popped in 
round the door 
(in the second text this is 
expanded in the section from 
'squeezed' to 'door') 
And begob what was it only 
Denis Breen 
that bloody old pantaloon. 
in his bath slippers 
with ••• tucked under his 
oxter. 
two bloody big books 
and the wife hotfoot after him 
unfortunate wretched woman 
trotting like a poodle 
Ignoring for the moment that part of the second text which 
has no parallel in the first, what is at issue in this passage is 
not the truth or falsity of what is being said but the same event 
articulated in two different discourses which offer us different 
representations (different truths). Behind 11 an elder of noble 
gait and countenance 11 and "that bloody old pantaloon Denis Breen 
in his bath slippers" we can discern no pure object. Rather 
each object can only be identified in a discourse which already 
exists and that identification is dependent on the possible 
distinctions available in the discourse. Therefore 11 an elder 
of noble gait and countenance" can only mean something in 
relation to the other descriptions available within this heroic 
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discourse. As "that bloody old pantaloon etc 11 is not one such 
description, it cannot be said to contradict it. Similarly "that 
bloody old pantaloon 11 does not give us a direct access to some 
pure object existing independently of the human world but again 
only means something within the whole system of the discourse in 
relation to the other descriptions it is not. 
But there is more to say than this. For we recognize 
these representations as representations of the same event. But 
where can we obtain this identity except through some third 
discourse which identifies both as inadequate representations of 
the same event which is adequately represented in this third 
discourse? This third discourse is the reader's own which is thus 
called into the play of the text. It is important to realise 
the crucial difference as to the point of insertion of this 
discourse in a text without origin (without an author). Whereas 
a realist text in a similar situation gives us the third discourse 
to explain the other two (thus the discourse charged with the 
narrative in Middlemarch explains the discourses of Mr Brooke and 
·Mr Dagley) and which offers the reader a point at which his 
discourses can innocently enter the text, Joyce's text offers no 
such point of entry. It is within this perspective that we can 
read the whole joyous activity of the Cyclops sequence which takes 
up in turn these endlessly different ways of signifying the world 
and places them beside each other. This activity produces a 
certain lack of sense, a certain humour, which prevents us from 
ignoring the text in order to pass through to some given order of 
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reality. And as the object is thrown into the play of discourse 
so is the reading subject. For if the object is produced by the 
various positions and oppositions available within a given 
discourse, the positions that the 'I' can take up are equally 
limited. The ways in which the self can be identified and 
expressed in the discourse of the nameless one and the heroic 
discourse of the counter-text are as different as the objects 
produced by these discourses. 
In its lack of a commanding position from which the 
reader can consume the discourses of the text, the Cyclops 
sequence involves the reader's own discourse on the same level 
as the other discourses of the text. Whereas the reader can enter 
the discourse of the realist text at an invited point (one could 
make a study of the interaction between the 'you' of the 
invitation at the beginning of the realist text and the 1we' 
that replaces it) and then leave it at an indicated point having 
consumed the content, the Cyclops sequence refuses this simple 
point of entry and exit. The realist text, in its assumption of 
a final language which effaces itself before an evident reality, 
leaves unquestioned, in a reciprocal movement, the reading 
subject which in the area outside inverted commas can grasp its 
own organisation in the absence of language. 
It would be relevant here to consider the definition that 
Lacan gives of the written as opposed to the spoken word at the 
beginning of his essay "L'Instance de la lettre dans 1 1 inconscient": 
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11 L 1 e'crit se distingue en effet par une 
privalence du texte au sens qu 1 on va voir 
prendre ici ace facteur du discours - ce 
qui y permet ce reserrement qui a mon grlf 
ne doit laisser au lecteur d'autre sortie 
que son entree, que je prefere difficile."27 
The difficulty of entry into a text is exactly the lack of an 
agreed representational language - an agreed level of truth 
established on the equivalence of position between author and 
reader. The subject always takes his own discourses to be simply 
representational and the lack of an agreed level where he can 
insert them will cause a difficulty which can be understood as 
laughter, fear or boredom. It is perhaps easiest to understand 
these trio of reactions by reference to the two experiential 
situations which produce the conditions of the subject before a 
written text. Firstly the child listening to his parents talk 
before he has finally mastered language. Secondly the analysand 
listening to his own discourses come back to him punctuated by 
the silence of the analyst. 28 
In the development of the child there is a moment when 
the infant (infans - unable to speak) learns a language. In this 
27. Jacques Lacan. op.cit. p.493. "The written distinguishes 
itself in effect by a prevalence of text, in the sense one is 
going to see accrue to this factor of discourse, - and this permits 
the tightening which according to my inclination would not leave 
the reader any other exit than his entry which I prefer to be 
difficult." 
28. The argument that follows summarises an article by Luce 
Irigary entitled "Communications linguistique et speculaire
11 in 
Cahiers pour l'Analyse no.3. Mai-Juin 1966, pp.39-55. See also 
Kristeva, Le Texte du Roman pp.81-85. 
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process of learning he becomes aware of certain places which he 
or she (as subject) can occupy - these are the points of insertion 
into language. Crucially this involves the learning of pronouns: 
the realisation that the 'you' the child uses to address the 
father or the mother can be permutated with an 1 I 1 in a situation 
from which it is excluded - when the parents speak to each other. 
This realisation comes with the realisation that the 'you' with 
which he (or she) is addressed can be permutated with a 'he' (or 
'she') - which is the possibility that the proper name is 
articulated in a set of differences - and that the child is only 
a signifier constantly defined by a set of substitution relations. 
The binary 'I'-'you 1 relation is transformed from two terms into 
a relational structure by the passage through the empty place of 
the 'he' (or 'she') - and it is through the experience of this 
empty place that the child learns language. The passing through 
this empty place is the necessary experience of exclusion which 
is essential to the proper control of language and the 
experience of this exclusion is the experience of death. 29 It is 
this which gives discourse its fearsome quality because it 
involves at the linguistic level a castration - a narcissistic 
wound which must be submitted to if one is to accedJLto the adult 
world. As well as the experience of fear, however, the child 
can experience a discourse in which he or she is uncertain of 
29. For the necessity of this exclusion for the construction of 
any infinite series see Jacques-Alain Miller "La Suture" in 
Cahiers pour L 1Analyse no.1. Janvier 1966, pp.37-49. 
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his or her place as boredom (when the child gives up trying to 
understand) or as laughter (when the child takes as significant 
relations which are not allowed by the discourse). When the 
substitution rules have been mastered the child finds itself 
divided between two worlds - the world of the ~nonciation, where 
he or she is constantly in play as signifier - and the world of 
I' ' the enonce, where he or she is constantly in place. 
The classic realist text constantly tries to ignore the 
enonciation in order to stay in the world of the ~none~. Firmly 
established in their interchangeability, the text attempts to 
repress the pronouns as relations and assert them as absolute 
terms. It thus attempts to give itself an origin, outside a 
systematic substitutability, in a fixed set of exchanges. The 
realist text generates itself by the same process of circulation 
through an empty term which we have identified in the child's 
mastery of language. This empty term is the 'it' of the narration 
and the result of the passage through 11 it 11 is that the realist 
text has the power to name i.e. to designate. The realist text, 
however, wishes to take this 'it' as full, as the origin that 
provides the text with its reality ("It happened that ••• 11 ). 
Histoire is firmly divorced from discours and when the two become 
equivalent (as they must for there to be an end) it is simply 
because a character has given up illusions, his or her discours, 
in order to face reality. 
Joyce's text in its emphasis on writing refuses the 
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possibility of any origin and therefore histoire falls back into 
discours as the text refuses to give us any fixed substitution 
rules. One of the results of this loss of a masterful 'it', is 
that the text loses the power to confer names. It is no accident 
that the story is told by the Nameless One and that all of the 
characters appear predominantly as initials or as nicknames, 
rather than as proper names. 
It is the possibility to name the object that characterises 
the realist text and it is this same power which allows it to 
create a character donate a proper name. It is in the 
immediacy of these objects and characters that we ignore the 
structure of language and take the subject as given. By ignoring 
language as structure, the subject denies his or her own limits, 
but at the same time accepts them. The subject is, at one and 
the same time, dominant in his or her 'presence' in the world 
and 'subjected' through the already fixed positions allotted to 
him or her and his or her experience by the structuring action of 
language ("Structure done: ce qui met en place une exp6rience 
pour le sujet qu'elle inclut. 11 ) 30 Ulysses through its refusal 
of any definite set of objects - and fixed identities - glories 
in its investigation of language as structure. The result of 
this attention to structure is to displace the subject as the 
30. Jacques-Alain Miller "Action de la Structure" in Cahiers pour 
L'Analyse no.9. Et~ 1968. p.95. "Structure is that which puts in 
place an experience for a subject which it includes" 
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founding source of its world - a 'presence' - and thus to remove 
it from its condition of subjection and to allow the reader to 
take up many contradictory positions. It is this liberation of 
the subject from this condition of subjection that constitutes 
the burst of laughter that marks the joke and, if one remembers 
Freud's comparison of the joke and the dream as similar psychic 
products, 31 then one could say that Ulysses is the joke to 
Finnegans Wake's dream. The importance of this laughter in 
Ulysses can be gauged by the attention to the laugh produced by 
Stephen in the schoolroom sequence. The laugh is produced by a 
riddle. The structure of a riddle is another way of producing 
the uncertainty of identities experienced in the Cyclops sequence. 
Stephen's reaction to it is a burst of "nervous laughter" (p.32) 
which in its 11 dismay11 marks the extent to which he is still 
0, 
subjected: "Secrets, silent, stony sit in the dark P.laces of both 
/\ 
our hearts: secrets weary of their tyranny: tyrants willing to 
be dethroned." (p.34) This de-throning (the liberation of the 
subject - the liberation of the signifier) is achieved for the 
reader in the text by a de-construction of any origin (any author) 
for the text which could establish the text as a representation 
passing between two identities. Thus the reader is cast 
unprepared into the text (as the child before the parent's 
conversation) uncertain of what position, if any, is to be allocated 
to it. Experience of fear, laughter and boredom. 
31. 11 ••• the dream-work operates by the same methods as jokes, but 
in its use of them it transgresses the limits that are respected 
by jokes. 11 Sigmund Freud. The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works. vol.8. p.173. 
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The specific textual practices which produce this lack 
of identity are too numerous to catalogue in detail but, in 
addition• to the simple juxtaposition of two descriptions of the 
same event, one could notice the use of lists within the text. 
On page 424 we are informed by the Nameless One of the danger of 
Ireland being de-forested and Lenehan says "Europe has its eyes 
on you. 11 Starting from the double sense of this phrase (taken 
literally it can be taken to mean that Europe is looking at 
Ireland's forests and whether England is ruining them and taken 
in the sense of the social cliche 'the eyes of the world were on 
Hollywood tonight for the all star premiere .•• r it can be 
understood to mean that Ireland's trees are at the centre of 
Europe's social world) the text marries together two separate 
sets of distinctions. The discourse of the forest and the 
discourse of the society columns are joined together to produce 
the wedding of "the chevalier Jean Wyse de Neaulan, grand high 
chief ranger of the Irish National Foresters, with Miss Fir 
Conifer of Pine Valley. 11 In this whole passage with its 
extensive guest list, a certain vocabulary which forms a very 
specific whole, that of the forest and all the trees in it, is 
grafted onto the form of a social column. 
We can perhaps best grasp the 'shock' we feel on reading 
Joyce's list of trees by contrasting it with how George Eliot 
employs the vocabulary of trees in the following passage: 
11 Brackenshaw Park, where the Archery Meeting was 
held, looked out from its gentle heights far over 
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the neighbouring valley to the outlying 
eastern downs and the broad slow rise of 
cultivated country hanging like a vast 
curtain towards the west. The castle, 
which stood on the highest platform of the 
clustered hills, was built of rough-hewn 
limestone, full of lights and shadows made 
by the dark dust of lichens and the washings 
of the rain. Masses of beech and fir 
sheltered it on the north and spread down 
here and along the green slopes like flocks 
seeking the water which gleamed below." 32 
In this passage 'beech and fir' are simply part of an 
extensive list and this list functions, in its catalogue of 
obvious identities, as a guarantee of an evident external reality 
which is being revealed in the book and exists independently of 
the book's written existence. The activity of writing as the 
production of a set of meanings is effaced to become simple 
representation, the rendering of identities existing independently 
of language. 'Beech and fir' in their solid particularity 
guarantee the neutrality and transparency of the writing. Joyce's 
list functions in almost exactly the opposite manner. First of 
all its completeness, by including all trees, ruins the 
particularity of the identities. 'Beech and fir' work through 
their exclusion of other possibilities but in Joyce's text there 
are no possibilities which are excluded and with this overload of 
sense we fall into nonsense. 33 Instead of the identities shining 
32. George Eliot Daniel Deronda. Vol.1. pp.144-145. 
33. One might say that nonsense is the way of talking or writing 
which is always drawing attention to its own status. This is true 
from the Cretan Liar onwards. 
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through and effacing the writing, the progressive adding of more 
and more identities achieves the opposite effect. Our attention 
is directed to the way in which the writing is acting as a producer 
of meaning rather than as a picture of an unconstituted reality. 
Representation gives way to production. 
But Joyce 1 s text draws attention to its activity as a 
producer of sense in a second way. For the content of the list 
(the trees) is enumerated within a different form (the society 
column). This transposition of languages, this confusing of form 
and content, refuses to allow us to ignore the words and merely 
pass through them to some given reality. The words no longer 
serve as a passage between two moments of full presence (the 
object and consciousness) but instead interrogate the reader's 
consciousness throu.gp the attention that is paid to the reality ~~~ 
of the discoursesAexist prior to any individual subjectivities or 
objects. "But the world, mind, is, was and will be writing its 
own wrunes for ever, man, on all matters that fall under the ban 
of our infrarational senses" u9.35/20.1). 
The divisions we can create in language are always already 
made as are the positions that can be taken up by the subject. It 
is in this respect that we can consider the practice of listing 
which is constant throughout the Cyclops. To list is precisely to 
apply a set of identities to the world and it is the power of 
language to produce lists, to set up a set of divisions which is 
the power to produce a world for the senses. The lists within the 
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text are all in some sense ruined; deprived of their ability to 
disappear and reveal the world. Instead it is writing which 
dominates the scene. The continuous setting up of differences, 
the endless production of identities and sense - it is this which 
constitutes the text of the Cyclops. It is worthwhile in the 
context of this chapter to look back at the original version of 
the Cyclops which appeared in The Little ReviewJ~mNovember 1919 
1:-o 
a-ft8. March 1920. Practically every list that appears in The Little 
Review text is expanded for the final book publication. We can 
best grasp this process by looking at the list provided to 
describe the images of many Irish heroes and heroines of antiquity. 
In the original version the list preserves the opposition Irish 
and non-Irish in the list: 'Cuchulin, Conn of hundred battles, 
Niall of nine hostages, Brian of Kincara, the Ardri Malachi, Art 
MacMurragh, Shane O'Neill, Father John Murphy, Own Roe, Patrick 
Sarsfield, Red Hugh O'Donnell, Dom Philip O'Sullivan Beare 134 
When we get to Ulysses the list has increased to nearly a 100 
names and its ability to function as a list is ruined by the 
inclusion of 'Patrick W. Shakespeare', 'Goliath', 'Herodotus' 
among numerous others (p.383). This ruination of the immediacy 
of the object allows, in the appearance of language as structure, 
the liberation of the reading subject from the positions in which 
he is subjected in his own discourses. I have already talked of 
the way in which Ulysses is no longer concerned with representation 
but with montage - and it should now be clear that montage involves,: 
34. The Little Review. November 1919. vol.6. no.7. p.42. 
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as the essential motor component of its effects, the discourse 
of the reader. 
This dynamic effect of the reader's discourse is 
achieved because the text offers no moment of entry for the 
reader's discourse - no fixed position from which to consume the 
discourses of the text. Caught as it were between the various 
discourse of the text, the reader's own discourse slips and 
slides as it takes up endlessly new relations with the discourses 
surrounding it. Corresponding to this lack of an entry to the 
Cyclops there is also a lack of an exit - a lack of a moment of 
closure in which the various discourses of the text are grasped 
and explained. If we look simply at the story related by the 
Nameless One, this lack of closure becomes obvious. Within the 
text of the Nameless One there are two main discourses, two 
main areas of representation and meaning. There is the discourse 
of the Nameless One which identifies everything in terms of 
malicious motives and hypocritical actions and there is the 
language of the Citizen which identifies everything in terms of 
Ireland. There is a certain expectation that either the 
narrative text or Bloom (our hero) will explain and reveal the 
mistakes that the Citizen and the Nameless One are making and 
will thus reveal the true nature of things. But, if we look at 
the physical end of the sequence, we can see this closure 
refused through a multiplicity of discourses. Throughout the 
section the juxtaposition of discourses has undermined any single 
discourse within the text. But in the final paragraph this 
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mutual subversion of discourses is carried over from the paragraph 
to the sentence. At the very end of the sequence the language of 
the Nameless One and the prophetic language of the explanatory 
text are placed side by side in the same sentence; "And he 
answered with a main cry:~! Adonai! And they beheld Him even 
b 
Him, ~en Bloom Elijah, amid clouds of angels ascend to the glory 
of the brightness at an angle of forty five degrees over Donohoets 
in Little Green Street like a shot off a shovel." (p.449). No 
discourse within the text is even given the privilege of physically 
ending it. Rather than offer us a definition of the discourses 
within the text - this juxtaposition throws us back to the 
ceaseless interplay of relations which is produced by the reader's 
discourse acting on the text. 
But if the narrative discourse can offer no position for 
the reader's discourse (where the narrative discourse itself holds 
no fixed position), our hero Leopold might be expected to do the 
job. But Bloom's discourses, related by the Nameless One, 
reproduce the montage of discourses within the whole sequence. 
For Bloom, unlike the Citizen and the Nameless One, is not caught 
up within one dominant discourse but rather takes pleasure in as 
many discourses as are available. Thus, in the brief time he is 
in the pub he enters into the discourse of science (p.394), and 
of law (p.405), as well as the discourses of Irish nationalism 
(p.410) and human compassion (p.416). And Bloom, entering into 
the play of languages, cannot erect a fixed representation of the 
world which will explain the other languages. When asked to 
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define what life really is he comes out with 11 Love, says Bloom, 
I mean the opposite of hatred. I must go now •.. 11 (p.432). 
Bloom refuses to stay to define the identity of life, to represent 
and to fix it. What is opposed to the violence of the citizen 
(based as it is on a fixed representation of the world) and the 
verbal violence of the Nameless One (based equally on a certain 
fixed meaning given to all actions and events) is the joyful 
entering into the various ways of signifying world and self. This 
is both Bloom's activity in the text and the activity of the 
reader in reading the text. 
This insistence on a dominant discourse can be linked 
specifically tov.iolence. The Citizen's violence in the text arises 
from the misunderstanding of Bloom's remark to Bantam Lyons that 
he was just going to throw his newspaper away. This remark on 
Gold Cup Day can only be given one interpretation, one identity, 
by the betting fraternity of Dublin. It can only be seen in one 
way and it is this fixed interpretation that leads to violence. 
The Cyclops section is that part of Ulysses which is concerned 
with the eye and with sight. What we realise as we read through 
the endless juxtaposition of various discourses is that the world 
we see is determined by the discourses we speak. Our senses and 
our sense are one. If we return to the passage already discussed 
when Denis Breen passes the pub it will be seen that there are 
some actions (Bob Doran asleep in the snug and Alf Bergan laughing 
at him) which cannot be seen by the heroic language. But there is 
no discourse which sees everything, no discourse which will reveal 
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the world in some pure state. And it is action based on the 
idea of some final fixed reality which is allied in the Cyclops 
(as elsewhere in Ulysses) with violence and intolerance. 
The contrast between the Citizen's use of lists and 
parodies within the narrative of the Nameless One and the use of 
lists and parodies within the 'counter-text', reveals the links 
between the fixing of an object and a subject and the eruption of 
violence. The Citizen reads out one list and one parody (pp.384-
5 and pp.434-5). But both the list and the parody are immediately 
placed within the fixed area of representation which constitutes 
the Citizen's world - this is, of course, the perfidy of England 
and the glory of Ireland. The list of births, marriages and 
deaths in the Irish Independent represents only the English 
domination of Ireland. Similarly the parody in the United Irishman 
is read in relation to the same fixed reality. Bloom threatens 
the area of the Citizen's representation because he cannot be 
identified. Is he a Jew or an Irishman? And it is this difficulty 
of identity that creates violence for, in the threat to the 
Citizen's area of representation, Bloom poses a threat to the 
Citizen himself. If the object disappears then in a reciprocal 
movement the subject is displaced. The struggle against this 
displacement is the very root of violence. 
Destroying correspondence, disrupting coherence and 
subverting any possible origin, Joyce's texts open a certain 
distance within the reading subject. This distance, this otherness 
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is what allows a certain access to the feminine. These methods 
of subverting the reading subject suggest that Joyce's texts can 
be considered as the novelistic equivalent of a Brechtian drama. 
It is interesting that, independently, both of them turned to the 
term 'epic' to describe their work. Not that epic should 
primarily be understood as a positive term. In fact it functions 
as a negative moment in a constant struggle against classic 
realism and narration, against origin, coherence and correspondence 
and for a discontinuous movement which constantly distances the 
subject from any identification. It is in this perspective we 
can understand the relative lack of interest of both Exiles and 
Joyce's poetry. In them there is an insufficient separation of 
the elements - an origin is all too insistent. One can, however, 
indulge for a moment in a fantasy - Exiles produced by Brecht 
while in Denmark in 1938, in exile and working on novels, - that 
indeed might have been interesting! 
CHAPTER 6 
CITY OF WORDS 2 STREETS OF DREAMS: 
THE VOYAGE OF ULYSSES 
Ulysses is a voyage through meaning - a voyage through all 
the discourses available in English in 1904. As Bloom and Stephen 
move through Dublin so the writing moves through the city of words 
that is English. And in this attention to discourses it is not 
simply the reality produced by these discourses that is in question 
but the desire that speaks through them. In my analysis of George 
Eliot•s texts I attempted to show how the appeal to a final meta-
discourse (which gave directly onto reality) was linked to an 
attempt to deny the existence of desire in a quest for a final 
oneness. It was suggested that one way of reading these neurotic 
texts was to take those moments where the main discourse broke 
down and to use those fissures to read back through the text 
disrupting that evident meta-discourse. This disruption has the 
effect of removing any position in which the reading subject can 
place himself unawares and innocent in the consumption of reality 
and replaces it with a variety of discourses with no fixed 
position for the reading subject. The process of reading then 
becomes an active operation by the reader in which the reader's 
discourses and those of the text meet to produce new discourses 
in which the subject's place is no longer assured. 
In Joyce's texts this work of disruption is already 
accomplished for the reader and in the attention paid to the 
material fact of language we have both the fragmentation of a 
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fixed reality and the possibility of desire •speaking' through 
this fragmentation. But what it may be demanded is desire? 
Desire can be defined (after Lacan) as neither a need which is 
satisfied by an object (thus hunger and food) nor a demand which 
is addressed to an other (thus the demand for love which can be 
answered). Rather it is a relation to phantasy which is the 
space instituted by language where the subject cannot grasp 
himself: 
11 Il n'y a pas un inconscient parce qu'il y 
aurait un d6sir inconscient, obtus, lourd, 
caliban, voire animal, d6sir inconscient leve 
des profondeurs qui serait primitif et aurait 
'a s '6lever au ni veau superieur du conscient. 
Bien au contraire, il y a un desir parce 
qu'il y a de l'inconscient c'est-a-dire du 
langage qui echappe au sujet dans sa structure 
et ses effets et qu'il y a toujours au niveau 
du langage quelque chose qui est au-dela de la 
conscience et c'est la que peut se situer la 
fonction du d~sir 11 1 
1. Jacques Lacan. "Psychanalyse et M~decine 11 in Lettres de 
1 1 Ecole Freudienne. no.1. p.45. quoted by Moustafa Safouan art. 
cit. pp.252-253. "There is not an unconscious because then 
there would be an unconscious desire which was obtuse, heavy, 
caliban-like even animal-like, an unconscious desire lifted up 
from the depths which would be primitive and would have to 
educate itself to the superior level of consciousness. 
Completely on the contrary, there is desire because there is 
unconsciousness - that's to say language which escapes the 
subject in its structure and its effects and there is always at 
the level of language something which is beyond consciousness 
and it is there that one can situate the function of desire". 
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In those stages which are used to characterise the small 
infant's development - that familiar trio of the oral, the anal 
and the phallic - the central question is one of separation -
the separation from the breast, the faeces, the phallus. It is 
these separations which allow language to function, and as a 
necessary corollary, desire to run its endless course. If 
we consider the small infant in the first stage of his development; 
we can postulate the child as initially experiencing two states 
of being - one of satisfaction at the breast and one of 
dissatisfaction which finds animal expression in the cry. It is 
in the moment when the infant correlates the cry with the 
experience of dissatisfaction and its abolition that the cry 
ceases to be a signal and becomes a sign (whose meaning is 
defined diacritically with the possibility of not crying). But 
the correlation of the cry with the experience of dissatisfaction 
and its abolition is exactly the identification of the breast 
as an object in the control of an other. As object - that is to 
say as a perpetual play of presence and absence. And it is with 
this play we enter into the world of desire. Desire not here to 
be confused with the pleasure of union with the breast (the 
state of satisfaction and a minimum of tension), but the desire 
for an object which can bring about the abolition of dissatis-
faction. Insofar as it is an object - that is to say a play of 
presence and absence - it will be desired again even in the 
experience of the abolition of need. The aim of the body is 
no longer a constant minimum of tension but the maximum and its 
discharge in a never-ending chain. The setting up of the world 
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of communication - of demand - is also the setting up of the 
unconscious - of desire. Desire is that which rests over and 
above any demand and which is indeed, to use Lacan's term, 
completely "excentric" 2 to consciousness. In this respect, 
desire is not centred like demand in the needs of the subject 
and, indeed, is not centred at all, but occurs as the movement 
along the chain of differences that constitute the recognition 
and abolition of need through the world of demand. 
The representational text, or rather, the text that wishes 
itself representational attempts to elide the virtuality of 
language and desire and to allow reality to appear directly 
outside a play of difference. As communication between two 
subjects, reader and writer, the text attempts to treat 
language as pure transparency. Outside the constitutive 
process of separation it wishes to treat language and reality as 
separate. It is insofar as this process of separation makes 
itself felt (as anxiety) that the text is neurotic. It is 
insofar as separation has been hidden successfully that the 
text can glory in its own self-possession - in its undoubted 
command of a founding consciousness. This self-possession (as 
we shall see) is predicated on the possession of the power of 
the phallus - a possession conferred by a radical miscognition 
of sexual difference. The Buck, as his name implies, stands 
for a phallic world that can ignore the possibility of difference 
2. cf. Jacques Lacan. Ecrits. p.11. 
because it is sure of its possession of the phallus. His 
phallic smile, "his white glittering teeth" (p.5) contrasts 
with "Toothless Kinch" (p.27); Stephen with a mouthful of 
rotting teeth. The realm of the Buck is also marked as the 
realm of communication - not simply in his easy rhyming poetry 
and facile conversation but explicitly when the text identifies 
him with Mercury, the God of communication (p.23). 
Stephen, however, cannot acce~to this realm because he 
is still caught in relation to his mother. If separation is the 
crucial factor in the working of desire, it is exactly this 
separation that Stephen is unable to operate. The separation 
from the mother is the essential moment in the structure of the 
Oedipus complex which Freud theorized as the determining factor 
in the transformation of small human animals into men and women. 3 
If, in the first instance, the male child in its position of 
dependence constantly asks itself why it is loved by the mother, 
then it is also at this stage that he constantly attempts to fit 
himself to her desires. Insofar as her desire is unconscious, 
this attempt is an attempt to mould himself to what she asks 
him to be - to her demands. It is with the recognition of 
sexual difference that the child understands what he is loved 
for - he is the phallus that the mother lacks; together they 
make one. But simultaneously, in a logically distinct moment, 
3. Although Freud originally postulated a simple reversal of 
the Oedipus complex for women, cf. The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works vol.4. p.257., later in his life 
he saw that the attachment to and separation from the mother 
was perhaps the most important factor in the development of the 
female psyche as well cf. vol. 19 pp.249-251 and vol.21. 
pp.225-227. 
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he recognises that the mother's desires are organised in terms 
of the father and the father is thus seen as being the phallus 
(and thus a rival). If the mother is now understood to be 
fundamentally lacking in her being - thus her love for the child 
and the father - the father is understood as a full presence, 
as the cause of his own desire that is to say the phallus 
incarnate. It is at the third stage when the child realises 
that the father's desire is also organised in terms of a lack, 
that he too possesses an unconscious and has undergone a 
symbolic castration that the element of hate enters. He hates 
the father because he is not the full presence that he promised 
to be. Popular accounts that the child sees himself as the 
rival of the father reduce the significant feature of the third 
stage of the Oedipus. For insofar as the father is a rival they 
are both endowed with the phallus; it is because the father is 
not the promised cause of his own desire that the child hates 
him. It is at this third and final stage when the child admits 
that he can never become an omnipotent creature that he submits 
to a symbolic castration which entails the end of the Oedipus 
complex. When this possibility is realised, he introjects an 
ego ideal which contains, as its central core, the lack in 
being which constitutes us as speaking and desiring animals. 
This lack in being is also the fundamental recognition of the 
otherness of the other - never the full mirror image of 
ourselves. Further this introjection involves the taking up 
of those previously deeply felt separations - the oral and the 
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anal. 4 This third stage, however, remains for us, caught in a 
patriarchal society, only a partially realised possibility. A 
possibility which finds its fullest realisation in those writers 
and thinkers who mark the end of an era characterised by 
Derrida as phallogocentric, 5 but who realise this possibility 
at the risk of madness. 6 Insofar as the third stage remains 
only a partially realised one for us, it is to a further under-
standing of the first and second stages that we must return to 
understand the process that is the writing of Ulysses. 
If we consider that moment of startling significance in 
the life of the young boy (a moment to whose importance all the 
experience of psycho-analysis testifies) when he realises that 
the woman does not have a penis we can understand the relations 
between the first and second stages of the Oedipus complex. 
In order to grasp the fact of absence, the child must place this 
absence in an interplay with the presence of his own penis. 
But to do this is to admit the possibility of the absence of 
the penis - to accept the penis as signifier (the phallus). 
But insofar as the small boy is not willing to consider the 
possibility of the absence of the penis, he must deny the phallus 
4. In the initial part of the phallic phase the penis serves 
as a cover for the earlier losses as Freud suggests in his 
remarks on the dissolution of the Oedipus complex op.cit. vol. 
19. p.175. 
5. Jacques Derrida. 11 Entretien avec Derrida. 11 La Quinzaine 
Li tte'raire du 16 au 30 Nov. 19 7 2. p. 16. 
6. Joyce said of Ulysses"··· c'etait terriblement 
ce livre. Une feuille transparente le s~pare de la 
Jacques Mercanton Les Heures de James Joyce p.46. 
/ 
risque, 
folie. 11 
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as signifier and turn it into a perpetual signified. To attempt 
to be the phallus the mother lacks is the neurotic condition. 
Representation is the same movement which is inaugurated by the 
fixing of the signifier for the subject in a perpetual signified. I 
But this fixing of the signified frustrates the movement of 
desire for there is now no absent object which can be desired. 
The fetishist, to overcome the fixity however, inaugurates 
desire by the replacement of the mother's penis. It is because 
the fetishist admits the absence of the object, that his desire 
can focus on its replacement - the fetish. The neurotic is 
caught in a repression of the signifier - constantly trying to 
define himself in terms of the mother's desire. However 
because this desire always remains opaque, it is experienced 
by the neurotic, as a desire for demand. The fetishist while 
he admits the possibility of lack admits of it only externally 
as the reflection on his own secure possession. For Freud the 
prototype of the fetish was the mants own penis. 7 This 
fetishism which is, in some sense, the normal conclusion of the 
Oedipus in our patriarchal society corresponds to the 
introjection of a phallic ego-ideal where the father functions 
as pure cause of his own desire. The rejection of the third 
stage of the Oedipal process occurs at the moment at which 
various remote objects are designated with phallic authority 
7. Sigmund Freud. op.cit. vol.21, p.157. 
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in the face of the evident failure of the biological father. 8 
If we return to our characterisation of the setting up 
of the world of communication and the unconscious, of demand 
and desire, we can make some attempt to characterise the three 
stages of the Oedipus in terms of various relations of the 
speaking subject to language. The neurotic attempting vainly 
to unite himself with the mother threatens to abolish the 
world of demand and thus of desire (Freud, if he teaches only 
one thing, teaches us that desire, to be desire must have a 
limit - the desire of the mother is that limitless desire that 
spells the frustration of desire). It can thus be said that 
the neurotic is always speechless (the job of the analyst is 
exactly that of furnishing the patient, from the patient's own 
discourse, with the material for his desire to speak). The 
phallic world is the world of communication where because desire 
is under control (he who has the phallus controls desire) so 
is demand. Language is reduced to the pure meeting of minds 
(provided those minds have bodies similarly endowed - women, of 
8. 11 What happened, therefore, was that the boy refused to take 
cognizance of the fact of his having perceived that a woman 
does not possess a penis. No, that could not be true: for if 
a woman had been castrated, then his own possession of a penis 
was in danger; and against that there rose in rebellion the 
portion of his narcissism which Nature has, as a precaution, 
attached to that particular organ. In later life a grown man 
may perhaps experience a similar panic when the cry goes up 
that Throne and Altar are in danger, and similar illogical 
consequences will ensue." ibid. p.153 (my emphasis) 
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course, are rigorously excluded from this world). 9 It is the 
pervert (the other side of neurosis - the possibility of escape) 
who moves constantly between language as communication and as 
system. Aware of the reality of the other, of women, the 
pervert is condemned to submit to a circulation of signifiers, 
phantasy, in which his position is never assured and in which 
he experiences language as system. Insofar as from this 
experience he can find a place of rest he will rejoin the world 
of communication, insofar as he fails he will sink beneath the 
waves of psychosis. 
Stephen, in the opening of the book, is caught between 
the first and second stages. While on the one hand he wishes 
to acce~to the phallic world of communication, he is unable 
to, except it may be noticed under the influence of drink. "The 
sacred pint alone can unbind the tongue of Dedalus 11 (p.21), says 
Mulligan, and throughout Ulysses drink provides the access 
to a male world of communication. It is the mother which lies 
as a barrier across his access to the world of communication 
which renders Stephen speechless. Insofar as Stephen feels 
himself the subject of his mother's desire he cannot believe in 
the father as selfsufficient cause and fulfilment of desire. 
Only by undertaking the voyage of writing can ~e create room 
for his desire to speak - that desire of which he knows nothing. 
9. Emblematically one could recall those Platonic dialogues which 
provide the starting point of Western thought and from which women 
are rigorously excluded. "Since, then, we have come to this 
decision," said Eryximachus, "that each man shall drink merely as 
much as he chooses, and that there shall be no compulsion, I 
propose in addition that we should send away the flute-girl who has 
just come in - let her play to herself or, if she likes, to the 
women of the household - and entertain ourselves today with 
conversation. 11 Symposium 176e. 
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The opening of the book finds him still struggling to be that 
full presence which constitutes neurosis. On the beach he talks 
of 'fs)ignatures of all things I am here to read, seaspawn and 
seawrack, the nearing tide, that rusty boot" (p.45) and the 
whole of the opening three chapters are a process of reading 
the signatures from the history lessons, the mathematical 
symbols, and Mr Deasy's letter about foot and mouth disease. 
The signatures, however, are conceived as presenting some full 
meaning which his full 11 I 11 can decipher. But it is exactly 
this full 'I' which can know nothing of writing - of the 
experience of lack and difference. Thus the poem that Stephen 
writes on the beach is invisible. For within this section 
writing exists only as repressed possibility: an insistence on 
materiality and difference, absence and lack which, in its 
return will disrupt the clear subjectivity of this section and 
make desire possible. 
For the reader,_ as for Stephen, the dominance of the 
speaking or reading subject is, in this section, totaL Language 
is purely an instrument of communication and it is in the necessity 
to displace the speaking and reading subject thatihe voyage is 
undertaken. The full presence is first broken by the change in 
the method of reading. Bloom, like Stephen, spends the majority 
of his introductory chapters reading. The advertisements for 
the farm at Kinnereth, Milly's letter, Matchan 1 s masterstroke, 
Ruby: the pride of the Ring, the Plumtree advertisement, the 
multicoloured hoardings, Martha 1 s letter - the list is very long. 
'1 
r .I 
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What is significant for our purposes is that the reading is, 
as it were, a reading at double remove - we are placed in the 
situation of reading through reading. This fact is brought to 
our attention by the move from Stephen to Bloom. Where with 
one set of discourses we can settle ourselves in a fixed position, 
two reveal system rather than position, discourse rather than 
subject. 
This displacement is accentuated at the first moment 
when the two discourses cross each other in the newspaper office. 
What is important in this meeting of discourses is those 
phenomena of repetition which are crucial within the text of 
Ulysses and which constitute the constant insistence of the text 
as written - as a set of traces that can be constantly re-worked. 
In the opening six episodes there are many examples of repetition. 
For instance Bloom reads the letter from Milly twice, once 
briefly (p.75) and once at length (pp.79-80). The repetition~ 
in these chapters retain the same significant oppositions in 
both versions - the same discourse prevails. Although the letter 
is expanded, it is expanded without altering the position of the 
reader. If we turn to the Aeolus section we find that the 
repetition in question is of a different order: 
"SOPHIST WALLOPS HAUGHTY HELEN SQUARE ON PROBOSCIS. 
SPARTANS GNASH MOLARS. ITHACANS VOW PEN IS CHAMP. 
-You remind me of Antisthenes, the professor said, 
a disciple of Gorgias, the sophist. It is said of 
him that none could tell if he were bitterer against 
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others or against himself. He was the son of 
a noble and a bondwoman. And he wrote a book 
in which he took away the palm of beauty from 
Argive Helen and handed it to poor Penelope. 
Poor Penelope. Penelope Rich. 
They made ready to cross O'Connell street." (p.188) 
In this passage the repetition brings something new into 
play. If we investigate the constitution of this novelty more 
closely, we can perhaps understand the way in which the reading 
subject can no longer hold himself in a position of dominance 
with regard to his discourses. The confident 'I' of communi-
cation - the analogue of phallic security - disappears to allow 
something else to speak. This something else is discourse out 
of control of a subject - desire which in its radical otherness 
strikes at the heart of our narcissistic constitution. The 
original newspaper headline is written within one set of 
significant oppositions (those of popular journalism) and 
repeated in another (those of classical scholarship). The 
phenomenon recalls those practices that we saw at work in the 
Cyclops section and one can notice the same effect - that is 
to say that the subject can no longer take himself as in a 
founding position outside the discourses but rather that he is 
articulated within them. It is in the newspaper office that 
the reading subject is prevented from innocently taking up a 
fixed position; rather he is caught in the sudden juxtaposition 
and interplay of discourses. And this interplay of discourses 
is the activity of the writing of the text. The act of writing 
is no longer hidden in the copying down of an already written 
(reality) but is rather the active investigation of the subject's I 
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position. With this insistence of writing the poem that Stephen 
wrote on the beach can make its appearance (p.168). The 
dominance of the subject has been replaced by the dominance of 
the signifier (the sets of significant oppositions). The extent 
to which the subject has been displaced from his situation of 
dominance can be g.auged when on page 177 we suddenly read: 
"I have often thought since on looking back over 
that strange time that it was that small act, 
trivial in itself, that striking of that match, 
that determined the whole aftercourse of both our 
lives. 11 
With this sentence we find a perfect example of a controlling 
meta-discourse in which the subject can treat language as pure 
uransparency. Caught up as it is, however, in the intertwining 
discourses of Joyce's text, it demonstrates nothing except its 
own structure - the structure of a control that the text is in 
the process of dissolving. 
In the newspaper office, this activity of writing is 
explicitly contrasted with the paralysis imposed by the 
newspaper's discourse. Bloom, as he stands behind the foreman 
and watches the presses turning, thinks: 
11 Now if he got paralysed there and no-one knew 
how to stop them they'd clank on and on the same, 
print it over and over and up and back. 11 (p.151) 
This theme of paralysis is continued when Myles Crawford tries 
--m 
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to tempt Stephen into using his writing talents in the 
newspaper, with the promise that together they will paralyse 
Europe (p.172). The discourse of popular journalism with its 
evident reality and obvious position for the reading subject is 
exactly a discourse of paralysis. And it is this paralysis 
n 
which is Dublin, stuck in the nauseous repetition of stereotypes. ' 
The text itself, in its activity as writing, offers an 
alternative to this paralysis and with this activity we begin 
a set of constant references to Joyce as writer. These self-
references can be seen in the passage already quoted where 
Stephen is equated with Antisthenes who gave the palm of beauty 
to Penelope. Joyce himself is not hidden behind the text (in 
the anonymity of a copier of reality), but emerges as one of 
the humourous references within the text. For this reason we 
get caught up in an endless set of deferred terms - Joyce is 
the writer who is writing the text so that the text will 
produce the writer who can write the text and so on. The 
stream of consciousness techniques must not be understood as 
the representation of some final reality but, as Joyce told 
11 
Gilbert, the bridge across which he could march his troops 
- the troops in question being so many different discourses. 
10. The whole of the Aeolus sequence contains several 
references to Dubliners. Gabriel Conroy crops up on page 159 
and the parable of the plums asks to be included as one of 
the stories of spiritual paralysis. 
11. Stuart Gilbert. James Joyce's Ulysses. p.28. 
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The opening section of Ulysses from the Telemachus to Hades 
can be read as the presentation of two subjectivities, two 
different patterns of language, two different texts. Just as 
Aristotle, Swift, Shakespeare and others circulate in Stephen's 
mind providing the sentences with which he experiences the 
world and himself, so Bloom's mind is composed of snatches of 
the planter•s handbill, Matcham 1 s masterstroke and popularising 
scientific works. Joyce made this point when Valery Larbaud, 
then in the process of translating Ulysses, asked him if 
quotations should go between quotation marks. Joyce replied 
that "the fewer quotation marks the better" and that even 
without them the reader "will know early in the book that S.D.ts 
12 
mind is full like everyone else's of borrowed words." The 
process by which consciousness is demonstrated as a constant 
articulation rather than an originating moment can be seen by 
looking again at the reference to Antisthenes. First used by 
Professor MacHugh it gets taken up by Stephen on p.310 and 
p.638. 
There is a contradiction in the fact that Stephen 
the artist wants to write from a fixed position, for this 
fixed position is incompatible with writing itself. This can 
be clearly seen in the Scylla and Charybdis section. Stephen 
is constantly trying to fix his 'I' in a stable ~nonc6 but 
~nonciation keeps multiplying the instances of the pronoun 
12. James Joyce. Letter to Valiry Larbaud. 4 June 1928. 
Letters. Vol.1. p.263. 
; j 
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beyond any such stable state. (p.242). Symmetrically he is 
attempting to fix Shakespeare in a certain position in his 
texts so that the texts become communication or representations 
of Shakespeare's life. Finally he gets caught in contradictory 
statements and laughs' to free his mind from his mind's bondage" 
(p.272) in that same laugh which is engendered by the contra-
dictory positions for the reader within the text of Ulysses. 
It is with this laugh that he abandons the attempt to locate 
Shakespeare's writing from a fixed authorial position and 
instead considers him as the movement of difference that 
constitutes the plays. Shakespeare is no longer the controlling 
subject representing a separate realm but is the fugitive 
subject articulated from character to character: 
"He is all in all. 
- He is, Stephen said. The boy of act one is 
the mature man of act five. All in all. In 
Cymbeline, in Othello he is bawd and cuckold. 
He acts and is acted on. Lover of an ideal or 
a perversion, like Jose he kills the real Carmen. 
His unremitting intellect is the hornmad Iago 
ceaselessly willing that the moor in him shall 
suffer." (p.272-273) 13 
Stephen wishes to enter the realm of communication but 
remains barred from it - aware through the pull of the mother 
of the radical insufficiency of the father. But insofar as the 
13. William T. Noon S.J., not perhaps surprisingly, sees this 
moment as evidence of Stephen's failure because he cannot hold 
apart Father and Son, Creator and Image - see Joyce and Aquinas. 
ch.6 especially pp.123-124. Noon is correct to hold that art 
becomes impossible at this point, and with art religion, but it 
is at that same conjuncture that writing begins. 
'i 
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mother's demands hold sway over him he is constantly being 
forced to find a father. He is thus still searching to find 
the self sufficient cause of desire, even though, as his theory 
of Shakespeare shows, he is aware that in order to be a "lord 
of language 11 (p.251) it is necessary to be wounded "there where 
love lies ableeding." (p.252). 
Mulligan with his rhymes and phallic imagery14 stands as 
one example of the world of communication, the singers in the 
Ormond Bar are another. They (in the world of voices) are 
opposed by Bloom the writer - an opposition which is given 
explicit sexual point by the use of membranes within the text. 
Bloom, as he sits writing in the dining room, is contrasted 
with Ben Dollard who is singing. But whereas the singer will 
enter the body of another with his voice (in the same movement 
that Boylan is accomplishing with Molly), the writer receives 
his pleasure in the constant losing and finding of himself. 
If the voice and the phallus constantly find a mirror confronting 
them, the writer finds his own other. Those who wish to burst 
the membrane - Dollard and Boylan - are contrasted with Bloom 
and the reader who play on the surface of the text which sends 
back a message always different from the one that was originally 
sent. 
14. The phallic nature of Gogarty's relation with Joyce can be 
seen in the account James F. Carens gives of their friendship in 
"Joyce and Gogarty11 in New Light on Joyce from the Dublin 
symposium. ed. Fritz Senn pp.28-45. In particular one might 
notice the description of the letter containing the Song of 
Medical Dick and Medical Davy. pp.33-34. 
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On page 348 we find the following passage: 
11 
- Sure you 1 d burst the tympanum of her ear, 
man, Mr Dedalus said through smoke aroma,with 
an organ like yours. 
In bearded abundant laughter Dollard shook 
upon the keyboard. He would. 
- Not to mention another membrane, Father 
Cowley added." 
The link between the tympanum and the hymen is here made 
explicit by Simon Dedalus and is contrasted with the attitude 
of Bloom to the membrane constituted by the page which is 
specified as being vellum - parchment made from skin in its 
original sense 15 - and which is compared to the hymen in the 
following terms: 
"Blank face. Virgin should say: or fingered only. 
Write something on it: page. 11 (p.368) 
Bloom's desire is to write on the page rather than burst through 
it for Bloom too has had to face up to the radical insufficiency 
15. The word vellum seems also to give a reference to velum. 
This word, in English, refers to the membrane on the soft palate 
which is an important factor in our production of sound. More 
tendentiously, through its etymology (Latin velum - a sail) the 
word links up to the constant reference to 'sails' and 1veils' 
in the text. The French word 'voile' which translates both 
meanings is of extreme importance for Mallarmi. Indeed the 
whole cluster of wave, sea, siren, veil imagery suggests that 
the whole of the Sirens could be read as a prolonged meditation 
on the similarities suggested by Mallarme between writing and 
the sexual act. Such a reading would have to Efatt from Robert 
Greer Cohn's magnificent Mallarm~'s Un Coup de Des. Over and 
above the fascinating reading of Mallarm6, this book provides 
some most searching comments on Finnegans Wake. 
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of his father through Virag's suicide. Unable to support a 
simple phallic ego ideal, Bloom has to allow his desire to 
circulate along a wider movement of signifiers, along elaborate 
phantasies. In other words, Bloom submits to writing - the 
very exemplar of perversion. But if the movement of writing, 
of perversion, is a constant exposure to the danger of otherness, 
of the feminine, it is the moment at which the fantasy is 
arrested that the pervert saves the phallus and joins the 
drinkers in the bar - and this, of course, is what Bloom does. 
After masturbating on the beach he joins the drinkers in the 
house of Horne. 
So far the concept of the perverse has been used in a 
simple opposition with the neurotic and it has been used to 
elucidate an openness to the otherness that the neurotic 
refuses to acknowledge. But it is now clear that we must 
elaborate distinctions within the area of perversity that 
Freud himself did not make. That is to say we must distinguish 
between a perverse structure which, while suspending the either/ 
or of sexual difference and investigating the non-disjunctive 
nature of discourse, undertakes this suspension and investigation 
only with the guarantee that the process will be ended and 
denied, and, on the other hand, a perversion so radical that 
there is never any question of arresting the process. The 
first is the fetishistic structure which we saw at work in 
Balzac's text and although Flaubert and the young Joyce hold 
the disjunction open for longer and longer, a close will always 
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loom as a possibility unless the disjunction is endlessly 
multiplied. The phallic position must not simply be held in 
suspense but it must be positively pulverised in a true 
anatomy, a cut up. The male position must be finally 
abandoned for the female one. If we pass from the neurosis of 
Stephen to the perversion of Bloom, it is hot until we reach 
the radical refusal of position in Molly that we have left 
behind the world of representation. 
Bloom's perversity allows a resurgence both of anality 
and orality in the Sirens sequence. Evidence of the process 
of separation and thus return of the signifier against the 
signified which holds everything separated, the anal and the 
oral are repressed in the world of communication but return in 
Bloom fascinated as he is by the mechanisms of the mouth and 
submitted to the return of drink '{npst be the cider or perhaps 
the burgund. 11 (p.375) already discussed. 16 If the voice is 
phallic, the ear is the register of vibration which deconstructs 
presence into difference, the imaginary into the symbolic. 
There is, however, another organ, which provides a privileged 
site for the imaginary17 , and which is opposed to the ear 
throughout Finnegans Wake as well as Ulysses. The eye is the 
organ with which the singers confront the world as they forget 
16. see supra:w. 170-171. 
17. see supra:w. 56-62. 
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ear. Similarly in the Cyclops, the one-eyed19 is the the 
aggressive world of drink and communication from which Bloom 
is excluded. In the world of the eye, the barmaids simply 
act as mirrors to the masculine world. The various equations 
of the Sirens between eye, voice, phallus, nationalism and 
religion find particular emphasis in their reflection by Lydia 
Douce as she listens to the song of the Croppy Boy: 
11 0n the smooth jutting beerpull laid Lydia hand 
lightly, plumply, leave it to my hands. All lost 
in pity for croppy. Fro, to: to, fro: over the 
polished knob (she knows his eyes, my eyes, her 
eyes) her thumb and finger passed in pity: passed, 
repassed and, gently touching, then slid so smoothly, 
slowly down, a cool firm white enamel baton protruding 
through their sliding ring. 11 (p.369) 
In order to confirm male power, women can only function as 
mirrors; they must deny their own sexuality. If Bloom manages 
to ignore the mirro:r;s of the Sirens he finally succumbs to an 
arresting of the signifiers in Nausicaa. Gerty McDowell is 
constantly attempting to turn herself into the fetish prescribed 
by the woman's magazine discourse which articulates her 
experience (it is the same discourse which Miss Douce and Miss 
Kennedy use). 20 This is the point at which Bloom if only 
18. see supra p. 167-168. 
19. As one-eyed, the Citizen can be read as a huge phallic pun. 
20. Fritz Senn makes the same point in his very interesting 
essay on Nausicaa contained in James Joyce's Ulysses ed. Clive 
Hart and David Hayman. pp.277-311. Senn's article points out 
not merely that Gerty uses the same discourses as the barmaids 
but the same one as Molly pp.300-301. What is radically 
different about Molly's, however, is the articulation which 
abandons the carefully ordered form which Gerty is constantly 
trying to impose. 
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through a prolonged detour, reaffirms the power of the phallus. 
That this power is dependent on a repression of female sexuality, 
and above all of female genitality, is made obvious through a 
variety of devices. Firstly there is GertyTs constant attempt 
to ignore the onset of her period. This effort reduplicates 
her struggle to remain in control of the flow of her discourses. 
The attempt to ignore the body and the attempt to preserve the 
subject-predicate form are here presented as different elements 
of the same structure. Secondly there is the constant 
reference to the Virgin - the Virgin being the means whereby 
the passage from father to son, which Stephen correctly 
analysed as crucial to religion is produced by the denial of 
th th T 1 · t 2 1 Th . . th . tl e mo er s sexua 1 y. e virgin as mo er is exac y 
the power of the phallic wor(l)d of communication - the voice 
22 
of the father shatters the tympanum to produce the son. 
Finally GertyTs limp marks her as less than perfect, an example 
of the inferior version of the male that women must represent 
in a phallocentric order. Before this female denial of female 
sexuality Bloom becomes a direct phallic TIT, eyes and 
masturbates. 
21. Some of these references to the Virgin are worked out in 
detail by Fritz Senn. art.cit. pp.291-295. 
22. When Ben Dollard reappears in Circe it is in response to 
the cry by Virag 11 He burst her tympanum" (p.637) Weldon 
Thornton Allusions in Ulysses p.400 tells us that this is an 
allusion to the medieval theory "that the Virgin Mary conceives 
Christ through her ear, by agency of the Word of God." 
Mulligan who thinks himself a transgressor because of his 
emphasis on the male sexual organs does not realise that he is 
simply the degraded successor of the same logic. This is also 
made clear in the parable of the bull in the Oxen of the Sun. 
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By the end of the Nausicaa section both Stephen and 
Bloom have been exhausted by the voyage of the text. Both 
find access to the phallic world of communication difficult 
because of the problems of paternity and the mother but both 
attempt to enter it and at the nursing home they are both 
stuck in it. True they both keep those characteristics 
assigned to them by the text and with which they dissociate 
themselves from others but this dissociation is now at the 
level of action and emotion - the activity of writing has been 
completely taken over by the text and it is only the writer/ 
reader who is still voyaging through sense. The reader,through 
the passage of the text,has been displaced from the world of 
communication in which the medical students revel. This is 
the world of the bull whether it be the complicated medieval 
world or the more simple post-Renaissance one where the only 
bit of the bull's grammar that is masterable is "the first 
personal pronoun which he copied out big" (p.524). The Oxen 
of the Sun takes us through the history of the English language 
but a language which has now become pure system. With each 
change the figures before us reform like elements in a 
kaleidoscope, with the difference that with each change the 
position of the viewer also alters - subject and object both 
mere effects of this anatomy of discourse. Language has been 
displaced from fixity into that pure flow that was prefigured 
earlier in the mathematical symbols - moving across the page 
11 in grave morrice. 11 (p.33.) 
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The repetition of certain phrases is one of the most 
noticeable features of Ulysses. They testify to the 
indestructible materiality of the signifier and to its 
dominance over the signified. The trace, the wake, is never 
finally eradicated, a thought that occurs to Bloom as he 
prepares to blot his letter to Martha Clifford and reflects 
that his letter could be read off the blotting pad (p.361) 
Bloom's immediate reaction is to think that this could form 
the basis for a prize detective story, a reaction dependent on 
the written trace left by Matcham's Masterstroke. In a welter 
of repetitions the text now recalls Mrs Purefoy and U.P.: up. 
and, as Bloom reflects that language is littered with quotations 
from Shakespeare, the text rewrites two lines that have occurred 
earlier in the library sequence on page 259. 
~ \.() 
The point ofXrepetitions ~ that they both mark the 
text of Ulysses as written and allow different meanings to 
attach to the signifiers. It is exactly this possibility of 
new meanings which is the possibility of desire speaking. The 
word escapes the control of the speaking subject insofar as it 
is always open to new definitions and it is in these new 
definitions that desire finds expression. Desire is the 
passage along the metonymy of signifiers and it is in those 
moments when the signifier is no longer completely under the 
domination of the signified that desire speaks - that 1 it' 
talks there where 'I' have lost control. Thus the nonsense of 
a verbal parapraxis is the slip in the metonymic chain which 
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points to the waking of desire. If the movement from signifier 
to signifier is the movement of phantasy, this movement always 
comes back to the conscious mind as fixed, as ~none~ - a certain 
meaning, a definite signified. Examination of the signifiers 
reveals, however, that as the body moves along the signifying 
chain it takes up all the positions offered to it. The movement 
at work in a simple phrase was demonstrated very clearly in 
Freud's analysis of the phantasy "A child is being beaten" 
where grammatical substitutions reveal the wealth of desires 
being articulated in a simple phrase. 2 3 
In Circe the whole text of Ulysses is taken up and 
repeated, a repetition which allows the speaking of desire. 
Circe is the text's unconscious as the events of the day get 
reworked in Nighttown. 24 If the movement of writing, of 
perversion, is the insistent pressure of the feminine then in 
Circe, with the removal of the fetish (Bloom's potato discovered 
under his mother's skirt (p.570) is taken from him by Zoe on 
page 599 and only returned on page 6Q3) and the removal from 
the reader of any fixed position whatever, the effects of 
writing can be experienced at their most corrosive as Bloom 
23. Sigmund Freud. op.cit. vol.17. pp.179-204. 
24. The transformations at work in Circe recall those processes 
which Freud describes as basic to the working of the unconscious -
condensation and displacement. Kenner comes close to a correct 
description when in an essay on Circe he describes it as "a 
nearly accidental psychoanalysis, wholly lacking an analyst" 
James Joyce's Ulysses. ed. C. Hart and D. Hayman. p.360. 
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becomes a woman. It is this experience of the feminine which 
is the only way out of the mother's demand that both presses 
the claims of a father but in its insistence reveals his 
essential lack. The only way to avoid the pressure of that 
demand is to disinter the desire that it conceals - the mother's 
repressed desire must be spoken through the child lest the 
child languish in neurosis. But the movement of desire is, 
in its insistence and its excentricity, also the movement of 
death - the annihilation of the conscious subject in the system 
of language. Caught in the demand of the mother Stephen 
cannot experience language - he has yet to be told the word 
that is "known to all men" (p.682). That word is exactly a 
signifier in excess of a signified, a name in excess of its 
bearer: the Name of the Father. But the mother's demand is 
that he should find a bearer worthy of the name. Stephen must 
kill the priest and king in his head because the mother has 
made their position untenable. Her demand that he should 
serve is exactly, in its insistence, that which has already 
revealed the priest and king as unservable. It is with the 
experience of the writing of Circe that the mother's desire 
can be disintered and with this disinterment we find the death 
of the world of demand constituted by religion and nationalism. 
This is the death the text recounts on page 691 with the 
hanging of the Croppy Boy. The Croppy ac~ris significant in 
Ulysses because the mistake he makes reveals the true identity 
of priest and king. Furthermore the Croppy actually confesses 
in shame to that which he should relish as freedom - forgetting 
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to pray for his mother r s rest. Tle Croppy B_oy stands for all the 
disastrous choices that have to be made in Ireland and from 
which one is only released in death. The passage through death 
is the passage the child realises as he finds himself no longer 
a full name but simply the value of a variable. To deny that 
death is to bar the child from the world of the signifier and 
of desire. The Croppy Boy's death sees the return of the 
signifier against the mother's demand 11 Horhot ho hray ho 
rhother 1 s hest 11 (p.691) and also provides access to the world 
of desire - of orgasm. The "gouts of sperm" that fall on the 
cobblestones provide the only father the text can have - from 
the only orgasm represented within it. Circe literally spells 
death and it is small wonder that Joyce suffered such strain 
writing it and was so desperate to make sure that he had the 
protection of the God of communication as he descended to the 
. f th . . f. 25 experience o e s1gn1 ier. 
The end of the text - the Nostos - can be considered as 
a persistent refusal to close the text - a refusal which 
in the same way, but on a grand scale, reduplicates that 
refusal of closure which I have indicated throughout Joyce's 
work. In the Eumaeus episode the reader might expect to be 
given the significance of the day's events and Bloom, manfully, 
attempts to do that by writing the short story he has been 
contemplating all day which he entitles 11 My Experiences, let us 
25. cf. Letter to Frank Budge"V\ Michaelmas 1920. Letters. 
vol.1. p.147-148. 
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say, in a Cabman 1 s Shelter." (p.750). Despite, however, the 
hopeful conglomeration of characters at Skin-the-Goat's, 
nothing emerges until the last paragraph when as Bloom and 
Stephen walk off, and seem to be talking of the book's themes 
"sirens, enemies of man's reason, mingled with a number of 
other toptcs of the same category, usurpers" (p.775-6) .. the 
reader_. ~ firmly placed outside the 11 t'ete-'a-tete 11 • Similarly 
Ithaca in its surplus of answers gives no place, at which the 
reader can satisfactorily find a moment of rest from where the 
text will make sense. 
Ithaca, as Joyce said, is the end (if not the close of 
the 26 book) , for Penelope is simply the movement of the book 
all over again, the movement to writing and the experience of 
the mother's desire. With the breakdown of the subject-
predicate form the text becomes the undulations of ~nonciation. 
The cliches which make up the content of Molly's thought are 
here unimportant as we achieve that motion of the signifier 
which has been the motion of the voyage. All that perhaps 
should be noted is that this section marks that to which the 
text is dedicated - the pulverisation of phallocentrism. It 
is often said that there is no slaughter of the suitors in 
27 Ulysses but this ignores the fact that Joyce implicitly 
26. Letter to Harriet Shaw Weaver. 7 October 1921. Letters 
vol.1. p.172. 
27. cf. Richard Ellmann. James Joyce. p.371. 
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placed such a slaughter in Penelope28 • 
a. 
No Gerty MfDowell, 
Molly refuses to conform herself to the wishes of men - as such 
she is fatal. Much speculation has been devoted to what 
happens after the end of Ulysses, but no-one seems to have 
remarked that what is certain is Boylan's death. 29 
28. On the 10 December 1920 Joyce writes to Frank Budgen 
"At first I had not thought of the slaughter of the suitors as 
in Ulysses' character. Now I see it can be there too. I am 
going to leave the last word with Molly Bloom •.. " Letters 
vol.1. pp.151-152. Towards the end of February 1921 he writes 
to Budgen again when having said that he is leaving the last 
word to Penelope, he adds 11 At one time I thought the slaughter 
of the suitors un-Ulyssean. In my present frame of mind I have 
modified my opinion." Letters vol.1. p.160. 
29. Molly's fatal effect on the male sex is most evident in 
the death of Rudy. The equivalence between Rudy and her lovers 
can be found in the equation Joyce noted down on the Notesheets 
for the Oxen of the Sun: "Rudy=Mulvey11 James Joyce's Ulysses 
Notesheets in the British Museum. Ed. Phillip F. Hering. p.256. 
i' 
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The Revolution in the Word and the Revolution. 
"If it is not far-fetched to say that my action, and that 
of men like Ibsen & c, is a virtual intellectual strike I would 
call such people as Gogarty and Yeats and Colm the blacklegs of 
literature. Because they have tried to substitute us, to serve 
the old idols at a lower rate when we refused to do so far a 
higher" James Joyce. Letter to Stanislaus Joyce. 6 November 1906. 
Letters vol.2. p.187. 
"The practical methods of the revolution are not 
revolutionary, they are dictated by the class struggle. It is 
for this reason that great writers find themselves ill at ease in 
the class struggle, they behave as though the struggle was 
already finished, and they deal with the new situation, conceived 
as collectivist, which is the aim of the revolution. The 
revolution of the great writers is permanent." Bertolt Brecht 
Sur Le Cintma p.25 (Translated directly from the French). 
CHAPTER 7 
FINNEGANS WAKE AND THE EASTER RISING 
It should be clear from the arguments advanced in the four 
previous chapters that the phrase "James Joyce and the Revolution 
in the Word" has a certain intelligibility. Joyce's texts do 
participate in such a revolution. A revolution which is brought 
about by a constant attention to the means by which sense is 
produced and a practice of writing which dramatises these means of 
production; a dramatisation which, in its process, alters the very 
conditions of production. Writing of Joyce and Finnegans Wake, 
Samuel Beckett commented that "his writing is not about something; 
it is that something itself111 and, in many ways, this thesis is 
simply devoted to tracing the consequences of that statement for 
all of Joyce's texts. Consequences which reverberate centrally 
in the areas of desire and power; of sexuality and politics. 
Finnegans Wake concentrates on these reverberations and the text, 
as Stephen Heath remarks, 11 ne cesse d•lnoncer, de facon tres 
claire ••• les rapports ~criture/sexualit~. 112 But it is not only 
1. Samuel Beckett. "Dante ••• Bruno. Vico .•• Joyce" in Our 
Exagmination Round his Factification for Incamination o'F"'work in 
Progress p.14. 
2. Stephen Heath. 11 Trames de lecture" Tel Quel. no.54. p.5. "The 
text never ceases to state, in clear fashion, the relations between 
writing and sexuality." This article and Heath's earlier 
"Ambiviolences 11 (Tel Quel no.SO pp.22-43 and Tel Quel no.51. pp.64-
77) constitute one of the most serious attempts to engage with 
Joyce's writing in recent years. Oriented towards Finnegans Wake, 
they provide a basis for reading the text although there are two 
important areas where these articles require revision and expansion. 
The first article tends towards an "infinite" reading of Joyce and 
not enough emphasis is placed on the fact that the text must be 
understood as a continuous lapsus working within a definite linear 
flow see infra pp.233-234. The second article corrects this 
tendency but the account given of the links between sexuality and 
language ignores Issy and thus one of the central concerns of the 
text. 
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the secrets of sexuality that are contained in the material of 
the letter, it is also constantly concerned with politics as the 
intricate play on the Piggott forgery bears witness. And that 
which articulates tkese levels of language, sexuality and politics 
is the constant desire to rise and the constant necessity of a 
subsequent fall: 
"When men want to write a letters. Ten men, ton 
men, pen men, pun men, wont to rise a ladder. 
And den men, dun men, fen men, fun men, hen men, 
hun men wend to raze a leader." (278.18/21) 
But if there is a general awareness of the importance of 
Parnell within the texts of Joyce, his importance is constantly 
de-politicised so that he becomes simply a symbol of the treachery 
of Ireland. 3 Indeed amongst the plethora of articles that 
confronts the student of Joyce, there is very little material 
which deals seriously with Joyce's political positions. 4 For who 
3. See, for example, H~i~ne Cixous' treatment of Parnell in 
L 1 exil de James Joyce ou l'art de remplacement. pp.233-249. Cixous 
was fue first to use extensively the political content of the letters 
to Stanislaus in Letters vol.2 but her treatment of Joyce's 
politics is entirely dominated by psychologism. One has simply to 
read the title of the chapter on socialism ("La Pose Socialiste"), 
or the title of the whole section on politics("La Tentation de La 
Politique11 ) to devine that Cixous' approach is a constant reduction 
of the political to the personal. 
4. Philip F. Herring can be taken as articulating a widely held 
position on Joyce and politics when he writes, "Institutions were 
important only because his personal reaction against them helped to 
define his artistic consciousness." 11 Joyce's politics" New Light on 
Joyce from the Dubl'in Symposium. ed. Fritz Senn pp.4-5. The most 
serious consequence of this psychologisation of Joyce 1 s politics is 
the undervaluing of Joyce's commitment to socialism before the 
First World War and Herring can once again be taken to be stating 
an accepted position, although on this occasion in an extreme form, 
when he writes that: "Joyce contented himself with opposing the 
forces that made his exile necessary; that those same forces 
(British imperialism, a Church hierarchy preoccupied with its own 
power, provincial narrowness of mind) had been condemned by his 
fellow Irish socialists as largely responsible for the poverty, 
emigration and spiritual stagnation of the Irish people during 
past centuries was for him merely coincidental." ibid. p.10. 
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could be more evidently un-political that the writer of 11 Dooleys-
prudence"? Who could have less connection with the political 
struggles of Ireland than a writer who left his country eighteen 
years before it achieved independence and who felt himself so 
little concerned with the Irish Free State that he never visited 
it nor even surrendered his British passport in exchange for an 
Irish one? 5 
Along with a lack of interest in Joyce's politics, there 
has been a general failure in Joyce studies to deal seriously 
with Joyce's use of language. Since Margaret Schlauch 1 s 
penetrating article in the magazine Science and Society in 1939, 
there have been very few articles on thisinpic produced within 
the considerable academic framework of Joyce studies. 6 Politics 
5. cf. Richard Ellmann. James Joyce. p.751. 
6. It is the introduction of the reader into the systematic order 
of discourse in Finnegans Wake, which has made the book so intract-
able to linguists. Recently Strother Purdy has made an admirable 
effort to come to terms with the Wake's language in "Mind Your 
Genderous: Toward a~ Grammar"~New Light on Joyce from the 
Dublin Symposium. ed.Fritz Senn. pp.46-78. Purdy's interesting 
researches are, however, doomed to partial failure insofar as he is 
committed to a philosophy of language as communication and to using 
a theory of language which ignores the place of the subject in his 
discourses. Any account of Finnegans Wake must explain the effect 
that F.G. Asenjo tried to specify in an idealist vocabulary in his 
article "The General Problem of Sentence Structure: An Analysis 
prompted by the loss of subject in Finnegans Wake" in Centennial 
Review of Arts and Sciences. VIII (1964) pp.398-408. Asenjo tried 
to explain how each word within the sentence could take up the 
position of the subject with regard to the rest of the sentence but 
his account is held back by an ideology of expressivity that runs 
through his account. Margaret Schlauch's article entitled "The 
Language of James Joyce" Science and Society. vol.3. Fall 1939. 
pp.482-497, made the point that personal connections of the reader 
were allowed in by the language structure: 11 Joyce demands more 
active participation from his public than any other writer I can 
recall." (p.490). With the work of Benveniste and Kristeva, we are 
approaching the situation where we can begin to give a theoretical 
account of how language works in Finnegans Wake, but it is certainly 
not the case that this account will involve the simple application 
of linguistic theories to the Wake. Rather it will involve the use 
of the Wake to elaborate linguistic theories. I can envisage a tim~ 
when Fin.negans Wake will be an essential part of any linguistics 
course. Any such advances will lean heavily on the insights, if noti 
the vocabulary, of Anthony Burgess' Joysprick, a work produced out- I, 
side the academic framework of Joyce studies. '1 
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and language are what lies buried beneath the endless studies on 
the symbolic correspondences, on the autobiography, on myth, on the 
meaning of the works. It is to questions of the relations between 
politics and language in Joyce's work (the connections between the 
revolution in the word and the revolution) that I wish to devote 
this chapter but before turning to these substantial questions I 
want to indicate the importance of the omission of a consideration 
of Joyce 1 s politics at the most evident level. 
Emblematically one could consider the critical reception 
afforded to that metaphor which Joyce used to illuminate his 
progress around Europe. Hundreds of thousands of words have 
poured forth on this exile; on the artist holding himself away 
from his people; on the sensitive soul escaping the provincial 
deadness of Ireland; on the heretic fleeing the Catholic Church. 
But what is never investigated is the real basis ofihis imaginary 
figure - the economic subservience in which Ireland was held by 
the imperial power of England. This subservience has ensured that 
for the 120 years since the famine, exile has been the normal 
condition of the Irish man and woman. 
F.S.L. Lyons has described the situation after the famine 
as follows: 
"Emigration, therefore, there had to be, emigration 
which in one form or another was to form part of the 
very fabric of Irish society during the succeeding 
hundred years. 11 7 
7. F.S.L. Lyons Ireland since the Famine. p.45. 
'''( 
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The difficulty of getting a job in Ireland was one of the crucial 
factors in Joyce's decision to leave Ireland and that he was aware 
of how he shared this fate with his countrymen and women is made 
clear by the words he addressed to his fellow Triestinos on this 
subject: 
"Finally, in the field of practical affairs this 
perjorative conception of Ireland is given the lie 
by the fact that when the Irishman is found outside 
of Ireland in another environment, he very often 
becomes a respected man. The economic and intellectual 
conditions that prevail in his own country do not 
permit the development of individuality. The soul of 
the country is weakened by centuries of useless struggles 
and broken treaties, and individual initiative is 
paralysed by the influence and admonitions of the church, 
while its body is manacled by the police, the tax office, 
and the garrison. No one who has any self-respect stays 
in Ireland, but flees afar as though from a country 
that has undergone the visitation of an angered Jove. 
From the time of the Treaty of Limerick, or rather, 
from the time that it was broken by the English in bad 
faith, millions of Irishmen have left their native land. 
These fugitives, as they were centuries ago, are called 
the wild geese ••• 
••• even today, the flight of the wild geese continues. 
Every year, Ireland, decimated as she already is, loses 
60,000 of her sons. From 1850 to the present day, more 
than 5,000,000 emigrants have left for America, and every 
post brings to Ireland their inviting letters to friends 
and relatives at home. The old men, the corrupt, the 
children, and the poor stay at home, where the double 
yoke wears another groove in the tamex neck; and around 
the death bed where the poor anaemic, almost lifeless, 
body lies in agony, the rulers give orders and the priests 
administer last rites."8 
It is only through a consideration of the real basis of 
Joyce's exile that we can understand the uncertainty and irony 
8. James Joyce. "Ireland, Island of Saints and Sages" in The 
Critical Writings of James Joyce ed. Ellsworth Mason and Richard 
Ellmann pp.171-172. 
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which is generated around Stephen Dedalus' appeal to exile as the 
solitary way. An added autobiographical joke~~~e!~~o~i~ 
this to Cranly. For Joyce's friend Byrne, who ~anly is based on, 
was also to choose exile six years after Joyce by emigrating to 
America. 
It is not, however, simply the consideration of such a 
major theme in Joyce's work that suffers because of the general 
lack of interest in Joyce's politics. In the Aeolus section of 
Ulysses we are treated to the spectacle of the political paralysis 
of Ireland as the old Parnellites bemoan the speech of the night 
before.9 The decline of the papers founded to help the nationa-
list cause and the windbags that have replaced Parn~ll are two 
symptoms of the spread of the disease. But the chapter is 
interesting in that it moves briefly outside the normal petit-
bourgeois world of Ulysses and, in that move, it demonstrates a 
surprisingly clear awareness of the nature and extent of the 
political paralysis that afflicts Ireland. Nal\etti, the foreman 
with whom Bloom discusses the question of the Keyes' advertisement 
is one of the few members of the unionised working class who 
figures in Ulysses. He was a M.P. for the nationalist party and 
was constantly cited as the example of how the nationalist cause 
embraced all classes. Indeed Nannetti was appointed as liaison 
officer between the Irish T.U.C. and the nationalist party, and his 
9. see supra. pp.205-206. 
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was a powerful voice within the trade-union movement against the 
10 
setting up of a separate working-class party. In addition it 
may not be farfetched to see another political allusion in the 
text in the prominent place assigned in the chapter to the trams 
of Dublin and the newspaper boys. In 1913, in an attempt to 
break the growing power of the Irish Transport and General Workers 
Union which Larkin and Connolly had been so successful in 
establishing in the previous five years, the Dublin employers 
organised a lock-out. The Dublin Lock-Out (which provided the 
bitterest and longest industrial struggle of Irish history and 
which was the occasion for the foundation of the Irish Citizen 
Army) turned around the unionisation of the trams and of the 
11 
newspaper delivery boys. The employe~s were led by William 
Martyn Murphy a former nationalist M.P. 
What I want to suggest by indicating these facts is that in 
the Aeolus section the analysis of the political paralysis of 
Ireland is far more than a simple statement that Parnell is dead 
and gone. The resonances and allusions of this chapter indicate 
that it is the way in which the nationalist struggle obscures class 
antagonisms which is the crucial factor in the paralysis of Ireland.i 
That this is the political analysis made by the young Joyce and that, 
this analysis provides the constant impetus of the later literary 
10. see J.W. Boyle. The Rise of the Irish Labour Movement 1888-
1907 (unpublished doctoral thesis, Trinity College, Dublin.) 
pp.218-220. 
11. For an account of the Lock-Out see C. Desmond Greaves. The 
Life and Times of James Connolly. chap.XVI!. The details 
concerning the newsboys and the tramwaymen can be found pp.306-308. 
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12 
works is what I wish to show in this chapter. But what must be 
emphasized at this stage is that it is necessary to take politics 
far more seriously than is usual in Joyce studies in order to grasp 
even the references in the works. Normally politics is glossed 
over by some appeal to the personality of the "great Irish artist". 
As an example of the deadening effect that such an approach has 
had, one could quote the following passage from Ellmannts biography 
which deals with Joyce 1 s stay in Trieste: 
"Trieste resembled Dublin, too, in its Irredentist 
movement; the similarity here was so striking that 
Joyce found he could interest his Italian friends 
in Irish political parallels, though no doubt he 
would have compelled them to listen in any case. 11 13 (my emphasis) 
The trivialisation of this last phrase distracts attention from the 
real political similarities between Italy and Ireland; similarities 
so striking that James Connolly learned Italian at the same time 
that Joyce was arguing about the Irredentist movement in Trieste. 
12. That this was the analysis held by the young Joyce can be seen 
in the letters to Stanislaus see infra p.256. I am not trying to 
suggest in this chapter that Joyce continued to hold the same 
political views throughout his life and that he consciously wrote 
Finnegans Wake to serve certain political ends. It is certain 
that after the outbreak of the First World War he lost any 
immediate interest in politics. What I am trying to suggest below 
is that both the political analyses and the literary works were 
produced within a certain political conjuncture and that one can 
understand them both in political terms. 
13. Richard Ellmann. op.cit. p.203. Ellmann's biography, 
magnificent achievement that it is, is sadly wanting in its 
descriptions of Joyce•s political beliefs. Joyce 1 s comments are 
constantly reduced to the ramblings of a great artist. 
, , I 
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Connollyis biographer explains why Connolly learned Italian at 
this time by stating, this time without any qualifying phrases, that 
11 he thought that their problems resembled those of the Irish11 14 
The purpose of these remarks is not to create another 
context for Joyce in which the texts will finally body forth their 
true meaning (at long last the political one that those with left 
wing sympathies have been waiting for all along). Rather these 
considerations are simply designed to disrupt those expectations 
of the non-political nature of Joyce's writing and to allow some 
new considerations of Finnegans Wake. The Wake insists constantly 
on the relations between language and sexuality; on the secrets 
that the letter will reveal about the fatherts encounters in 
Phoenix Park. What has not been sufficiently understood is that 
these considerations of sexuality have certain political 
consequences. 
If Stephen in A Portrait still considers himself a 11 foster-
child11 who may find a father worthy to bear the name of Dedalus, 
in Finnegans Wake the split between bearer and name is made 
absolute as the father just becomes the permutations of a set of 
letters. It is the divorce between bearer and name which makes 
language possible but this divorce is constantly covered over, 
repressed, in the normal workings of language. Finnegans Wake 
disrupts this normal process of language in order to allow this 
14. C. Desmond Greaves. op.cit. p.185. 
i 
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divorce to make itself felt. In the imaginary world of the child 
there is a simple correspondence between sign and referent; the 
two are magically linked together in a one to one relation. But 
the word finds its meaning not through its relation to the thing 
but by the diacritical relations into which it enters on the 
phonic and semantic levels. It is the recognition of the 
systematic nature of language (that names are defined through a 
set of substitutions; that they find their definition in a nexus 
of differences rather than a plenitude of being} which is the 
condition of the successful use of language. What Joyce makes 
us experience in his writings is what Freud was teaching 
contemporaneously: that the determining moment in this process is 
the recognition that the father is no more than a name but that 
this recognition is constantly obscured in the necessity to 
control language. 
One can restate this paradox in slightly different terms. 
As I write, each word finds its sense and meaning through the 
differential oppositions that define it within the English 
language, but I constantly have the impression of injecting the 
meanings into the words as I write. This division is the 
constitutive feature of language and subjectivity and it is the 
division which Freud categorised in terms of the conscious and the 
unconscious, the ego and the id, the "I" and the "it". For as I 
write I constantly find myself securely in position as the "I" of 
the statement but in the act of writing I pass along the material 
of language where there is no such fixed position but simply an 
1, 
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endless set of substitutions. Thus the importance of the lapsus 
for Freud because it is at that moment when the subject loses 
control of his or her discourses that something else speaks - "it" 
speaks there where 11 1 11 have lost control. 
The Wake is a continuous lapsus. It declares itself to be 
the "lapse not leashed" (63.24) and it is the mechanism of the 
lapsus which is the mechanism of the progress of the work. The 
lapse is the moment in the world of communication when another 
subject speaks to another addressee across the phonic and 
semantic material of language. The lapse reveals us in our 
discourse and out of position; not placed in the comforting "I" 
but displaced in the wake of our progress through language. Thus 
Finnegans Wake hesitates between a minimal control which takes us 
from line to line and a riot of meanings which invoke relations 
along a myriad of different levels (semantic, phonic, factual, 
inter-linguistic). One consequence of this is that we must 
recognize that Finnegans Wake is written in English. The answer 
to the question "Are we speachin dtanglas landadge" (485.12/13) 
must be yes although it may be noted that after Finnegans Wake 
the English language has been radically transformed, has, in 
some sense, been permanently deprived of the possibility of 
providing transparent expression for the triumphant ego. A 
further consequence following from this consideration of the 
mechanisms of the lapsus is that we must follow both the syntax 
and the major semantic concerns of any particular passage of the 
text lest it becomes a simple collocation of letters which offers 
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no initial opposition to our passage through it. 
Finnegans Wake should be studied as 11 nat language at any 
sinse "' of the wo~d 11 (83.12). Which is to say language which goes 
beyond meaning (sense) and time (since) in an attempt to understand 
and abolish the sin involved in language the guilt inherent in 
the very act of speaking or writing. It is in the second section 
of Book 2 of Finnegans Wake, the Night Lessons of the children 
that we find this concern pushed to the very limit. This section 
caused Joyce almost more trouble than any other when he was writing 
it and he was forced, most unusually, to abandon some of the materiali 
he wished to use. 15 "The Muddest Thick That Was Ever Heard Dump" 
was the initial title that Joyce gave to the geometry lesson and 
it is the geometry lesson which provides the central focus of the 
kaleidoscope of the book. Night lessons of a 11 nightynovel 11 (54.21), 
they are the essentials of the NIGHTLETTER (308.20). It is the 
section where Dolph, the Shem figure, describes to Kev, the Shaun 
figure, what is underneath the mother ALP's skirts. Kev secure in 
a male narcissism thinks that the results will be "like pah" and 
"as plane as a poke stiff" (296.28/30); he refuses to accept the 
possibility of difference. For it is at the moment that such a 
difference is accepted that the father ceases to be a full presence 
and gets caught up in the nets of difference. 
15. Details of the composition of the chapter can be found in 
David Hayman's "'Scribbledehobbles' and How They Grew. 11 in Twelve 
and a Tilly ed. Jack P. Dalton and Clive Hart. pp.107-118. There 
is also a description of the growth of the chapter in A First 
Draft Version of Finnegans Wake. ed. David Hayman. pp.31-33. 
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What Joyce demonstrates in this section is that it is the 
phallus which is the determining term within the signifying order 
and the access to language and writing. The phallus not to be 
confused with the penis - the anatomical reality - but to be 
understood as the signifier of sexual difference, the possibility 
of the presence or absence of the object. It is with this 
possibility that the father gets caught up as a term within the 
symbolic order; that the name becomes separated from the bearer. 
But if it is this rupture which guarantees language, this rupture 
is constantly obscured and there is a constant attempt to 
minimize and avoid this fundamental lack in that second movement 
of the Oedipus that I have already described. 16 Within Finnegans 
Wake it is nationalist politics which serves as the constant image 
of a new secure position for the subject where the trauma of 
difference can be ignored. Kev can disavow what he has seen 
beneath the mother's skirts by fixing on another model of a full 
presence - on the heroic struggle for national liberation. But 
Dolph is intent on driving home the lesson of difference and of 
the secrets of writing. He urges Kev to 11 pose the pen, man, way 
me does 11 (303.2/3) for if he does he will see that 11 This is brave 
Danny weeping his spache for the papers. This is cool Connolly 
wiping his hearth with brave Danny. And this, regard! howChawleses 
Skewered parparaparnelligoes between brave Danny boy and the 
16. See supra pp.196-198Jnsofar as the second stage marks a 
successful conclusion of the Oedipus complex in our society, one 
can assent to Stephen Heath's judgement that Shaun is 11 L 1 0edipe 
r~ussi, le sujet sans faille 11 11 Trames de Lecture" Art.cit. p.7. It 
should be noticed that there is a grave danger in overpersonifying 
the opposition between system and position, discourse and 
communication which runs through Finnegans Wake. With Shem and 
Shaun one describes different aspects of the one organisation of 
discourse and desire. cf. infra.pp. 236-237. 
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Connolly. Unpanishadem! Top. Spoken hath Llarty Magory. 
Eregobragh. Prouf!" (303.8/14). 
It is at this moment, as Dolph ridicules the three great 
heroes of Irish nationalism: Daniel O'Connell, Charles Stewart: 
Parnell and James Connolly, that Kev finally attacks his brother 
and knocks him down. To take up the position of writing, to allow 
absence to make itself felt is unthinkable for him. At all costs 
meaning and the father must be preserved against the onslaughts of 
Dolph, against the mocking of Erin Go Bragh. The proof that Dolph 
outlines is that the mother reveals the insufficiency of the 
father. It is this insufficiency that Kev cannot support and when 
the refuge he has taken in nationalism and its heroes is threatened 
with dissolution by writing, he reacts in the only way possible -
with violence. The mechanisms at work here are the same as those 
at work in the Cyclops episode when the Citizen attacks Bloom. 
Confronted with the reality of difference and the impossibility of 
definition (Bloom is both Irishman and Jew, the name is separated 
from the bearer) the secure ego reacts against this threat of 
displacement with violence. 17 
To speak is to have accepted a symbolic castration; to have 
accepted difference and absence. To enter into language is thus 
to have denied to the father his self-sufficiency and it is this 
denial which constitutes the guilt associated with language. The 
Shauns attempt to disavow this guilt and to concentrate simply on 
17. see supra pp. 189-190. 
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language as meaning but are thus excluded from the world of desire 
and writing; the Shems wallow in the guilt, become "Shame's 
but are exiled from the world of communication. If only Shem can 
write the letter, only Shaun can deliver it. The two are different 
elements of the same structure and it is for this reason that one 
can turn so easily into the other as the story of the prankquean 
demonstrates. System is always likely to solidify into the 
position it upholds and position is constantly threatening to 
dissolve into the system that upholds it. The dissolution of Shaun ! I 
in 111.iii provides an enactment of this process. 
The Wake makes of the father only a name as he is "variously 
catalogued, regularly regrouped" (129.12) in a play of language 
which turns him into a set of "normative letters" (32.18) such that 
he becomes an 11 apersonal problem, a locative enigma" (135.26/27). 
We are no longer engaged in the search for~ father, for an 
origin, but in a study of the "paradigmatic ear" (70.36) which is 
the place produced for the father by our forms of address, by our 
orders of discourse. Metaphorically in the~ that place is the 
fixity of Howth head as the water takes its different forms around 
it - river, sea, vapour, rain. If the "masculine monosyllables" 
(190.35) serve as the fixed point around which the rhythm flows, 
it is the feminine stream which provides the movement. Language 
18. This is how Joyce is addressed in a "litter" written by 
Vladimir Dixon and published in An Exagmination Round his Factifi-
cation for Incamination of Work in Progress. p.193 Ellmann confirms 
that Dixon is a pseudonym for Joyce. James Joyce. p.626. 
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is a constant struggle between a "feminine libido" which threatens 
to break all boundaries and a "male fist" which threatens to fix 
everything in place: 
II who thus at all this marvelling but will 
press on hotly to see the vaulting feminine 
libido of those interbranching ogham sex 
upandinsweeps sternly controlled and easily 
repersuaded by the uniform matteroffactness of 
a meandering male fist." (123.06/9) 
Anna Livia breaks with all forms of law be they secular or 
religious (139.25/28) but insofar as language depends on law -
on a series of exclusions and oppositions - Anna cannot use 
language; she cannot write down her secrets. Symmetrically Shaun 
who is the law-giver and embodies the law, is so fixed by its 
oppositions that he cannot create enough movement to let the 
symbols operate. For him, letters are "tame, deep and harried, 
in my minets I" (425.25) and this fixity of language as controlled 
by an ego means that despite all this protests in 111.i. he cannot 
read the letter. If Anna Livia refuses to pay the necessary 
attention to sexual differences which would enable her to write, 
Shaun having recognised it unwillingly attempts to identify himself 
with the phallus - to make of himself a "letter potent" (419.24) 
and thus banishes himself from the world of writing. Carried along 
by the river, he constantly ignores its flow and thinks himself the 
master of his own destiny. It is Shem who provides the point of 
intersection between the male and the female which allows of the 
possibility of writing. It is Anna Liviais voice that breaks 
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through Mercius' speech and it is Shemts ability to speak the 
mother which is his power to make the "dumb speak" (195.5). 
Writing through its constant demonstration of the 
differences and absences with which language is constituted allows 
t th f . . 19 F. W k b a constant openness o e em1n1ne. 1nnegans a e y 
investigating the very act of writing lets the unconscious speak; 
it tells us the motheris secrets. As bodies that find ourselves 
constituted in language we should understand that the Beckett 
quote with which I opened is not an appeal to an empty formalism 
but draws attention to that imperfect union of word and flesh 
which can be investigated in writing. The Wake suggests that 
there are two fundamentally different attitudes to language which 
are articulated along sexual divisions. But it is at this 
point that we reach the limits of this thesis. So far I have 
been content with explaining how Joyce's writing breaks with that 
relation between the subject and language which is exemplified 
by Shaun and which I have characterised in Freudian terms as the 
second stage of the Oedipus. The question of the other relation 
to language has constantly been defined negatively in relation 
to this "normal" relation. Finnegans Wake demands, however, a 
more positive definition for it suggests that there is a totally 
different attitude to language which can be characterised as 
female. 
Within the text Issy functions as an insistent reminder 
19. For the analysis of writing see supra. pp. 153-158. 
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of a different attitude to language. During the Nightlessons 
she regards the twins' struggles as an irrelevance. While the 
"jemmijohns" will cudgel each other, she will not give a damn 
("her tootpettypout of jemenfichue 11 ) because she has had an 
opportunity of studying 11 gramma's grammGC" 11 (268.07/17). Gramma's 
grammar insists on the dialogic basis to language and draws 
attention to the consequent reflexivity of both language and 
desire which makes of "mind your genderous 11 an appropriate 
warning to anyone who attempts to speak (268.17/29). It is the 
lack of the knowledge of grandma's grammar which leaves the twins 
obsessed with the independent Cartesian ego - Kev wallowing in it 
and Dolph/Jerry attempting to write his way out of it (304.31). 
Grandma's grammar serves as the term to distinguish a language 
in which the experience of loss and absence is not determined by 
the reaction to sexual difference; a relation to that experience 
of absence and loss which finds no unification in the symbol of 
the phallus. In an attempt to indicate what such a language and 
such an experience might be we must make one further brief reflec-
tion on the process of insertion into the world of the symbolic 
and of language. This reflection, however, must remain even more 
tentative than heretofore because with Grandma's grammar we 
approach that area which psycho-analysis has yet to theorise at 
all adequately. Freud, at the end of his life, was forced to 
recognise this inadequacy when he asked the famous question "What 
does a woman want?". Here Joyce's practice remains in excess of 
any theoretical development. Here Joyce is still writing in our 
20 future. 
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I have attempted to explain how it is a submission to a 
central lack in being, a gap in the letter, that is the condition 
of the existence of desire and language. While in an original 
moment an identity of being is presumed, the correlation of 
alternative states of being with certain sounds entails the 
recognition of a set of differences which, from the undifferen-
tiated world of being, pluck an object. The object is immediately 
already a possible absence, a lack in being, and its correlation 
with any given word depends on a set of diacritical relationships 
rather than on some divinely ordered one to one correspondence. 
The indeterminacy of these diacritical relationships is what 
ensures that already in the moment it is discovered, the letter 
has a gap in it. This process of separation which constitutes 
world and word in the same movement is constant throughout the 
small childts life but it is thepiallus which takes up 
metaphorically all these previous separations and thus becomes the 
privileged signifier - the key term around which all differential 
oppositions function. It is thus in terms of certain relations 
20. Julia Kristeva's distinction between the semiotic (an 
ordered rhytllilJmic use of sound without any crucial determination) 
and the symbolic (the achieved use of language) which is advanced 
in section A.1. of La R~volution du Langage Po~tique could well 
be elaborated in terms of the writing of Finnegans Wake. To do 
this, however, would require a detailed phonemic study of / 
Finnegans Wake of the sort that Kristeva applies to Mallarme in 
section B.1. of the same work. 
I' I 
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to the phallus that we can understand the terms of the entry of 
the subject into language and desire. 
The central role of the phallus is not simply determined 
by anatomical difference but by the way that the child understands 
it to be taken up in the mother's own desire, as the mark of her 
own submission to the world of difference and language. It is 
thus the maternal grandfather who is the determining term for 
the child's access to the symbolic. However, behind the mother's 
relation to the maternal grandfather, there rests her attachment 
to her own mother - the maternal grandmother. It is in the 
availability of the relation to the maternal grandmother that we 
might try and sketch the outlines of the central differences 
between the formation of the male and female unconscious. These 
difference~which find no explanation within psycho-analytic 
theory are, I believe, essential to any explanation of the 
language of Finnegans Wake which affords to the text the 
importance it deserves. 
Joyce indicates that 11 gramma's grammar 11 is available to 
girls but not to boys. This asymmetry can be explicated in 
psycho-analytical terms by the fact that before the little girl 
can take up her symmetrical Oedipal relations with her father, 
she must separate herself from her mother. In one of his last 
attempts to deal with this problem, the essay entitled "On 
Female Sexuality", Freud wrote of this first relation to the 
mother in the following despairing terms: 
r1 
,, 
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"Everything in the sphere of this first 
attaclunent to the mother seemed so 
difficult to grasp in analysis - so grey 
with age and shadowy and almost impossible 
to revivify - that it was as if it had 
succumbed to an especially inexorable 
• II repression. 21 
Some reflection on this first attaclunent and separation should 
convince us that it is impossible for the phallus to take up 
previous separations for the little girl in the same way that 
it does for the little boy. 
For in the separation from the mother the small boy under-
goes a fundamental wound to his narcissism which ensures an 
access to language but also a defence against the recognition 
of the wound that ensures the access is constantly obscured. The 
little girl's separation from the mother receives no such single 
determination. While the recognition of sexual difference must 
eventually function as the recognition of a possible loss, the 
little girl's first reaction is Issy's patronising "Funny spot 
t o have a_ fingeyZ _" (144.35). It is only after the little girl 
has taken up a position as inferior that the phallus can come to 
take up the central position. What is important to notice is that 
insofar as the little girl's first identification proves correct, 
her narcissism is fundamentally different from the male's. Shaun's 
narcissism is always a defence involving aggression. Issy, like 
Alice, just looks in the mirror. But insofar as this fundamental 
narcissism is not challenged so the girl's grasp of language is 
21. Sigmund Freud. The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works. vol.21. p.226. 
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not so sure - for there is no one term which takes up and 
stabilises the separations. One might ask what kind of discourse 
this organisation would produce and the answer might well be 
Finnegans Wake. Or, rather, it is the impact of this discourse 
on the phallocentric male discourse which produces Finnegans Wake. 
If we lack the necessary theoretical concepts in order to 
develop this relation fully, we can say that in the Wake the female 
is she who exceeds the limits imposed on her by the male, and, in 
that excess, reveals those limits as limits. The daughter holds 
the last promise for the father of finding a being who will 
believe in him as source of his own desire, "what wouldn't you 
give to have a girl!" (620.26/7). But he is doomed to fail again 
for the mother spells out "my yearns to her" (620.36) and he is 
revealed again. Into the oppositions male and female, fixity 
and movement Finnegans Wake introduces writing: movement in 
fixity, fixity in movement, an ineradicable bisexuality, a 
constant process, 11 The Seim anew" ( 215. 23) 
This acceptance of movement and process coupled with the 
awareness of identity as a constant effect of the passage of 
language has profound political implications for a society based 
on a notion of the individual as an independent and self 
sufficient entity. It is only through the acceptance of the 
most reductive account of the relation between politics and 
literature that Joyce's texts can be dismissed as non-political. 
Traditionally we are accustomed to understand questions of the 
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political nature of literature in terms of the specific 
political positions that are espoused or rejected within a work. 
But Joyce 1 s writing renders such a criterion obsolete. Given the 
refusal of any hierarchy of discourses within a text, the 
political discourses which appear do so without any of those 
determinations which enable the reader to correlate them as true 
or false against a given reality. Of course, the temptation may 
be to read them within the framework of classical irony and 
presume that we arem:erely being shown the emptiness of all politics 
but such a strategy of reading would have to supply a meta-
discourse which Joyce•s tests resolutely refuse. A refusal I 
have demonstrated in my analyses of "Ivy Day in the Committee 
Room" and the Cyclops sequence. 
Rather than engaging in the direct espousal of political 
positions, Joyce•s work poses new questions about the relation 
between reader and text in ways that I have attempted to 
explicate. What remains to be discussed is the politics of this 
relation and the consequences of a practice of writing which 
subverts traditional political discourse. I have suggested that 
the crucial difference in the reader's position confronted by 
Joyce•s texts is that instead of a set of discourses so organised 
that the reader can take himself in some imaginary unity, the 
reader finds a disruption of his own position such that his 
unity is transformed into a set of contradictory discourses; an 
investigation of his own symbolic construction. What is lost 
here is the full Cartesian subject and this loss is a political 
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event of the most central importance. For with the loss of this 
punctual subject one ceases to have discrete areas in which the 
punctual subject can find a position. Instead one is confronted 
with a set of overlapping and contradictory activities which 
produce the subject in his contradictions. But with this 
conception of the subject, a separate political discourse tied 
to a separate political party becomes an impossibility. I would 
argue that Joyce's texts are revolutionary texts in the sense that 
they are committed to the overthrow of the possibility of con-
temporary (both his and still ours) political discourse but I 
would further argue that they are, in one important sense, 
profoundly ineffective revolutionary texts. 
To understand this contradiction it is necessary to return 
to the earlier definition I gave of a literary revolution. I 
argued that a literary revolution was one in which a number of 
specific poetic changes combined with an ideological contradiction 
to produce a radical break in the forms of fiction. 22 It is now 
time to begin to expand this definition. Joyce's texts produce 
a multitude of breaks with previous literary forms and I have 
demonstrated that these breaks can all be articulated in terms of 
the allocation of contradictory positions to the reading subject. 
Centrally I have already discussed how Joyce's texts are devoted 
to producing a separation between signifier and signified and thus 
to de-constructing the transparence of signification which allows 
22. see supra. pp. 54-56. 
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the imaginary production of a full subject. 23 But insofar as 
I 
! ' 
I 
one merely makes a formal claim for separation it would seem ,, ' 
' i 
I 
that an ideal text would be a simple collocation of letters. 
I have, however, argued against such an abstract formalism and 
I have suggested, in this chapter, that it is through a 
consideration of the lapse that we can understand the necessity 
for the text to provide enough unity for the separation to be 
effective as process. For insofar as the text remains simply 
unreducible to any activity of the subject it can be experienced 
only as boredom, it is the extent to which it subverts expectations 
within an activity that the text submits the reader to the 
experience of separation. It is in terms of the relation between 
unity and separation that we can begin to discuss the primary 
ideological contradiction which I claim is a component of a 
literary revolution. For it is certain that such a component 
cannot simply be the insertion of "correct" political views for 
we have already seen that Joyce conducts an investigation of 
discourse such that no one position within the text could 
determine the text in which it appears. But through a considera-
tion of unity and separation we can provide an analysis of the 
political determination of a text and thus begin to consider why 
although Joyce's writing has profound political implications, 
there is no attempt to link these effects to any direct political 
situation. The question can be phrased as "Why is there no 
articulation of the politics of Joyce•s texts at the political 
level? 11 • 
23. see supra pp. 145-152. 
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It is Brecht, the greatest theorist of literary 
revolution that this century has yet produced, to whom we must 
return in order to understand the politics of separation within 
a text. Brecht•s~or an epic theatre were above all calls 
to break the unity that works of art conferred upon the spectator 
and to transform the passive consumption of meanings into the 
active appropriation of knowledge. 24 Rather than a text compact 
with its own meaning, a text which confers a unity and gives a 
position to the subject, Brecht demands a text whose fissures 
and differences constantly force an activity of articulation on 
the subject - an articulation which in its constant changes and 
contradictions makes known, demonstrates, the contradictions of 
the reader's position both as reader and, in consequence, as agent 
in the world. But in order to achieve this work of separation 
(the work that Finnegans Wake constantly forces on us) it is 
necessary to begin where there is an identity. If we think back 
on those constitutive moments which produce us as sexed human 
beings then we can recognise a regularity whereby each psychic 
stage is the transformation of an identity - with the breast, the 
faeces, the phallus - into a separation. What is remarkable about 
each of these transformations is that they involve also the fall 
from pleasure into desire and from belief into knowledge. For 
insofar as there is unity and identity the subject is a founding 
24. see supra p. 145 and . p. 152. See also the whole of "The 
Modern Theatre is the Epic Theatre" Brecht on Theatre pp.33-42. 
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source, secure in its own self-sufficiency. The creation of an 
object defined through its differences changes all this. For it 
creates both the possibility of knowledge (the studying of sets 
of differences which find their determination independently of 
their relation to the subject) and the possibility of desire 
because the object (in the very fact of its recognition) becomes 
a possible absence. It is this possibility of absence that 
banishes forever the chance of total satisfaction because there 
can be no total enjoyment of an object. Consciousness, however, 
is, in some sense irrevocably bound up with a world of belief 
in which subject and object merge in an undifferentiated presence. 
Insofar as the object exists for consciousness it has been plucked 
forth from the undifferentiated mass of existence; it is defined 
through a set of differences. But in its concern to maintain 
life consciousness must studiously ignore this set of differences 
which must be there for the object to appear at all. It was in 
relation to this problem that Freud first located the existence 
of an unconscious when he recognised that the defining chain of 
differences constantly threate~ to break and disrupt the 
necessarily homogenous world of consciousness. Caught in the 
homogenous state of consciousness, the object finds itself 
trapped in a unity of belief - conferred an identity. In order 
for knowledge to occur, there must be separation so that an 
identity can be broken down in its constitutive relationships. 
On the one hand we find identity and the~e we discover pleasure 
and belief and, on the other, we can produce separation and there 
we will find desire and knowledge. 
I 
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The political question can now be grasped as the problem 
of locating an identity which must be separated out so that it 
can be ~ppropriated as knowledge. The concept which enables us 
to resolve this question is the central concept of epic theatre -
the gest. Benjamin, writing of epic theatre, defined the gest 
in terms of interruption - the freezing of a moment so that 
instead of an imaginary vision of obviousness we are forced to 
examine a set of relationships: 
11 The damning of the stream of real life, the 
moment when its flow comes to a standstill, 
makes itself felt as rEtlux: this reflux is 
astonishment ••• But if the stream of things 
breaks against this rock of astonishment, then 
there is no difference between a human life 
and a word. In epic theatre both are only the 
crest of the wave. Epic theatre makes life 
spurt up high from the bed of time and, for an 
instant, hover irridescent in empty space. Then 
it puts it back to bed. 11 25 
Benjamin's characterization of a word and a human life as 
the same for epic theatre serves to emphasize that epic theatre 
breaks with that identity given to a life in the course of the 
flow of experience, or a word in the flow of speech, in order to 
make clear that their identity can only be defined through a set 
of differences - the relationships that define them. The gest, 
then, is a set of relationships revealed by an interruption and 
one can see how usefully this concept could be used to characterize 
Joyce's work where it is constantly a question of interruptions 
which reveal a set of relationships (one could use the gest to 
25. Walter Benjamin. Understanding Brecht p.13. 
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define the structure of Dubliners). But in order for astonishment 
to be generated it is necessary that an obvious identity must 
subsume the relationships which are revealed by the interruption. 
In other words it is when the world of pleasure and belief is 
interrupted that we set up desire and knowledge but it is 
necessary to start there where there is an identity in order to 
achieve the necessary separation. 
We can now understand that the problem of the ideological 
level of contradiction within a text is not in terms of whether 
the text 'contains' the correct political line as part of its 
content but whether it aims at a specific identity or identities 
which its procedures and practices then transform into a set of 
relationships. The question thus becomes one of determining a 
specific audience for which certain identities can be asserted 
and then deconstructed. The political question to be posed in 
relation to Joyce's text is whether the multitude of breaks within 
the text find a determination in terms of a particular audience 
and thus a particular political situation. 
When we phrase the question in this fashion it becomes 
clear that Joyce's texts are so politically ineffective because 
they lack any definite notion of an audience to which they are 
addressed. Joyce's disappointment at the reaction to Ulysses 
and Finnegans Wake reveals a radical failure to differentiate 
amongst his readers in such a way that his texts could become 
effective. The inevitable result of this weakness is a certain 
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homogenisation of the audience such that Joyce can appear to be 
addressing some immutable human nature and this appearance is 
strengthened by the use of such theorists as Vico. It is 
important to stress that the practice of Joyce's writing moves 
beyond any immutable individual human nature to investigate the 
very processes of that nature's variable construction but the 
inability to specify an audience means that in order to j 319; 
experience this investigation it is necessary to draw on the 
endless efforts of the Joyce scholars. In order to place ourselves 
in the position from which the process of separation in Finnegans 
Wake can be experienced, it is necessary to have a commitment to 
Joyce. Joyce 1 s only audience become Joyce scholars. 
The reasons for Joyce's failure at this level are not of 
a personal nature but are to do with the political situations 
in which he found himself. The simple reduction of Joyce's 
interest in politics to a traditional model of the egocentric 
artist has had seriously deleterious effects. It has deflected 
attention from the fact that in pre-war Dublin and Trieste, Joyce 
was privileged to involve himself in debates which seemed of 
little interest at the time and yet which were to have momentous 
political effects not just in Ireland and Italy but throughout 
the world. In the first twenty years of the twentieth century 
the three great political themes of the nineteenth century -
democracy, socialism and nationalism - were altered, negated and 
combined to produce the three new political movements of the 
twentieth century: anti-colonialism, Communism and Fascism. After 
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the fall of Parnell, Ireland witnessed a general disenchantment 
with parliamentary politics which made the Dublin of Joyce 1 s 
youth the breeding ground for the Easter Rising and one of the 
twentieth century's first anti-colonial struggles. 26 The 
Trieste in which he argued against the Irredentists became, five 
years after he left it, the first Fascist city in Europe. 27 Two 
out of the way cities of Europe gave Joyce access to the mainstream 
of two of the three political movements. which have so dominated 
the twentieth century. 
The major component, however, in both the embryonic 
movements in whose gestation Joyce participated was nationalism 
and it is nationalism that dominates both the political writings 
of the pre-First World War days and the political concerns of the 
later texts. In the political comments that punctuate the long 
letters to Stanislaus, in the lectures he gave in Trieste, in the 
political articles he contributed to Il Piccolo della Sera, it is 
the problems of Irish nationalism which were the constant focus 
of Joyce's thought about Ireland and politics. And, for Joyce, 
the one central problem of Irish nationalism was that while 
Irish claims to independence were fully justified, the political 
manifestations of nationalism were profoundly reactionary. In 
particular he found the nationalist movement's subservience to 
the Catholic Church an index of its futility for, as he told the 
26. see F.S.L. Lyons. Ireland Since the Famine.pp.202-260. 
27. "During the first half of 1920 the new fascist movement re-
mained a circumscribed phenomenon of little importance. The only 
Italian city it succeeded in penetrating was Trieste, whose atmos-
phere was in many ways exceptional: the closeness of Fiume, the 
military administration to which the city was subjected, and above 
all the existence of a state of chronic tension between the Slav 
and Italian populations, which had been greatly aggravated by the 
end of Austrian rule, made Trieste a good breeding-ground for an 
intensely nationalistic movement such as fascism." Giuliano 
Procacci. History of the Italian People.pp.415-416. 
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inhabitants of Trieste: 
II I confess that I do not see what good it 
does to fulminate against the English tyranny 
while the Roman tyranny occupies the palace of 
the soul." 28 
Joyce's commitment to socialism was largely determined by 
his conviction that it was only socialism that would rid Ireland 
of both England and Rome. Catholicism was the paralysis of 
Ireland and this paralysis found its focus in the institution of 
marriage with its inbuilt hypocrisy about sexuality. Sinn Fein's 
campaign against the "venereal excess" of the English reduced 
him to paroxyms of rage: 
II I 9 m nauseated by their lying drive 1 about pure 
men and pure women and spiritual love and love for 
ever: blatant lying in face of the truth. I don't 
know very much about the 'saince' of the subject 
but I presume there are very few mortals in Europe 
who are not in danger of waki-ng some morning and 
finding themselves syphilitic. 11 29 
When he heard that Gogarty had married he wrote to Stanislaus: 
"You have often shown opposition to my socialistic 
tendencies. But can you not see plainly from facts 
like these that a deferment. of the emancipation of 
the proletariat, a reaction to clericalism or 
28. James Joyce art. cit. The Critical Writings of James Joyce. 
ed. Ellsworth Mason and Richard Ellmann. p.173. 
29. James Joyce. Letter to Stanislaus Joyce. 13 November 1906. 
Letters vol.2. p.191-192. 
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aristocracy or bourgeoisism would mean a 
revulsion to tyrannies of all kinds. 
Gogarty would jump into the Liffey to save 
a man's life but he seems to have little 
hesitation in condemning generatbns to 
servitude .•. For my part I believe that to 
establish the church in full power again in O Europe would mean a renewal of the Inquisition ..• 11 3 
Socialism was the only possible defence against the servitude of 
belief and earlier he had written to Stanislaus in much the 
same terms: 
"It is a mistake for you to imagine that my 
political opinions are those of a universal 
lover: but they are those of a socialistic 
artist. I cannot tell you how strange I feel 
sometimes in my attempt to live a more 
civilised life than my contemporaries. But 
why should I have brought Nora to a priest or 
a lawyer to make her swear away her life to me? 
And why should I superimpose on my child the 
very troublesome burden of belief which my 
father and mother superimposed on me? 11 31 
But if Joyce saw clearly at this time that the only way 
forward for Ireland was a union of the social and national 
struggles, he did not understand how this union was to be brought 
about. A convinced anti-parliamentarian, Joyce saw some 
possibility of advance in Arthur Griffith's Sinn Fein movement 
which in an article on Fenianism he identified as the true 
successors of the 'physical force' tradition in Irish politics. 32 
30. James Joyce. Letter to Stanislaus Joyce. About 12 August 1906. 
Letters vol.2. p.148. 
31. James Joyce. Letter to Stanislaus Joyce. 
Letters vol.2. p.89. 
2 or 3 May 1905. 
32. The Critical Writings of James Joyce.ed.Ellsworth Mason and 
Richard Ellmann. p.191. Earlier in the same article Joyce agreed 
with the "physical force" party that "any concessions that have 
been granted to Ireland, England has granted unwillingly, and, as 
it is usually put, at the point of a bayonet. 11 p. JfB. 
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But he despaired of the racialism that was prevalent in the 
paper and which was fostered in particular by some articles of 
Gogarty which condemned the English for their sexual habits. 
Joyce wrote to Stanislaus: 
"What I object to most of all in his (Griffith's) 
paper is that it is educating the people of Ireland 
on the old pap of racial hatred whereas anyone can 
see that if the Irish question exists, it exists for 
the Irish proletariat chiefly. I have expressed 
myself badly, I fear, but perhaps you will be able 
to get at what I mean. 11 33 
Joyce's difficulty of expression was not fortuitous but rather 
bore witness to the real political problem of winning the 
progressive side of nationalism away from that part that was tied 
to a reactionary Catholicism. That Joyce could see no solution 
to this problem reflects no discredit on him for it was the 
problem that was to dog the Irish nationalist movement up to 
independence and beyond. F.S.L. Lyons sums up this dual aspect 
of the Irish situation in the following terms: 
"In their continuing reliance upon the efficient 
functioning of a more or less benevolent government, 
in their reluctance to innovate in either industry 
or agriculture, in their attachment to their 
religion, and in their unchanging moral and social 
attitudes, the Irish presented to the twentieth 
century world the strange and paradoxical spectacle 
of a people who, having pursued with immense tenacity 
and a great measure of success the goal of independence, 
were content to rear upon the foundations of that 
independence one of the most conservative states in 
E II urope. 34 
33. James Joyce. Letter to Stanislaus Joyce. 25 September 1906. 
vol.2. p.167. 
34. F.S.L. Lyons. op.cit. p.103. 
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If the union of Connolly and Pearse in the Easter Rising 
constituted the one real moment when the social and national 
struggle became one, it was a union which was to fall apart with 
the deaths of the two leaders. The social content of the 
proclamation of the independence read out on the steps of the 
Post Office has been described by the leading historian of modern 
Ireland as "the brightest hope for the future 11 , but also as "the 
seed of the deepest disillusionment 11 • 35 For if the alliance 
between Connolly 1 s Irish Citizen Army and Pearse's Irish 
Republican Brotherhood achieved in practice that union which 
Joyce ten years earlier had recognised as essential, there was no 
theoretical basis which would sustain the alliance through the 
years that followed. After Connolly the labour movement refused 
to participate in the nationalist struggles and thus condemned 
themselves to the sidelines. 36 This failure left the political 
field open to that nationalist ideology most wedded to the 
Catholic Church. The extent of Catholic dominance in the state 
that finally emerged after 1922 is perhaps common knowledge but 
in brief one could recall that the Irish constitution claims to 
derive its power from God37 and that in 1939 the Irish Labour 
Party, because of objections raised by the Irish hierarchy, 
removed from its constitution the demand for a Worker's Republic, 
a demand that had been inserted three years previously. 38 
35. ibid. p.371. 
36. ibid. pp.524-525. 
37. see Tom Nairn 11 Ireland11 Bananas. Early Summer 1975. p.28. 
38. F.S.L. Lyons. op.cit. p.525. 
258 
Finnegans Wake, in its political aspect, can be judged 
as the aesthetic counterpart to the Easter Rising. And, in this 
respect, Finnegans Wake merely emphasises the political tendencies 
of the earlier works. If Connolly underestimated the reactionary 
nature of nationalist ideology and the Catholic Church, Joyce had 
come to see them as the major enemies. Any discourse which held 
out the promise of an identity and belief had to be resolutely 
undermined so that language could speak through the ego, so that 
the female could speak through the male. Finally taken to its 
limit this entailed the systematic deconstruction of the national 
and mother tongue so that grandma's grammar could finally delineate 
the limits of our being. But in this activity Joyce left behind 
the objective audience in Ireland who would have given his texts 
the specific political determinant of attempting to drive a wedge 
between the ambitions of the national revolution and the reality 
of Catholicism. Rather than starting from an audience which his 
texts could then subvert, rather than his texts figuring a social 
identity which could then be "shocked" into a set of relationships, 
Joyce's texts were addressed more and more to an audience of his 
own imagination. The subjective drive to destroy the p~~lity 
of identity and belief, the desire to ~e.s::81:l--l~l~yy undermine~any 
dominant discourse became the determining political feature of 
his work. Lenin defined this over-estimating of the subjective 
factor in politics as leftism and Eisenstein can thus be seen to 
be making an acute political judgement from his Leninist position 
when he declared that in art Joyce was a "leftist 11 • 39 
39. S. Eisenstein. The Film Form. p.185. 
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 
This bibliography is divided into four parts. In the 
first three sections my purpose has been to list all the works 
mentioned in the dissertation together with works that were of 
importance in the writing of the dissertation but which escaped 
mention in the text. Neither of the first two sections are 
meant to be exhaustive. Thus the first section which deals with 
JoyceYs own writing gives details of the first version of "The 
Sisters" and the first published version of the Cyclops section 
because they are mentioned in the main body of the text, but there 
is no attempt to cover the immense range of Joyce's publications 
in magazines. All such details can be found in Slocum, John J., 
and Herbert Cahoon, A Bibliography of James Joyce 1882-1941, 
London 1953. The second section which deals with secondary 
material on Joyce is necessarily very selective. Full details of 
Joyce studies up to 1961 can be found in Deming, Robert H., 
A Bibliography of James Joyce Studies, Kansas 1964. These original 
bibliographical studies can be supplemented by the bibliographies 
in the PMLA and the additional details published in the James 
Joyce Quarterly. The third section deals with other material 
used in the dissertation and is, in consequence, extremely 
disparate. There seemed little point, however, in introducing 
further distinctions within this material. 
The final section is devoted to works by and about the 
French psycho-analyst Jacques Lacan. Insofar as Lacan 1 s work is 
inscribed within the huge field of psycho-analysis, I have limited 
myself, in listing the secondary material, to texts which are 
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explicitly devoted to exposition or criticism of Lacan and I ii 
have not attempted to produce a bibliography of work which makes 
use of Lacanian concepts. Despite this limitation, this fourth 
section constitutes, to my knowledge, the most thorough bibliography 
of Lacan and works devoted to Lacan. 
i I 
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Section 4. The Writings of Jacques Lacan and commentaries on those 
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translated with notes and commentary by Anthony Widden. Baltimore, 
1968. All items which have been taken unchecked from these 
bibliographies are marked respectively (R) or (W). 
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Congr>es de Rome. La Psychanalyse,1(1956), pp.202-255. 
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delivered to the 11 Magistero 11 of Rome University 15 December, 1967. 
Scilicet no.1. 1968 pp.42-50. 
"De la psychanalyse dans ses rapports avec la r~alit~ 11 Paper 
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These comments of Lacan were stimulated by the response to his 
Propositions of the 9th October 1967. They were printed without 
a title but referred to in the way indicated. Scilicet no.2/3 
1970. PP. 9-29. 
11 Adresse du jury d 1 accueil a l'assemblee avant son vote (le 25 
janvier 1969.) Scilicet no.2/3. 1970. pp.49-51. 
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quatre concepts fondamentaux de la 
As well as the text of the seminar of 
includes a "Postface" dated lst January 
19 7 3 • pp· 5- 5 2 • 
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Seminar of January-February, 1957: 11 La Relation d 1objet et les 
structures freudiennes, 11 BP,X/12 (May, 1957), pp.742-43. 
Seminar of March-April, 1957: 11 La Relation dlobjet et les structures 
freudiennes, 11 BP, X/14 (June, 1957), pp.851-54. 
Seminar of May-July, 1957: 11 La Relation d'objet et les structures 
freudiennes, 11 BP, XI/1 (September, 1957), pp.31-34. 
Seminar of November, 1957: "Les Formations de 1 1 inconscient," BP, 
XI/4-5 (January, 1958), pp.293-96. 
Seminar of December, 1957-March, 1958: 11 Les Formations de 
l'inconscient," BP, XII/2-3 (November, 1958), pp.182-92. 
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interpr~tation," ..!!f, XIII/5 (January, 1960), pp.263-72. 
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Perversions 2 Ps~chodynamics and Therapy (ed. M. Balint) New York, 
1956. pp.265-27 . 
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